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Essays in Information Transmission and Institution Design  
 
Qingqing Cheng, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2017 
 
This thesis consists of three essays in information transmission and institution design. Chapter 1 
constructs a model of information transmission. The model was set up with an informed sender 
and two uninformed receivers, where the sender wants to convince the receivers to take a certain 
action. We analyze strategic information transmission model with two parameters, one is 
different levels of persuasive function of the channels; another is different degrees of connection 
between the receivers. We show that if persuasive function is a linear or convex function, the 
sender should invests all expenditure to one channel with higher level of persuasive function and 
higher degree of information transmission of the receiver; while if persuasive function is a 
concave function, three possible optimal behaviours of the sender are investing to one channel, 
both channels equally, or both channels unequally. Given two concave function examples, we 
show some decision rules for the sender’s optimal expenditure allocation. Specifically, we show 
that it is not always to allocate expenditure in both channels equally in symmetric model; it is 
always to invest all expenditure to only one channel when another channel has very low level of 
persuasive function, or very low degree of connection between the receivers, and it is always to 
increase expenditure in one channel when the degree of information transmission of the 
corresponding receiver increases in asymmetric model.  
    Chapter 2 studies two scenarios in a formal analysis of scientists’ effort provision in 
 iv 
research and dissemination. One is a simultaneous problem that the sender offers effort to send 
signal to two types of audiences, such as experts and public; another is a sequential problem that 
the sender offers effort in academic research, and then sends signal to one type of audiences to 
representation with effort in science popularization. We investigate how the scientist should 
divide their time or energy between academic research and science popularization to obtain 
maximum utility. Consider the same probability and different probability functions at two 
dimensional for each scenario. We show the optimal allocation of effort depends on the weight of 
payoff from academic research and science popularization, and the difference in two probability 
functions between two signals, or between signal and representation. Specifically, in scenario 
one, if there exist polarization in academic research and science popularization, we could prevent 
polarization by increasing the ratio of the weights of payoff from dissemination and research 
using incentives to guarantee the scientist keep the allocation of effort as before. In scenario two, 
the result shows that we should put equal effort on research and dissemination for scientific 
achievements transformation no matter how difference in two probability functions between 
signal and representation. 
    Chapter 3 constructs a simple model of direct democracy with supermajority rule and 
different preference intensities for two sides of a referendum: reform versus status quo. Two 
parties spend money and effort to mobilize their voters. We characterize the set of pure strategy 
Nash equilibria. We investigate the optimal majority rule that maximizes voters’ welfare. Using 
an example, we show that if the preference intensity of the status quo side is relatively high, the 
higher preference intensity of the status quo side, the higher the optimal majority rule. While, if 
the preference intensity of status quo side is relatively low, the optimal majority rule decreases if 
the preference intensity of the status quo side increases. We also show that when the preference 
intensity of the status quo side is higher, or the easiness to mobilize voters on the status quo side 
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Strategic Information Transmission in Random 
Networks: Theory and Applications 
 
-Abstract- 
     
This paper constructs a model of information transmission. The model was set up with an 
informed sender and two uninformed receivers, where the sender wants to convince the receivers 
to take a certain action. We analyze strategic information transmission model with two 
parameters, one is different levels of persuasive function of the channels; another is different 
degrees of connection between the receivers. We show that if persuasive function is a linear or 
convex function, the sender should invests all expenditure to one channel with higher level of 
persuasive function and higher degree of information transmission of the receiver; while if 
persuasive function is a concave function, three possible optimal behaviours of the sender are 
investing to one channel, both channels equally, or both channels unequally. Given two concave 
function examples, we show some decision rules for the sender’s optimal expenditure allocation. 
Specifically, we show that it is not always to allocate expenditure in both channels equally in 
symmetric model; it is always to invest all expenditure to only one channel when another 
channel has very low level of persuasive function, or very low degree of connection between the 
receivers, and it is always to increase expenditure in one channel when the degree of information 
transmission of the corresponding receiver increases in asymmetric model.  




    Information transmission plays an important role in economic and social life. At the same 
time, there are some important issues that have to be attention for the decision maker in 
information transmission, such as the choice of media, the selection of the channels or programs 
and so on. For launching a new product or service in the market, the most important is to choose 
the right channels to disseminate the information of new product for manufacturers in order to 
draw customer’s attention and win customers’ trust and favor. For scientific research, it is not 
only necessary for scientists to timely access to the results of others research, but also in time to 
publish their own research results across the right channels to gain more attention and responses. 
In addition, it is significant for politicians to spend effort on the following question: how to 
promote their claims better in the selection of the channels to obtain higher approval rating.  
This paper regards information transmission as sender-receiver games. We investigate the 
optimal allocation of expenditure on media channels to make the sender to obtain a maximum 
persuasion power. 
Take a presidential election as an example, lots of campaign advertising designed by 
political consultants influence political debate and voters through the media, which would be 
sent to larger groups of voters with some effort or expense. The reason is that the images and 
emotions evoked by campaign advertising could sway voters, which plays a key role in 
information transmission. This paper believes that a candidate risks missing the persuadable 
voters he needs to win an election if he spends money on the wrong network. How to choose 
targets wisely become important for political parties and candidates. 
For the choice of media, as can be seen from Table 1.1 and Table 1.2, the total amount of 
campaign advertising spending is gradually increasing with the years, and the percent share of 
total political advertisement putting are gradually changing quietly. Specifically, political 
advertisers treat the Internet as a novelty. In 2008, digital advertising accounted for $22 million, 
which was about 0.4 percent of the $6.2 billion; while, digital accounted for $1,000 million,  
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 Table 1.1: Total Political Spend ($million)  
 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016E  
Broadcast $4,320 $4,122 $5,640 $4,596 $6,055  
Cable TV $468 $493 $939 $719 $1,102  
Radio $553 $464 $819 $485 $827  
Print $644 $715 $874 $787 $848  
OOH $247 $573 $377 $635 $365  
Digital $22 $14 $159 $271 $1,000  
Total $6,254 $6,381 $8,809 $7,494 $10,197  
 
 Table 1.2: Percent Share 
 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016E 
Broadcast 69% 64.6% 64% 61.3% 59.4% 
Cable TV 7.5% 7.7% 10.7% 9.6% 10.8% 
Radio 8.8% 7.3% 9.3% 6.5% 8.1% 
Print 10.3% 11.2% 9.9% 10.5% 8.3% 
OOH 3.9% 9.0% 4.3% 8.5% 3.6% 
Digital 0.4% 0.2% 1.8% 3.6% 9.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Borrell and Associates, Kantar/CMAG, Numura estmates 
 
which was about 10 percent of the $10.1 billion in 2016. It can be seen that digital is starting to 
eat into traditional media’s share. Nomura says that the most of the spending that is moving to 
digital is going to end up with Alphabet Company and Facebook Company, which will get 
around $400 million and $350 million in political ads, respectively. Thus it seems very important 
and necessary to evaluate the effect of advertising expenditure in media. 
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Table 1.3: Top Recipients of Obama Campaign Online Media Spending in 2008 
Media Company Google Yahoo Centro Advertising.com Facebook CNN.com … 
Estimated Amount Paid $7,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,300,000 $947,000 $643,000 $461,000 … 
 
Consider U.S. President Barack Obama campaign advertising strategy in 2008, Obama’s 
presidential campaign was regarded as a classic of integrated marketing communications in new 
era, because he combined with video website, search engine advertising and other online 
methods to set up the relationship with voters by in-depth and interactive approach. He was 
ultimately successful in obtaining support and trust of the voters, and became the first black 
president of the United States.  
ClickZ, the U.S. market research firm, released a statistical report in November 2008. The 
total cost of online advertising for the President-elect of the United States, Barack Obama, was 
over $16 million in 2008. From Table 1.3, it can be seen that the most of these funds went to 
Google, Yahoo and Facebook. Also, in October, the Obama campaign put a length of 30 minutes 
of campaign advertising in major commercial television stations, and the cost was $4 million. 
This shows that his precise campaign ads achieved good promotional effect. Precision is the 
direction of future development of advertising, which requires us to further improve the 
advertising algorithms, and to fractionize the market. 
For the selection of channel or program, hundreds of channels vying for viewer attention, 
Figure 1.1 shows top cable networks for political Ads on the 2014 U.S. midterm elections in the 
television market. We already knew who campaigns are targeting and how they’re trying to 
influence voters. Echelon Insights, a research and analytics firm, used cable TV data to produce 
the figure of political Ads allocation, which totally analyzed more than 2.6 billion TV spots. 
Obviously, the number of spots that Republicans bought is larger difference among top cable 
networks; while the number of spots that Democrats bought is almost equally among top cable 
networks. In addition, Fox News is the most popular channel with political ad buyers, on which  
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Figure 1.1: Top Cable Networks for Political Ads 
 
Republicans alone bought more than 43,000 spots. Republicans also bought more than 10,000 
spots on ESPN, HGTV and A&E. For Democrats, they bought almost 23,000 spots on CNN, 
which is more than twice the number of Republican ads. Democrats also purchased more than 
10,000 spots on ESPN, HGTV, USA, TNT, and MSNBC. 
In Networks, large numbers of media and hundreds of channels, it is important for 
candidates to put more effort on the questions that how to choose suitable media to transit 
information, and how to optimally allocate expenditure to different TV channels, different 
newspapers or different websites, and maximize the persuadable voters one needs to win an 
election. Invest equally, or selectively? Thus it is necessary for us to study strategy information 
transmission in random networks to enhance utility and value of information. 
What we mainly focus on this paper is the optimal allocation of the sender’s advertising 
expenditure on media channels in order to obtain a maximum persuasion power. In addition, 
what factors affect the sender’s maximum persuasion power, and how? Specifically, we discuss 
different levels of persuasive function of the channels and different degrees of connection 
43,755 
9,072 17,532 14,496 9,171 9,415 3,014 11,063 
7,571 








Fox News CNN ESPN HGTV USA TNT MSNBC A&E Republican Democratic 
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between the receivers. The purpose of this paper is to work out some decision rules for the 
optimal expenditure allocation under some special examples.  
Our strategic information transmission model based on Shannon and Weaver model (1949), 
which is the best-known example of the “informational” approach to communication consisting 
of six elements: an information source, a transmitter, a channel, physical noise, a receiver, and a 
destination. In Shannon and Weaver Model, a speaker and a listener would be the source and the 
destination rather than the transmitter and the receiver. This paper proposes that the participants 
in the model are commonly humanized as the sender and the receiver. We introduce an 
information transmission model with participants as the sender and the receiver. 
This paper focuses on a reduced-form approach to an information transmission model, 
which is constructed with one informed sender and two uninformed receivers, where the sender 
wants to convince receivers to take a certain action. The sender allocates expenditure to convey 
truthful information to the receivers by advertising in the channels, and the receivers update their 
beliefs rationally on the basis of the information that they obtained from own channel and other 
channel’s receiver. In order to convincing the receiver’s action, this paper introduces two 
parameters, which are the level of persuasive function of the channels and the degree of 
connection between the receivers.  
One reason is that different channels have different levels of information transmission. For 
example, national channels and local channels have various degrees of impact for audiences in 
general. Specifically, the left party’s channel has larger persuasion power for the left party’s 
information, and smaller persuasion power for the right party’s information; similarly for the 
right party’s channel. Also, News channel has a larger probability to succeed in persuading 
political information than entertainment channel, while entertainment channel has a larger 
probability to succeed in persuading entertaining information than News channel. Thus it seems 
necessary for us to distinguish it by introducing a parameter. Another reason is for connection 
between receivers, each receiver has own degree of information transmission. For example, we 
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are more likely to listen and follow what leaders and experts are saying. Thus they have higher 
degree of information transmission than general person. 
    The seminal paper on strategic information transmission by Crawford and Sobel (1982) is 
about a sender-receiver cheap talk game with soft information. Cheap-talk models address the 
question of how much information can be credibly transmitted when communication is direct and 
costless. Farrell and Gibbons (1989) develop the simplest model of cheap talk with two 
audiences. They show how costless, non-verifiable claims can affect the receivers’ beliefs and 
how the incentives for truthful revelation to one receiver are affected by the presence of the other. 
Goltsman and Pavlov (2011) are closely related to Farrell and Gibbons (1989), who compare 
private and public communication in the cheap talk model and gave a considerable 
generalization. Caillaud and Tirole (2007) build one sender and multi-receivers model of 
persuasion, and explore how sponsors of ideas or projects should design their strategies to obtain 
favorable group decisions.   
This paper considers information acquisition is costly. The sender invests expenditure for 
advertising in media channels, which has a slight different with cheap talk models above 
mentioned. Some recent literatures on costly information transmission are as follows. Li and Li 
(2013) assume information campaigns are costly and study two privately informed political 
candidates, while, this paper only focuses only one sender. Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014) 
analyze Bayesian persuasion with costly signals. The cost of a signal is proportional to the 
expected reduction in uncertainty relative to some fixed reference belief. Degan and Li (2017) 
assume the higher costs associated with higher precision and study a sender’s optimal choice of 
precision. Here we analyze the sender’s optimal allocation of expenditure in this paper.  
Some literatures provide some lights on advertising. Bagwell (2007) discusses the 
persuasive, informative and complementary views of advertising to answer the question that why 
consumers respond to advertising. Specially, two mechanisms make advertisements informative. 
First, Coate (2004b) assumes that advertising contains hard information, and information that 
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cannot be falsified. Advertising is directly informative, similar assumption is adopted in 
Ashworth (2003), Schultz (2007) and Tirole (1988). The second is indirectly informative 
advertising. Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Gerber (1996) and Prat (2002) show that equilibria 
with informative advertising exist, even though the advertisings have no direct information 
content. 
    This paper adopts persuasive function to represent persuasion power of the channels. We 
assume the sender has records that reveal own qualifications and the sender cannot lie about own 
records, i.e. the sender represents truthful information. The idea is similar to campaign 
advertising’s rules from Coate (2004a, b), and others’ work, such as Dixit and Norman (1978) 
and Becker and Murphy (1993). In addition, Santilli (1983) shows that persuasive advertising 
using rational means is moral as long as the product or service it represents is good or useful, and 
argues that advertisements which present information in a straightforward and truthful way are 
always moral no matter what they advertise. 
Consider connection between receivers, the idea of it is from social proof in persuasion 
method; the reason is that we are influenced by others around us. Specifically in uncertain or 
ambiguous situation, we are likely to conform to what others do. In addition, persuasion is 
reciprocity because we dislike people who neglect to return a favor when offered a free service. 
We are also more likely to be persuaded by people we see as similar to ourselves. Here, we 
assume the receivers can persuade with each other.       
The main purpose of this paper is to study the sender's optimal expenditure allocation. 
Chamberlin (1933) suggests that the purpose of advertising (persuasive or informative) and the 
extent of scale economies warrant greatest attention. So we focus on investigate persuasive 
function. If persuasive function is a linear or convex function, the sender should invests all 
expenditure to one channel with higher level of persuasive function and higher degree of 
information transmission for the receiver to reach a maximum power of persuasion; while if 
persuasive function is a concave function, behavior of the sender should depend on the levels of 
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persuasive function of the channels and the degrees of connection between receivers. Thus our 
main results focus on concave function.  
Given two particular examples, we mainly analyze them under symmetric environment with 
same levels of persuasive function of the channels and same levels of connection between 
receivers. Then we study other two asymmetric environments, one is with different levels of 
persuasive function of the channels and same levels of connection between receivers, and 
another is with different levels of connection between receivers and same levels of persuasive 
function of the channels. Some decision rules for the sender’s optimal expenditure allocation are 
given in this paper.  
    Specifically, we show that it is not always to allocate expenditure in both channels equally 
in symmetric model; it is always to invest all expenditure to only one channel when another 
channel has very low level of persuasive function, or very low degree of connection between 
receivers, it is always to increase expenditure in one channel when the degree of information 
transmission of the corresponding receiver increases, and the sender is more likely to invest all 
expenditure to one channel when the degree of information transmission for another channel’s 
receiver is lower enough in asymmetric model.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up strategic information 
transmission model with two channels and studies some general results. Section 3 investigates 
two special examples of concave function in symmetric form model. Section 4 extends 
symmetric form to asymmetric form model for two examples given in section 3. Section 4 
concludes. All the proofs of the results are in Appendix. 
 
1.2 Model 
    Based on Shannon and Weaver (1949) model of communication, we adopt a reduced-form 
approach to construct strategic information transmission model. Consider strategic information 
transmission model with two channels, each channel has one loyal receiver, i.e. watching only in 
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one channel. Receiver 𝑖 is one type of audiences for the channel 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2. Here we have three 
players, one informed sender and two uninformed receivers.  
The informed sender transmits truthful information to both receivers by media separately. 
Assume information conveyed by the sender plays a positive role in society, the more 
information acquired is, the higher probability it is to persuade the receivers. For example, if a 
manufacture releases more information about nice characterizes of new product, then the 
consumer informed will be more likely to buy it; if an insurance company releases more 
information about details of insurance policies, then the people informed will be more likely to 
insure.  
Introduce a functional form λ to measure the efficacy of information transmission 
technology of media, and then a persuasive function of media is denoted by 𝜆(∙) ∈ [0,1], which 
is continuous, increasing, twice differentiable, and satisfies 𝜆(0) = 0. Also, different channels 
have different levels on information transmission because of its own characteristics in reality. For 
example, News channel has a larger probability to persuade political information than Sports 
channel. We introduce a parameter 𝛼𝑖 ∈  [0,1]  to represent the level of the channel 𝑖 ’s 
persuasive function, then the persuasive functions of both channels are denoted by 𝛼𝑖𝜆(∙), 𝑖 =1,2. Given total expenditure C, if the sender spends an amount 𝐶𝑖 to the channel 𝑖, we have 
𝐶 = ∑ 𝐶𝑖2𝑖=1  and the persuasive function of the channel 𝑖 is 𝛼𝑖𝜆(𝐶𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2. If 𝛼1 = 𝛼2, there 
exits symmetric level of both channels’ persuasive function. If 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 0, it has no significant 
for both channels’ persuasive functions; while if 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 1, there exits symmetric full level 
of both channels’ persuasive functions. 
    Consider connection between both receivers, such as colleague, friend, relative, in other 
words, the receivers can exchange information with a certain degree. However, each receiver has 
own degree of information transmission. For example, a leader has higher degree of information 
transmission than the members. Thus we assume the parameter of transmitting information from 
receiver 1 to receiver 2 is denoted by 𝜌12 ∈ [0,1], and from receiver 2 to receiver 1 is denoted  
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�⎯⎯⎯⎯� Receiver 1 
    Sender (C) 
Information
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� medium                 ↓ ρ12, ↑ ρ21       
                               Channel 2 
𝛼2𝜆(𝐶2)
�⎯⎯⎯⎯� Receiver 2 
Figure 1.2: Strategic Information Transmission Model with Two Channels 
 
by 𝜌21 ∈ [0,1], 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 . If 𝜌12 = 𝜌21 , there exists symmetric connection between both 
receivers. If 𝜌12 = 𝜌21 = 0, there does not exist connection between both receivers; while if 
𝜌12 = 𝜌21 = 1, there exists full connection between both receivers. 
In Figure 1.2, 𝛼1𝜆 (𝐶1),𝛼2𝜆 (𝐶2)  are regarded as direct persuasion, which are the 
probabilities obtained from receivers’ own channel; 𝛼2 𝜌21𝜆(𝐶2),𝛼1 𝜌12𝜆(𝐶1) are regarded as 
indirect persuasion, which are the probabilities obtained from the receivers in other channels; 
𝛼1𝛼2𝜌21𝜆 (𝐶1)𝜆 (𝐶2),𝛼1𝛼2𝜌12𝜆 (𝐶1)𝜆 (𝐶2) are regarded as overlapped persuasion, which are 
overlapping pieces of information’s probabilities obtained by one receiver from other channel’s 
receiver. Receivers update their beliefs rationally from own channel and other channel’s receiver, 
and take an action. The probability functions of the receivers persuaded are set as follows 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 1 ∶ 𝜋1(𝐶1,𝐶2) = 𝛼1𝜆(𝐶1) + 𝛼2𝜌21𝜆(𝐶2) − 𝛼1𝛼2𝜌21𝜆(𝐶1)𝜆(𝐶2), 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 2 ∶ 𝜋2(𝐶1,𝐶2) = 𝛼2𝜆(𝐶2) + 𝛼1𝜌12𝜆(𝐶1) − 𝛼1𝛼2𝜌12𝜆(𝐶1)𝜆(𝐶2), 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶 = 𝐶1 + 𝐶2,𝛼1,𝛼2 ∈ [0,1],𝜌12, 𝜌21 ∈ [0,1]. 
The objective of the sender is to obtain optimal allocation of expenditure in media channels in 
order to reach a maximum persuasive power for convincing all receivers take a certain action.  
 
Problem The maximization problem for the sender in strategic information transmission model 
with two channels can be written as follows   
𝑈(𝐶1) = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶1𝛼1(1 + 𝜌12)𝜆(𝐶1) + 𝛼2(1 + 𝜌21)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 𝛼1𝛼2(𝜌21 + 𝜌12)𝜆(𝐶1)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶],𝛼1,𝛼2 ∈ [0,1],𝜌12,𝜌21 ∈ [0,1]. 
 12 
For above Problem, since the maximization problem for the sender is equal to maximize the sum 
of the probability functions of both receivers persuaded, which can be written as   
𝑈(𝐶1,𝐶2) = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶1,𝐶2𝜋1(𝐶1,𝐶2) + 𝜋2(𝐶1,𝐶2) 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐶 = 𝐶1 + 𝐶2. 
Simplifying the probability functions of both receivers persuaded using the budget constraint 
𝐶2 = 𝐶 − 𝐶1, we have 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 1 ∶ 𝜋1(𝐶1) = 𝛼1𝜆(𝐶1) + 𝛼2𝜌21𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 𝛼1𝛼2𝜌21𝜆(𝐶1)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1), 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 2 ∶ 𝜋2(𝐶1) = 𝛼2𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1) + 𝛼1𝜌12𝜆(𝐶1) − 𝛼1𝛼2𝜌12𝜆(𝐶1)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1). 
Simplifying the objective function, we have 
𝑈(𝐶1) = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶1𝜋1(𝐶1,𝐶 − 𝐶1) + 𝜋2(𝐶1,𝐶 − 𝐶1). 
Substituting the probability functions of receivers persuaded, we have  
𝑈(𝐶1) = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶1𝛼1(1 + 𝜌12)𝜆(𝐶1) + 𝛼2(1 + 𝜌21)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 𝛼1𝛼2(𝜌21 + 𝜌12)𝜆(𝐶1)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶],𝛼1,𝛼2 ∈ [0,1],𝜌12,𝜌21 ∈  [0,1]. 
 
Property 1 If the level of the channel’s persuasive function or the parameter of information 
transmission between the receivers increases, the maximum persuasive power obtained by the 
sender will increase. 
 
Checking first derivative with respect to 𝛼𝑖, we have 
𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑𝛼𝑖
= �1 + 𝜌−𝑖,𝑖�𝜆(𝐶𝑖) − 𝛼−𝑖�𝜌−𝑖,𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖,−𝑖�𝜆(𝐶𝑖)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶𝑖)  > 0. 
Note that if the level of one channel’s persuasion function increases, which means it is easier to 
persuade the receivers, the sender will obtain higher persuasive power. Then it is better for the 
sender to lead the channels to improve their own advertising technology level. 
Checking first derivative with respect to 𝜌𝑖,− 𝑖, we have 
𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑𝜌𝑖,−𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝜆(𝐶𝑖) − 𝛼𝑖𝛼−𝑖𝜆(𝐶𝑖)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶𝑖) > 0. 
Note that the parameter of information transmission between the receivers increases, which 
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means there exists a positive interaction between both receivers. Then one receiver would be 
more likely to trust and take the same behavior of another receiver with larger probability, and 
the sender will obtain a larger persuasion power. Thus it is better for the sender to stimulate 
information transmission between the receivers by some activities, such as sharing feedback, 
debates and knowledge contests among receivers.  
 
For the objective function of the sender, first derivative with respect 𝐶1, we have 
𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑𝐶1
= 𝛼1(1 + 𝜌12)𝜆′(𝐶1) − 𝛼2(1 + 𝜌21)𝜆′(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 𝛼1𝛼2(𝜌21+ 𝜌12)[𝜆′(𝐶1)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 𝜆(𝐶1)𝜆′(𝐶 − 𝐶1)]. 
Second derivative with respect 𝐶1, we have 
𝑑2𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑2𝐶1
= 𝛼1(1 + 𝜌12)𝜆′′(𝐶1) + 𝛼2(1 + 𝜌21)𝜆′′(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 𝛼1𝛼2(𝜌21+ 𝜌12)[𝜆′′(𝐶1)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 2𝜆′(𝐶1)𝜆′(𝐶 − 𝐶1) + 𝜆(𝐶1)𝜆′′(𝐶 − 𝐶1)]. 
From the first derivative and second derivative, we notice that the result of the sender’s 
maximization problem is related with the properties of the persuasive function 𝜆 (∙). 
    In addition, as we mentioned above, the receivers can be persuaded by different types of 
persuasive function depend on information transmission technology of media, which is related 
with means of disseminating information, the modes of issuing information, the way of 
organizing information and so on. With the rapid development of information transmission 
technology, media has become more diverse in transmitting information. There are currently two 
classifications. One is electronic, such as telephone, radio, television and Internet. Another is 
non-electronic, like newspaper, magazines, textbook etc. Chamberlin (1933) suggests us to focus 
on the extent of scale economies. Then we simply classify the persuasive function of media by 
property of function. If the persuasive function is assumed to be linear or convex, it is constant or 
increasing return to scale; while, if the persuasive function is assumed to be concave, it is 
decreasing return to scale. 
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Proposition 1 In strategic information transmission model with two channels, if 𝜆 (∙) is a linear 
or convex function, the sender should invest all expenditure to one channel with higher level of 
persuasive function and higher degree of information transmission for the receiver to reach 
maximum persuasion power. 
 
Note that 𝜆(∙) is a linear or convex function if and only if 𝜆′′(∙) ≥ 0. Checking second 
derivative of the objective function 
𝛼1(1 + 𝜌12)𝜆′′(𝐶1) + 𝛼2(1 + 𝜌21)𝜆′′(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 𝛼1𝛼2(𝜌21+ 𝜌12)[𝜆′′(𝐶1)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 2𝜆′(𝐶1)𝜆′(𝐶 − 𝐶1) + 𝜆(𝐶1)𝜆′′(𝐶 − 𝐶1)]. 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶],𝛼1,𝛼2,𝜌12,𝜌21 ∈ [0,1], 𝜆(∙) ∈ [0,1],  𝜆′(∙) ≥ 0,  𝜆′′(∙) ≥ 0. 
Rearrange above expression, we have that 
𝜆′′(𝐶1)[𝛼1(1 + 𝜌12) − 𝛼1𝛼2(𝜌21 + 𝜌12)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1)] + 2𝛼1𝛼2(𝜌21 + 𝜌12)𝜆′(𝐶1)𝜆′(𝐶 − 𝐶1)+ 𝜆′′(𝐶 − 𝐶1)[𝛼2(1 + 𝜌21) − 𝛼1𝛼2(𝜌21 + 𝜌12)𝜆(𝐶1)] ≥ 0. 
We find direct and indirect persuasion denoted by [𝛼1(1 + 𝜌12)𝜆′′(𝐶1) + 𝛼2(1 + 𝜌21)𝜆′′(𝐶 −
𝐶1 dominate overlapped persuasion denoted by 
𝛼1𝛼2(𝜌21 + 𝜌12)[𝜆′′(𝐶1)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 2𝜆′(𝐶1)𝜆′(𝐶 − 𝐶1) + 𝜆(𝐶1)𝜆′′(𝐶 − 𝐶1)] . The second 
derivative of the objective function is great or equal to zero, and the objective function is convex 
in C1, so a critical value of C1 is a global minimum value. Then we ignore first order condition. 
The objective function reaches maximum value when 𝐶1 = 0 𝑜𝑟 𝐶. There exist two corner 
solutions, and then the sender should spend all expenditure C to one of the channels. The corner 




𝑑𝜌𝑖,−𝑖 > 0. 
Then the sender should spend all expenditure C to one channel with higher level of persuasive 




Proposition 2 In strategic information transmission model with two channels, if 𝜆  (∙) is a 
concave function, the optimal expenditure allocation for the sender depends on the levels of the 
channels’ persuasive function and the degrees of information transmission between the receivers. 
Three optimal choices could be adopted, allocating expenditure to one channel, both channels 
equally, or both channels unequally.  
 
Since λ (∙) is a concave function, it is decreasing return to scale, we have 
𝜆′(𝐶1) ≥ 𝜆′(𝐶 − 𝐶1) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶/2], 
𝜆′(𝐶1) ≤ 𝜆′(𝐶 − 𝐶1) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐶1 ∈ [𝐶/2,𝐶]. 
Specially, 
• 𝐼𝑓 𝜌12 = 𝜌21 = 0,𝛼1 = 𝛼2,  
𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶/2], 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)𝑑𝐶1 = 𝛼1𝜆′(𝐶1) − 𝛼2𝜆′(𝐶 − 𝐶1) ≥ 0,  𝐶1 ∈ [𝐶/2,𝐶], 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)𝑑𝐶1 = 𝛼1𝜆′(𝐶1) − 𝛼2𝜆′(𝐶 − 𝐶1) ≤ 0, 
𝑑2𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑2𝐶1
= 𝛼1𝜆′′(𝐶1) + 𝛼2𝜆′′(𝐶 − 𝐶1) < 0. 
Thus 𝐶1 = 𝐶/2 is a maximum point. The sender definitely allocates both channels equally. 
 
• 𝐼𝑓 𝜌12 = 𝜌21 = 1,𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 1,  
𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑𝐶1
= 2𝜆′(𝐶1) − 2(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 2[𝜆′(𝐶1)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 𝜆(𝐶1)𝜆′(𝐶 − 𝐶1)]. 





= 2𝜆′(0) − 2𝜆′(𝐶) − 2𝜆′(0)𝜆(𝐶). 
When direct persuasion and indirect persuasion of both receivers denoted by [2𝜆′(0) − 2𝜆′(𝐶)] 
dominate overlapped persuasion denoted by 2𝜆′(0)𝜆(𝐶), we have 𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑𝐶1
> 0, 𝐶1 = 0 is a local 
minimum point; While, when direct persuasion and indirect persuasion of both receivers is 
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dominated by overlapped persuasion, we have 𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑𝐶1
< 0, 𝐶1 = 0 is a local maximum point. 
Thus the sender will not always allocate both channels equally. 
 
In general, note that λ(∙) is a concave function if and only if 𝜆′′(∙) ≥ 0. Checking second 
derivative of the objective function 
𝑑2𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑2𝐶1
= 𝛼1(1 + 𝜌12)𝜆′′(𝐶1) + 𝛼2(1 + 𝜌21)𝜆′′(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 𝛼1𝛼2(𝜌21+ 𝜌12)[𝜆′′(𝐶1)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 2𝜆′(𝐶1)𝜆′(𝐶 − 𝐶1) + 𝜆(𝐶1)𝜆′′(𝐶 − 𝐶1)]. 
Because 
𝛼1(1 + 𝜌12)𝜆′′(𝐶1) + 𝛼2(1 + 𝜌21)𝜆′′(𝐶 − 𝐶1) ≤ 0, 
𝛼1𝛼2(𝜌21 + 𝜌12)[𝜆′′(𝐶1)𝜆(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 2𝜆′(𝐶1)𝜆′(𝐶 − 𝐶1) + 𝜆(𝐶1)𝜆′′(𝐶 − 𝐶1)] ≤ 0. 
When 𝛼1,𝛼2,𝜌21, 𝜌12 are higher enough, overlapped persuasion dominates direct and indirect 
persuasion, and then the second order condition is great than 0. There may exist corner solution. 
The sender would likely to invest expenditure one of the channels. While, when 𝛼1,𝛼2,𝜌21, 𝜌12 
is lower enough, overlapped persuasion is dominated by direct and indirect persuasion, the 
second order condition is less than 0. There exits internal solution. The sender would likely to 
invest expenditure to both channels. 
   
1.3 Concave Function Examples in Symmetric Form Model  
Although the sender conveys the truthful information, media has certain selectivity and 
tendencies for perception of information according to its own attitude, experience and so on. 
Thus there exists altered, omitted, or re-organized information during transmitting from the 
sender to media and then to receivers, resulting in information distortion. We introduce the 
parameter K to represent the information distortion in persuasive function, and assume higher K 
leads to lower persuasive function of media. Then the persuasive function is denoted by 𝜆(𝑐,𝐾), 






≥ 0, 𝜆(0,𝐾) = 0,𝐾 > 0. 
    Giving two concave functions, we consider symmetric strategic information transmission 
model with two channels. Assume we have same levels of both channels’ persuasive functions, 
which are equal to 1; and same degrees of information transmission for both receivers, which are 
denoted by 𝜌,𝜌 ∈  [0,1].  
 
1.3.1 Example 1 Consider the following concave persuasive function of media 
𝜆(𝑐) = 𝑐
𝑐 + 𝐾  ,𝐾 ≥ 0. 
 
The maximization problem for the sender is written as 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶1(1 + 𝜌) � 𝐶1(𝐶1 + 𝐾) + (𝐶 − 𝐶1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)� − 2𝜌 𝐶1(𝐶1 + 𝐾) (𝐶 − 𝐶1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶],𝜌 ∈  [0,1],𝐾 ≥ 0. 
 
Theorem 1 The optimal allocation of expenditure for the sender in Example 1 is allocating 
expenditure to both channels equally in symmetric strategic information transmission model. 
 
First derivative with respect to 𝐶1, we have 
𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑𝐶1
= (1 + 𝜌) � 𝐾(𝐶1 + 𝐾)2  − 𝐾(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2�
− 2𝜌 � 𝐾(𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 (𝐶 − 𝐶1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾) − 𝐶1(𝐶1 + 𝐾) 𝐾(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2� = 0. 
𝐾(𝐶1 + 𝐾)2(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2  (𝐶 + 2𝐾 − 𝜌𝐾)(𝐶 − 2𝐶1) = 0, we obtain a critical value of 𝐶1 = 𝐶/2. 
Specially, consider the point 𝐶1 = 0, we find the first order condition is always great than 0 at 






= (1 + 𝜌) � 𝐾
𝐾2
 − 𝐾(𝐶 + 𝐾)2� − 2𝜌 𝐾𝐾2 𝐶(𝐶 + 𝐾)
= 1
𝐾(𝐶 + 𝐾)2 [(1 + 𝜌)((𝐶 + 𝐾)2 –𝐾2) − 2𝜌𝐶(𝐶 + 𝐾)]= 1
𝐾(𝐶 + 𝐾)2 𝐶(1 + 2𝐾 − 𝜌) > 0. 
Second derivative with respect to 𝐶1, we have 
𝑑2𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑2𝐶1
= (1 + 𝜌) � −2𝐾(𝐶1 + 𝐾)3 + −2𝐾(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)3�
− 2𝜌 � −2𝐾(𝐶 − 𝐶1)(𝐶1 + 𝐾)3(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾) − 2 𝐾𝐾(𝐶1 + 𝐾)2(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2  + −2𝐾𝐶1(𝐶1 + 𝐾)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)3�= −2𝐾(𝐶 + 2𝐾 − 𝜌𝐶)(𝐶1 + 𝐾)3(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)3 [(𝐶1 + 𝐾)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾) + (𝐶 − 2𝐶1)2] < 0. 
The second derivative of the objective function is less than zero, so the objective function is 
concave in 𝐶1. Then a critical value of 𝐶1 = 𝐶/2 is a global maximum value. It’s an internal 
solution. The sender should invest expenditure C to both channels equally. 
 
1.3.2 Example 2 Consider the following concave persuasive function of media 
𝜆(𝑐) = 𝑙𝑛 (𝑐 + 1)
𝑙𝑛𝐾
,𝐾 ≥ 𝐶 + 1. 
 
The maximization problem for the sender is written as 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶1(1 + 𝜌) �𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 + 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 � − 2𝜌 �𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 � �𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 �. 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶],𝜌 ∈ [0,1],𝐾 ≥ 𝐶 + 1 
 
First derivative with respect to 𝐶1, 
𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑𝐶1
= (1 + 𝜌) � 1(𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾  − 1(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾�
− 2𝜌 � 1(𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 1(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾� 
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= (1 + 𝜌) � 1
𝑙𝑛𝐾
 − 1(𝐶 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾� − 2𝜌 1𝑙𝑛𝐾 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾
= 1
𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑙𝑛𝐾(𝐶 + 1) [𝐶𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 𝜌(2(𝐶 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1) − 𝐶𝑙𝑛𝐾)], 
We have the results as follows 
 
Lemma 1 
1. 𝐼𝑓 𝜌 ∈ �0, 𝐶𝑙𝑛𝐾
2(𝐶+1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)−𝐶𝑙𝑛𝐾� ,𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ � , 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛   𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)𝑑𝐶1 �𝐶1=0 ≥ 0.   
𝐶1 = 0 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡; 
2. 𝐼𝑓 𝜌 ∈ � 𝐶𝑙𝑛𝐾
2(𝐶+1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)−𝐶𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 1� ,𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ �, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)𝑑𝐶1 �𝐶1=0 ≤ 0.   
𝐶1 = 0 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡.  
3. 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦, 𝑖𝑓 𝐾 ∈ �(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ , +∞�, 𝐶𝑙𝑛𝐾
2(𝐶+1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)−𝐶𝑙𝑛𝐾 > 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)𝑑𝐶1 �𝐶1=0 ≥ 0. 
The first order condition is always great than 0 regardless 𝜌 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝐶1 = 0,  
𝐶1 = 0 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑎 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡. 
 
We find the first order condition at the point 𝐶1 = 0 is not always great than 0 like Example 1. 
When 𝜌 is higher enough, the indirect and overlapped persuasion dominate direct persuasion, 
the first order condition is less than or equal to 0. Then the sender is more likely to invest one of 
the channels.   




𝐶1=𝐶/2 = (1 + 𝜌) � 1(𝐶/2 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾  − 1(𝐶 − 𝐶/2 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾�
− 2𝜌 � 1(𝐶/2 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶/2 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 𝑙𝑛(𝐶/2 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 1(𝐶 − 𝐶/2 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾� = 0 
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𝐶1=𝐶/2= (1 + ρ)lnK �− 1(C/2 + 1)2 − 1(C − C/2 + 1)2�
−
2ρlnKlnK �− ln(C − C/2 + 1)(C/2 + 1)2 − 2 1(C/2 + 1)(C − C/2 + 1) − ln(C/2 + 1)(C − C/2 + 1)2�= −2lnKlnK(C/2 + 1)2 �𝑙𝑛𝐾 − ρ�−𝑙𝑛𝐾 + 2 ln�(2/C + 1)𝑒���. 
We have the results as follows 
 
Lemma 2 1. 𝐼𝑓 ρ ∈ �0, 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2 ln�(2/C+1)𝑒�−𝑙𝑛𝐾� ,𝐾 ∈ [𝐶 + 1, (2/C + 1)𝑒], 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑑2𝑈(𝐶1)𝑑2𝐶1 �𝐶1=2/𝐶 ≤ 0.  
𝐶1 = 𝐶/2 is a local maximum point.  





, 1� ,𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, �2
C






≥ 0.  
𝐶1 = 𝐶/2 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡.   
3. 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦, 𝑖𝑓 𝐾 ∈ �(2/C + 1)𝑒, +∞�, 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2 ln�(2/C+1)𝑒�−𝑙𝑛𝐾 > 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)𝑑𝐶1 �𝐶1=0 ≤ 0. 
The second order condition is always less than 0 regardless 𝜌 𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝐶1 = 𝐶/2, 
𝐶1 = 𝐶/2 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑎 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡. 
 
We find the second order condition at the point 𝐶1 = 𝐶/2 is not always less than 0 like 
Example 1. When 𝜌 is higher enough, the indirect and overlapped persuasion is dominated by 
the direct persuasion, and then the second order condition is great than or equal to 0. The point 




Lemma 3 Let 
𝜌1 = 𝑙𝑛𝐾2 𝑙𝑛[(𝐶 2⁄ + 1) 𝑒] − 𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 𝜌2 = 𝐶𝑙𝑛𝐾2(𝐶 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1) − 𝐶𝑙𝑛𝐾, 
𝐾1 = (𝐶 2⁄ + 1)𝑒,𝐾2 = (𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ ,  
We have 𝜌1 < 𝜌2,𝐾1 > 𝐾2.  
 
The proof of Lemma 3 is provided in Appendix. It compares two critical values of the parameter 
of connection between the receivers and the degrees of information distortion of the channels. 
The critical value of 𝜌1 happens when overlapped persuasion dominates the direct and indirect 
persuasion; while, the critical value of 𝜌2 happens when overlapped persuasion is dominated by 
the direct and indirect persuasion.  
 
From Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Lemma 3, we find 
𝐼𝑓 𝜌 ∈ � 𝑙𝑛𝐾2 𝑙𝑛[(𝐶 2⁄ + 1) 𝑒] − 𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 𝐶𝑙𝑛𝐾2(𝐶 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1) − 𝐶𝑙𝑛𝐾�,  
𝐶1 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶1 = 𝐶/2 are both local minimum points. Then there exists a maximum point 
𝐶1 ∈ (0,𝐶/2).Then the first order condition has two solutions when 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶 2⁄ ]. The general 
results as follows 
 
Simplifying first derivative, we have 
𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑𝐶1
= 1(𝐶1 + 1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 �(𝐶 − 2𝐶1)+ 𝜌 �(𝐶 − 2𝐶1) − 2𝑙𝑛𝐾 [(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) − (𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1)]��. 
Definition 1 (𝑖) 𝑞(𝐶1) = 1(𝐶1 + 1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾,  (𝑖𝑖) 𝑓(𝐶1) = (𝐶 − 2𝐶1)+ 𝜌 �(𝐶 − 2𝐶1) − 2𝑙𝑛𝐾 [(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) − (𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1)]�. 
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Note that  (i)  𝑞(𝐶1) > 0  when  𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶] ; (ii)  the figure of f(C1)  is symmetric since f(C1)＝f(C − C1). Consider C1 ∈ [0, C 2⁄ ].  
 
Lemma 4 The first order condition of Example 2 has no more than two solutions when  𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶 2⁄ ]. The sign of 𝑔(𝐶1) changes no more than once. Three cases as follows: 
(1) 𝑔(𝐶1) always less than zero; 
(2) 𝑔(𝐶1) changes from less than zero to greater than zero; 
(3) 𝑔(𝐶1) always greater than zero; 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑔(𝐶1) = 𝜕𝑓(𝐶1)𝜕𝐶1 = −2 + 2𝜌 𝑙𝑛 [(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) (𝐶1 + 1)] + 2 − 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑙𝑛𝐾 . 
 
The proof of Lemma 4 is provided in Appendix. Since it is symmetric model, we just consider  𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶 2⁄ ] . Because the sign of second order condition changes no more than once 
when 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶 2⁄ ], the first order condition will have no more than two solutions. The graph of 
the object function has one maximum point and one local minimum point, or one maximum 
point and two local minimum points when 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶 2⁄ ]. We find 𝐶1 ∈ (0,𝐶 2⁄ ) is an internal 
solution of first order condition, 𝐶1 = 𝐶 2⁄  is an extreme value point of the objective function, 
and 𝐶1 = 0 is a corner solution.  
 
Lemma 5 There exits two critical values of the parameter of connection between the receivers in 
Example 2. 
(1) The first critical point 𝜌1 happens at 𝐶1 = 𝐶 2⁄ , SOC=0, 
𝜌1 = 𝑙𝑛𝐾2 𝑙𝑛[(𝐶 2⁄ + 1) 𝑒] − 𝑙𝑛𝐾. 
(2) The second critical point 𝜌2 happens at 𝐶1 = 0, FOC=0, 
𝜌2  =  𝑙𝑛𝐾2𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − 𝑙𝑛𝐾. 
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If the graph of the objective function changes from one maximum point to two maximum points 
when 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶], there exits a critical point, and the critical point 𝜌1 happens at 𝐶1 = 𝐶 2⁄ , 
SOC=0. The degree of information distortion 𝐾1 in the channel reaches maximum value when 
𝜌1 = 1, 𝐾1 = (𝐶 2⁄ + 1)𝑒. If the graph of the objective function changes from two maximum 
points to one minimum point when 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶], there exits a critical point, and the critical point 
ρ2 happens at 𝐶1 = 0, FOC=0. The degree of information distortion K2 in the channel reaches 
maximum value when 𝜌2 = 1, 𝐾2 = (𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ . 
 
Lemma 6 Analysis of three cases about the graph of the objective function of Example 2. 
(1) Consider 𝑔(𝐶1) always less than zero when 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶 2⁄ ],  
𝐾 ∈ (𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 2⁄ + 1)𝑒),𝜌 ∈  �0, 𝑙𝑛𝐾2 ln [(𝐶 2⁄ + 1) 𝑒] – 𝑙𝑛𝐾�  𝑜𝑟 𝐾 ∈  �(𝐶 2⁄ + 1)𝑒, +∞�, 
   The objective function reaches maximum value at 𝐶1 = 𝐶 2⁄ . 
(2) Consider 𝑔(𝐶1) changes from less than zero to greater than zero when 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶 2⁄ ],         (𝑖) 𝐾 ∈  �(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ , (𝐶 2⁄ + 1)𝑒�,𝜌 ∈ � 𝑙𝑛𝐾2 𝑙𝑛[(𝐶 2⁄ + 1) 𝑒] – 𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 1� 
𝑜𝑟         𝐾 ∈  �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ �,𝜌 ∈  � 𝑙𝑛𝐾2 𝑙𝑛[(𝐶 2⁄ + 1) 𝑒] – 𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾2𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − 𝑙𝑛𝐾� 
   The objective function reaches maximum value at 
𝜌 = −(𝐶 − 2𝐶1)(𝐶 − 2𝐶1) − 2[(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) − (𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1)]/𝑙𝑛𝐾 ;         (𝑖𝑖) 𝐾 ∈  �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ �,𝜌 ∈ � 𝑙𝑛𝐾2𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − 𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 1�, 
    The objective function reaches maximum value at 𝐶1 = 0. 
 
The proof of Lemma 6 is provided in Appendix. We ignore the result of the third case g(C1) 
always greater than zero when C1 ∈ [0, C 2⁄ ] from Lemma 4, because the result of the third case 
is included in the result (ii) of the second case. 
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Theorem 2 Optimal Allocation of Expenditure in Example 2 
Consider 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶], we have 
(1) When 𝐾 ∈  (𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ ),  
• If 𝜌 ∈  �0, 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2 𝑙𝑛[(𝐶 2⁄ +1)𝑒] –𝑙𝑛𝐾�, the objective function reaches maximum value at 𝐶1＝𝐶 2⁄ . 
The sender should invest the expenditure to both channels equally. 
• If 𝜌 ∈  � 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2 𝑙𝑛[(𝐶 2⁄ +1)𝑒] –𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾� , the objective function reaches maximum 
value at 𝐶1 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 − 𝐶1) satisfied the following expression: 
𝜌 = −(𝐶 − 2𝐶1)(𝐶 − 2𝐶1) − 2[(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) − (𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1)] 𝑙𝑛𝐾⁄ . 
     The sender should invest the expenditure 𝐶1 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 − 𝐶1) to channel 1. 
• If 𝜌 ∈  � 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 1�, the objective function reaches maximum value at 𝐶1 = 0 
or C. The sender should invest the expenditure C to one of the channels. 
(2) When 𝐾 ∈  �(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ , (𝐶 2⁄ + 1)𝑒� 
• If 𝜌 ∈  �0, 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2 𝑙𝑛[(𝐶 2⁄ +1)𝑒] –𝑙𝑛𝐾�, objective function reaches maximum value at 𝐶1 = 𝐶 2⁄ . 
The sender should invest the expenditure C to both channels equally. 
• If 𝜌 ∈  � 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2 𝑙𝑛[(𝐶 2⁄ +1)𝑒] –𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 1�, the objective function reaches maximum value at 𝐶1 and (𝐶 − 𝐶1) satisfied the following expression: 
𝜌 = −(𝐶 − 2𝐶1)(𝐶 − 2𝐶1) − 2[(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) − (𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1)] 𝑙𝑛𝐾⁄ .  
The sender should invest the expenditure 𝐶1 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 − 𝐶1) to channel 1. 
(3) When 𝐾 ∈  �(𝐶 2⁄ + 1)𝑒, +∞�, objective function reaches maximum value at 𝐶1＝𝐶 2⁄ . 
   The sender should invest the expenditure to both channels equally. 
 
Theorem 2 provides a specific example for proposition 2, and shows how the sender allocate the 
expenditure to both channels depending on the degree of connection between the receivers and 
the degree of information distortion of the channel. 
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Corollary 1 Decision Rules about Optimal Allocation of Expenditure in Example 2 
(1) It would be better for the sender to invest expenditure to both channels equally: (i) when K is 
lower enough (close to C+1) and 𝜌 is lower enough (close to 0), or (ii) K is higher enough. 
(2) It would be better for the sender to invest expenditure to only one channel when K is lower 
enough (close to C+1) and 𝜌 is higher enough (close to 1).  
(3) It is better for the sender to invest expenditure to the channels unequally: (i) when K is lower 
enough and 𝜌 is intermediate value, or (ii) when K is intermediate value and 𝜌 is higher 
enough (close to 1). 
 
Note that for the first situation of Corollary 1, the level of connection between the receivers is 
lower, which means receivers are independent; the degree of information distortion of the 
channel is higher, which means the information transmission technology of the channel is not 
good. Then when there are no good information transmission channels provided with 
independent receivers, it is rational for the sender to allocate expenditure to the channels equally 
under random situation. For the second situation, when there has positive interaction with the 
receivers and good information transmission channel, then one receiver could be more likely 
informed by another receiver. The sender should invest all expenditure to one channel.  
 
Corollary 2 Optimal behavior of the sender as 𝝆 increases in Example 2 
(1) When K is low enough (close to C+1), if 𝜌 increases from zero to one, the graph of the 
objective function changes from one maximum point to two maximum points gradually, thus the 
sender should firstly invest expenditure to both channels equally, then invest more expenditure to 
one channel than another until only invest one channel. 
(2) When K is intermediate value, if 𝜌 increases from zero to one, the graph of the objective 
function changes from one maximum point to two maximum points gradually, thus the sender 
should firstly invest expenditure to both channels equally, then invest more expenditure to one 
 26 
channel than another gradually. 
(3) When K is higher enough, the graph of the objective function only has one maximum point, 
thus it would be better for the sender to invest expenditure to both channels equally regardless 𝜌. 
 
Note that it is not always for the sender to allocate the expenditure in both channels equally. If 
the information distortion of the channel is lower than a certain degree, the sender increases 
expenditure in one channel when 𝜌 becomes higher than before. If the information distortion of 
the channel is higher than a certain degree, the send allocates expenditure in the channels 
equally. 
 
Given some numerical examples for Corollary 2  
Assume C=1. 
(1) When K ∈ �C + 1, (C + 1)(C+1)/C�, we assume K=3.  
Figure 1.3 shows that the graphs of the objective function with different value of ρ. If ρ 
increases, 𝐶1 has two solutions. One decreases from C/2 to 0, and another increases from 
C/2 to C. it would be better for the sender to invest from both channels equally to both 
channels unequally, and then from both channels unequally to only invest one channel. 
(2) When K ∈  �(C + 1)(C+1)/C, (C/2 + 1)𝑒�, we assume K=4.04.  
Figure 1.4 shows the graphs of the objective function with different value of ρ. If ρ 
increases, 𝐶1 has two solutions. However, it is different from numerical 1, 𝐶1 will not 
become corner solution as 𝜌 increases. It would be better for the sender to invest from both 
channels equally to both channels unequally. 
(3) When K ∈  �(C/2 + 1)e, +∞�, we assume K=5.  
Figure 1.5 shows the graphs of the objective function with different value of ρ. It would be 
better for the sender to invest expenditure to both channels equally. 
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ρ=0.6                      ρ=0.642                  ρ=0.645 
     
ρ=0.65                      ρ=0.66                  ρ=0.7 
Figure 1.3: Numerical Examples of Example 2 (1) 
 
 
     
ρ=0.1                      ρ=0.98                  ρ=0.99 
     
ρ=0.995                    ρ=0.999                 ρ=1 
Figure 1.4: Numerical Examples of Example 2 (2) 
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ρ=0.1                      ρ=0.5                    ρ=1 
Figure 1.5: Numerical Examples of Example 2 (3) 
 
1.4 Concave Function Examples in Asymmetric Form Model  
1.4.1 with different levels of the channel’s persuasive function 
Assume the levels of the channels’ persuasive functions are different, the level of the channel 1 is 
denoted by 𝛼 ∈ (0,1), and the level of the channel 2 is 1. Keep same degrees of connection 
between the receivers, which is denoted by 𝜌 ∈  [0,1].  
 
1.4.1.1 Example 1  
𝜆(𝑐) = 𝑐
𝑐 + 𝐾  ,𝐾 > 0 
The maximization problem for the sender is written as follows 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶1(1 + 𝜌) � 𝛼𝐶1(𝐶1 + 𝐾) + (𝐶 − 𝐶1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)� − 2𝜌𝛼 𝐶1(𝐶1 + 𝐾) (𝐶 − 𝐶1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾), 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶], 𝜌 ∈  [0,1],𝛼 ∈ (0,1),𝐾 > 0. 
 
Theorem 3 Optimal Allocation of Expenditure in Example 1 
(1) When 𝛼 ∈  (0,𝐾2 (𝐶 + 𝐾)2⁄ ], the objective function reaches maximum value point when 
𝐶1 = 0. It’s a corner solution. Thus the sender should invest all expenditure to the channel 2. 
(2) When 𝛼 ∈  (𝐾2/(𝐶 + 𝐾)2, 1), there exits an internal solution. The optimal of expenditure for 
the sender should satisfy the following condition 
𝜌 = 𝛼(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 − (𝐶1 + 𝐾)2
𝛼𝐶(𝐶 − 2𝐶1) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐶1 + 𝐾)2. 
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The proof of Theorem 3 is provided in Appendix. If the sender only invest the expenditure to 
channel 2, we obtain a critical value of 𝛼 = 𝐾2/(𝐶 + 𝐾)2 by giving 𝜌 = 0,𝐶1 = 0. Thus we 
find that the sender should only invest the expenditure to the channel 2 when the level of the 
channel’s persuasive function 𝛼 is lower than a certain value (close to 0).  
 
Corollary 3 Decision Rules about Optimal Allocation of Expenditure in Example 1 
When the level of persuasion function of the channel 𝛼 is lower than a certain value (close to 1), 
the sender should invest all expenditure to channel 2; when the level of persuasion function of 
the channel 𝛼 is higher than a certain value, the sender should invest expenditure to both 
channels, and expenditure invested in channel 1 increases from zero to C/2 when 𝛼 increasing. 
 
The proof of Corollary 3 is provided in Appendix. By the implicit function theorem, we find the 
sender should increase expenditure in channel 1 when α increases from (𝐾2/(𝐶 + 𝐾)2, 1). If 
α = 1, it’s symmetric information transmission model and the sender allocates expenditure to 
both channels equally. If α = 0, it has no significant for the channel 1 and the sender should 
spend all expenditure to the channel 2. 
 
1.4.1.2 Example 2  
𝜆(𝑐) = 𝑙𝑛 (𝑐 + 1)
𝑙𝑛𝐾
,𝐾 > 𝐶 + 1. 
 
The maximization problem for the sender is written as follows 
𝑈(𝐶1) = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶1(1 + 𝜌) �𝛼 𝑙𝑛 (𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 + 𝑙𝑛 (𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 �
− 2𝜌𝛼 �𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1)
𝑙𝑛𝐾
� �
𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)
𝑙𝑛𝐾
�, 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶],𝛼 ∈ (0,1),𝜌 ∈ [0,1],𝐾 > 𝐶 + 1. 
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First derivative with respect to 𝐶1, we have 
𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑𝐶1
= (1 + ρ) � α(C1 + 1)lnK  − 1(C − C1 + 1)lnK�
− 2ρα � 1(C1 + 1)lnK ln(C − C1 + 1)lnK − ln(C1 + 1)lnK 1(C − C1 + 1)lnK� 
Specially, consider the point 𝐶1 = 0,  
𝜕𝑈(𝐶1)
𝜕𝐶1
|𝐶1=0 = 1𝑙𝑛𝐾 �(1 + 𝜌) �𝛼 − 1𝐶 + 1� − 2𝜌𝛼 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 �= 1
𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑙𝑛𝐾
��(1 + 𝜌)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌𝑙𝑛 (𝐶 + 1)�𝛼 − (1 + 𝜌)𝑙𝑛𝐾
𝐶 + 1 � 
 
Theorem 4 Checking the sign of 𝜕𝑈(𝐶1)
𝜕𝐶1
|𝐶1=0 of Example 2 according to the partition of 𝛼 1.𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝛼 ∈ (0,1),𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 � ,𝜌 ∈ � 𝑙𝑛𝐾2𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − 𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 1�,      𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜕𝑈(𝐶1)
𝜕𝐶1
|𝐶1=0 < 0,𝐶1 = 0 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡. 2.𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝛼 ∈ �0, (1 + ρ)ln𝐾(𝐶 + 1)[(1 + ρ)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)]�, 
  𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 � ,𝜌 ∈ �0, 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾�  𝑜𝑟 𝐾 ∈ �(𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 , +∞�, 
  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜕𝑈(𝐶1)
𝜕𝐶1
|𝐶1=0 < 0, 𝐶1 = 0 is a local maximum point. 3.𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝛼 ∈ � (1 + ρ)ln𝐾(𝐶 + 1)[(1 + ρ)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)] , 1�, 
  𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 � ,𝜌 ∈ �0, 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾�  𝑜𝑟 𝐾 ∈ �(𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 , +∞�, 
  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜕𝑈(𝐶1)
𝜕𝐶1
|𝐶1=0 > 0, 𝐶1 = 0 is a local minimum point. 
 
The proof of Theorem 5 is provided in Appendix. We find 𝐶1 = 0 is not always a local 
minimum point. 
 
Lemma 7 The first order condition of Example 2 has no more than three solutions. 
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The proof of Lemma 7 is provided in Appendix. The graph of the object function has no more 
than two local maximum points. Since 𝛼 ∈ (0,1), 𝐶1 ∈ (0,𝐶 2⁄ ) is an internal solution, and 
𝐶1 = 0 is corner solution of Example 2. We provide two optimal allocations to the sender, one is 
allocating less expenditure in channel 1 than channel 2, and another is allocating all expenditure 
in channel 2.  
 
Corollary 4 Decision Rules about Optimal Allocation of Expenditure in Example 2 
(1) Regardless the level of persuasive function of the channel 𝛼, when K is lower enough (close 
to C+1) and 𝜌 is higher enough (close to 1), it would be better for the sender to invest all 
expenditure C to channel 2. 
(2) When 𝛼 is lower enough (close to 0), K is higher enough, or K is lower enough (close to 
C+1) and 𝜌 is lower enough (close to 0), it would be better for the sender to invest all 
expenditure C to channel 2. 
(3) When 𝛼 is higher enough (close to 1), K is higher enough, or K is lower enough (close to 
C+1) and 𝜌 is lower enough (close to 0), it would be better for the sender to divide expenditure 
C to both channels, and allocate less expenditure in channel 1 than channel 2. 
 
Note that it is always for the sender to invest all expenditure to the channel when the level of 
persuasive function of this channel is lower enough; and the sender should invest expenditure to 
both channels, which happens only when the level of persuasive function of this channel is 
higher enough (close to 1). 
 
Given some numerical examples of Example 2 for Corollary 4  
1) When C = 1, K ∈ �C + 1, (C + 1)C+1C � , ρ ∈ � 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 1�, assume K = 3, ρ = 0.7. 
Figure 1.6 shows that the optimal allocation is 𝐶1 = 0. Regardless the level of persuasive 
function of the channel α, when K is close to C+1 and ρ is higher enough (close to 1), it would  
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𝑎=0.1                      𝑎=0.5                    𝑎=0.9 
Figure 1.6: Numerical examples of Example 2 (4) 
 
      
𝑎=0.6                          𝑎=0.9 
Figure 1.7: Numerical examples of Example 2 (5) 
 
be better for the sender to invest all expenditure C to channel 2. 
2) When C = 1, K ∈ �C + 1, (C + 1)C+1C � , ρ ∈ �0, 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾�, assume K = 3, ρ = 0.5. 
Figure 1.7 shows that when K and ρ are lower enough, if α is lower enough, it would be 
better for the sender to invest expenditure C to channel 2; if α is higher enough, it would be 
better for the sender to invest expenditure C to both channels, and allocate less expenditure in 
channel 1 than channel 2. 
3) When C = 1, K ∈ �(C + 1)C+1C , +∞�, assume K = 10, ρ = 0.5. 
Figure 1.8 shows that when K is higher enough, if α is lower enough, it would be better for 
the sender to invest all expenditure C to channel 2; if α is higher enough, it would be better 
for the sender to invest expenditure C to both channels, and allocate less expenditure in 
channel 1 than channel 2. 
 33 
        
𝑎=0.6                      𝑎=0.9 
Figure 1.8: Numerical examples of Example 2 (6) 
 
        
𝑎=0.996                     𝑎=0.999                 𝑎=0.9999 
Figure 1.9: Numerical examples of Example 2 (7) 
 
4) When C = 1, K ∈ �C + 1, (C + 1)C+1C � , ρ ∈ �0, 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾�, assume K = 3, ρ = 0.65 
Figure 1.9 shows that when K and ρ are lower enough, and α is higher enough, it would be 
better for the sender to invest more expenditure to channel 1 as α is increasing. 
 
1.4.2 with different degrees of information transmission for the receivers 
Assume the parameter of information transmission from receiver 1 to receiver 2 is denoted by 
𝜌12 ∈ [0,1], and from receiver 2 to receiver 1 is denoted by 𝜌21 ∈ [0,1], where 𝜌12 ≠ 𝜌21. 
Keep the levels of the channels’ persuasive function constant, and assume it is equal to 1.  
 
1.4.2.1 Example 1  
𝜆(𝑐) = 𝑐
𝑐 + 𝐾  ,𝐾 > 0 
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The maximization problem for the sender is written as follows 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶1(1 + 𝜌12) C1(C1 + 𝐾) + (1 + 𝜌21) (𝐶 − C1)(𝐶 − C1 + 𝐾) − (𝜌21 + 𝜌12) C1(C1 + 𝐾) (𝐶 − C1)(𝐶 − C1 + 𝐾), 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶],𝜌12,𝜌21 ∈  [0,1],𝜌12 ≠ 𝜌21,𝐾 > 0. 
 
Theorem 5 Optimal Allocation of Expenditure in Example 1 
There exists an internal solution. The optimal of expenditure for the sender should satisfy the 
following condition 
𝜌12 = 𝜌21[(𝐶 − 𝐶1)2 + 𝐶𝐾 + 𝐾2] + (𝐶 + 2𝐾)(2𝐶1 − 𝐶)
𝐶1
2 + 𝐾2 + 𝐶𝐾 . 
 
The proof of Theorem 5 is provided in Appendix. Specially, if ρ21 = 0, 𝜌12 = (𝐶+2𝐾)(2𝐶1−𝐶)𝐶12+𝐾2+𝐶𝐾 . 
We find that the sender should increase expenditure in channel 1 from C/2 to C when ρ12 
increases. If ρ12 = 0, 𝜌21 = (𝐶+2𝐾)(𝐶−2𝐶1)(𝐶−𝐶1)2+𝐶𝐾+𝐾2. We find the sender should decrease expenditure in 
channel 1 from C/2 to 0 when ρ21 increases. 
 
Corollary 5 Decision Rules about Optimal Allocation of Expenditure in Example 1 
It would be better for the sender to invest more expenditure to channel 1 than channel 2 when 
𝜌12 is larger than 𝜌21. In addition, the sender should increase expenditure in channel 1 when 
𝜌12 increases or 𝜌21 decreases. 
 
The proof of Corollary 2 is provided in Appendix. By the implicit function theorem, we find the 
sender should increase expenditure in channel 1 when ρ12  increases or ρ21  decreases. If 
ρ12 = 𝜌21,𝐶1 = 𝐶/2. It’s symmetric information transmission model and the sender allocates 




1.4.2.2 Example 2  
𝜆(𝑐) = 𝑙𝑛 (𝑐 + 1)
𝑙𝑛𝐾
,𝐾 > 𝐶 + 1. 
The maximization problem for the sender is written as 
𝑈(𝐶1) = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶1𝛼1(1 + 𝜌12) ln (C1 + 1)lnK + 𝛼2(1 + 𝜌21) ln (C − C1 + 1)lnK − 𝛼1𝛼2(𝜌21+ 𝜌12) ln (C1 + 1)lnK ln (C − C1 + 1)lnK  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶],𝛼1,𝛼2 ∈ [0,1],𝜌12,𝜌21 ∈  [0,1],𝐾 > 𝐶 + 1. 
 
First derivative with respect to 𝐶1, 
𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑𝐶1
= (1 + ρ12) 1(C1 + 1)lnK − (1 + ρ21) 1(C − C1 + 1)lnK − (ρ21+ ρ12) � 1(C1 + 1)lnK ln (C − C1 + 1)lnK − ln (C1 + 1)lnK 1(C − C1 + 1)lnK� 





= (1 + ρ12) 1lnK − (1 + ρ21) 1(C + 1)lnK − (ρ21 + ρ12) 1lnK ln(C + 1)lnK )
= 1(C + 1)lnK {(1 + ρ12)(C + 1) − (1 + ρ21) − (ρ21 + ρ12)(C + 1) ln(C + 1)lnK }= 1(C + 1)lnK �𝐶 + ρ12(C + 1) �1 − ln(C + 1)lnK � − ρ21 �1 + (C + 1) ln(C + 1)lnK �� 
We have the results as follows 
𝐼𝑓 ρ12 ∈ �0, ρ21[lnK + (C + 1) ln(C + 1)] − ClnK(C + 1)[lnK − ln(C + 1)] � ,𝑤𝑒 𝑔𝑒𝑡  𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)𝑑𝐶1 �𝐶1=0 ≤ 0,  
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐶1 = 0 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡; 
𝐼𝑓 ρ12 ∈ �ρ21[lnK + (C + 1) ln(C + 1)] − ClnK(C + 1)[lnK − ln(C + 1)] , 1� ,𝑤𝑒 𝑔𝑒𝑡  𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)𝑑𝐶1 �𝐶1=0 ≥ 0,  
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐶1 = 0 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡. 
We find the first order condition is not always great than 0. When ρ12 is lower enough, the 
persuasion of receiver 1 is dominated by the persuasion of the receiver 2, and the first order 
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condition is less than 0. Then the sender is more likely to invest one of the channels.  
 
Theorem 6 Optimal Allocation of Expenditure in Example 2 
If there exists an internal solution, the optimal of expenditure for the sender should satisfy the 
following condition 
ρ12 = ρ21[(C1 + 1)lnK + (C − C1 + 1) ln(C − C1 + 1) − (C1 + 1) ln(C1 + 1)] − (C − 2C1)lnK[(C − C1 + 1)lnK − (C − C1 + 1) ln(C − C1 + 1) + (C1 + 1) ln(C1 + 1))] . 
 
The proof of Theorem 6 is provided in Appendix. Specially  
1. If ρ21 = 0, ρ12 = −(C−2C1)lnK[(C−C1+1)lnK−(C−C1+1) ln(C−C1+1)+(C1+1) ln(C1+1))]. We find that the sender 
should increase expenditure in channel 1 from C/2 to C when ρ12 increases.  
2. If ρ12 = 0, ρ21 = (C−2C1)lnK[(C1+1)lnK+(C−C1+1) ln(C−C1+1)−(C1+1) ln(C1+1)]. We find the sender should 
decrease expenditure in channel 1 from C/2 to 0 when ρ21 increases.  
3. If ρ12 = ρ21, it’s symmetric information transmission model. 
 
Corollary 6 Decision Rules about Optimal Allocation of Expenditure in Example 2 
If ρ12 or ρ21 is lower enough, the sender is more likely to invest all expenditure to anther 
channel. It would be better for the sender to increase expenditure in channel 1 as 𝜌12 increases; 
while it would be better for the sender to decrease expenditure in channel 1 as 𝜌21 increases. It 
would be better for the sender to invest more expenditure to channel 1 than channel 2 when 𝜌12 
is larger than 𝜌21. 
 
Given some numerical examples for Corollary 6  
Assume C = 1, K = 18 
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ρ12 = 0           ρ12 = 0.5          ρ12 = 0.75            ρ12 = 1 
Figure 1.10: Numerical examples of Example 2 (8) 
 
               
ρ12 = 0         ρ12 = 0.25             ρ12 = 0.5           ρ12 = 0.75 
Figure 1.11: Numerical examples of Example 2 (9) 
 
            
         ρ21 = 0          ρ21 = 0.5             ρ21 = 0.75          ρ21 = 1 
Figure 1.12: Numerical examples of Example 2 (10) 
 
(1) When ρ21 = 1, Figure 1.10 shows that it would be better for the sender to increase 
expenditure to channel 1 from 0 to C/2 as the level of information transmission from receiver 1 
to receiver 2 (𝜌12) is increasing from 0 to 1. 
(2) When ρ21 = 0.5, Figure 1.11 shows that it would be better for the sender to increase 
expenditure to channel 1 as the level of information transmission from receiver 1 to receiver 2 
(𝜌12) is increasing. 
(3) When ρ12 = 1, Figure 1.12 shows that it would be better for the sender to decrease 
expenditure to channel 1 from C to C/2 as the level of information transmission from receiver 1 
to receiver 2 (𝜌21) is increasing from 0 to 1. 
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1.5 Conclusion  
This paper constructs a model of information transmission. We mainly analyze a symmetric 
strategic information transmission model by introducing two parameters. One is the level of 
persuasive function of the channel; another is the degree of connection between the receivers. 
The model was constructed with an informed sender and two uninformed receivers, where the 
sender wants to convince the receivers to take a certain action. General results suggest that the 
sender obtain higher maximum persuasive power with higher level of the channel’s persuasive 
function and higher degree of connection between the receivers. 
Considering the persuasive function of the channel, we prove that if persuasive function is a 
liner or convex function, the sender should invests all expenditure to one channel with higher 
level of persuasive function and higher degree of information transmission for the receiver. 
However, if persuasive function is a concave function, optimal behavior of the sender is 
uncertain, which depends on the level of persuasive function of the channel, the degree of 
connection between the receiver, and the degree of information distortion in the channel. The 
optimal allocation could be allocate one channel, both channels equally or both channels 
unequally. Thus our results focus on concave function. 
This paper solved the sender’s expenditure allocation problem. Our analysis mainly focused 
on the concave function of the channel under three specific environments. For concave function 
example 1, the results are regular for us. The sender should invest expenditure to both channels 
equally in symmetric model, invest expenditure more in one channel with higher level of 
persuasive function, and invest expenditure more in one channel with higher degree of 
information transmission for the receiver in asymmetric model.  
However, for concave function example 2, the results are irregular for us. In the symmetric 
strategic information transmission model, it would be better for the sender to invest expenditure 
to both channels equally when the degree of information distortion and level of information 
transmission are lower enough, or the degree of information distortion is higher enough. Also, it 
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would be better for the sender to invest expenditure to only one channel when the degree of 
information distortion is lower enough and the parameter of information transmission between 
receivers is higher enough. Others, it would be better for the sender to invest expenditure to two 
channels unequally. Thus we find it is not always for the sender to allocate the expenditure in the 
channels equally in the symmetric model. 
In asymmetric strategic information transmission model with different levels of persuasive 
function of the channels, it would be better for the sender to invest expenditure to channel 2 
when the degree of information distortion and degree of information transmission are higher 
enough regardless the level of persuasive function, or the higher degree of information distortion 
with lower level of persuasive function, or the lower degree of information distortion and lower 
degree of information transmission with lower level of persuasive function. Others, it would be 
better for sender to allocate expenditure to two channels, and an amount of expenditure to 
channel 1 is less than channel 2. Thus we find that it is always for the sender to invest all 
expenditure to channel 2 with lower level of persuasive function of the channel in asymmetric 
model with different levels of persuasive function of the channels. 
    In asymmetric strategic information transmission model with different parameter of 
information transmission, the sender is more likely to invest all expenditure to one channel when 
the degree of information transmission for another channel’s receiver is lower enough. It would 
be better for the sender to increase expenditure in channel 1 as the degree of information 
transmission for the receiver 1 ρ12 increases; while the result for ρ21 is contrary to the result 
for ρ12.  
    This paper is conducive to obtain more receivers to participation and support. In addition, it 
provides the optimal allocation of expenditure for the sender. Limitation of this paper is only 
consider two-channel problem, thus we could use general persuasive function instead of specific 
persuasive function to analyze the problem with multi-channel in the future. 
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1.6 Appendix   
Proof of Lemma 3 Comparing two critical values of the parameter of connection between the 
receivers and the degrees of information distortion of the channels.  𝜌1 = 𝑙𝑛𝐾2 𝑙𝑛[(𝐶 2⁄ + 1) 𝑒] − 𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 𝜌2 = 𝐶𝑙𝑛𝐾2(𝐶 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1) − 𝐶𝑙𝑛𝐾, 
𝐾1 = (𝐶 2⁄ + 1)𝑒,𝐾2 = (𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ ,  
Let  
𝑄(𝐶) =  𝐾2
𝐾1




(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄(𝐶/2 + 1)𝑒 =  1, 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝐶→∞ (𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄(𝐶/2 + 1)𝑒 =  2𝑒, 
𝑄′(𝐶) =  − 2(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ �(𝐶 + 2) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1) − 2𝐶�
𝑒𝐶2(𝐶 + 2)2 . 
Let 
ℎ(𝐶) =  (𝐶 + 2) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1) − 2𝐶, 
We have 
𝑓(𝐶) = ℎ′(𝐶) =  𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1) − 𝐶
𝐶 + 1, 
𝑔(𝐶) = 𝑓′(𝐶) =  𝐶(𝐶 + 1)2. 
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑔(0)＝0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔(𝐶)＝ 𝐶(𝐶 + 1)2 > 0,𝑤𝑒 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  𝑓(𝐶) = � 𝑔(𝑐)𝑑𝑐𝐶
0
> 0. 
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓(0) = 0,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓(𝐶) =  𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1) − 𝐶
𝐶 + 1 > 0,𝑤𝑒 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  
ℎ(𝐶) = � 𝑓(𝑐)𝑑𝑐𝐶
0
> 0. 
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 ℎ(𝐶) > 0,𝑄′(𝐶) = −  2(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ �(𝐶 + 2) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1) − 2𝐶�
𝑒𝐶2(𝐶 + 2)2 < 0, 
𝑄(𝐶) =  𝐾2
𝐾1
= (𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄(𝐶/2 + 1)𝑒 ∈  �2𝑒 , 1�, 




= 𝑙𝑛𝐾2𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − 𝑙𝑛𝐾
𝑙𝑛𝐾2 𝑙𝑛(𝐶/2 + 1) 𝑒 − 𝑙𝑛𝐾 = 2 𝑙𝑛(𝐶/2 + 1) 𝑒 − 𝑙𝑛𝐾2 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − 𝑙𝑛𝐾. 
Since (𝐶/2 + 1)𝑒 > (𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 , we have  𝑙𝑛(𝐶/2 + 1) 𝑒 > 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ , 
𝜌2
𝜌1
= 2 𝑙𝑛(𝐶/2 + 1) 𝑒 − 𝑙𝑛𝐾2 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − 𝑙𝑛𝐾 > 1, 
𝜌1 <  𝜌2. 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Lemma 4 Checking the first order condition of Example 2 has no more than two 
solutions when  𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶 2⁄ ]. 
First derivative with respect to 𝐶1, 
𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑𝐶1
= (1 + 𝜌) � 1(𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾  − 1(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾�
− 2𝜌 � 1(𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 1(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾�. 
Simplifying first derivative, we have 
𝑑𝑈(𝐶1)
𝑑𝐶1
= 1(𝐶1 + 1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 �(𝐶 − 2𝐶1)+ 𝜌 �(𝐶 − 2𝐶1) − 2𝑙𝑛𝐾 [(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) − (𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1)]��. 
Definition 1 (𝑖) 𝑞(𝐶1) = 1(𝐶1 + 1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾,  (𝑖𝑖) 𝑓(𝐶1) = (𝐶 − 2𝐶1)+ 𝜌 �(𝐶 − 2𝐶1) − 2𝑙𝑛𝐾 [(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) − (𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1)]�. 
Note that  (i)  𝑞(𝐶1) > 0  when  𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶] ; (ii)  the figure of f(C1)  is symmetric since f(C1)＝f(C − C1). Consider C1 ∈ [0, C 2⁄ ].  
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𝑔(𝐶1) = 𝜕𝑓(𝐶1)𝜕𝐶1 = −2 + 2𝜌 𝑙𝑛 [(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) (𝐶1 + 1)] + 2 − 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑙𝑛𝐾 . 
ℎ(𝐶1) = 𝜕𝑔(𝐶1)𝜕𝐶1 = 2𝜌𝑙𝑛𝐾 �−(𝐶1 + 1) + (𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)(𝐶1 + 1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) � = 2𝜌(𝐶 − 2𝐶1)(𝐶1 + 1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾. 
Then we have 
ℎ(𝐶1) ≥ 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶/2]. 
Thus the sign of 𝑔(𝐶1) changes no more than once, and 𝑓(𝐶1)＝0 has no more than two 
solutions. Since we have 𝑞(𝐶1) > 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶/2], 𝑞(𝐶1)𝑓(𝐶1)＝0 has no more than two 
solutions. Thus the first order condition of Example 2 has no more than two solutions when  𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶 2⁄ ].  ⊡  
Proof of Lemma 6 Analyzing three cases about the graph of the objective function in Example 2 
(1) Consider g(C1) always less than zero when C1 ∈ [0, C 2⁄ ].     
The following conditions must be satisfied K ∈ (C + 1, (C/2 + 1)e), ρ ∈  �0, lnK2 ln [(C/2 + 1) e] – lnK�  or K ∈  �(C/2 + 1)e, +∞�. 
In this case, f(C1) will decrease when C1 increases, and f(C/2) = 0, so the sign of f(C1) 
changes from positive to zero when C1  increases. Since q(C1) > 0 , we get the first 
derivative  q(C1)f(C1)  changes from positive to zero. Then the objective function reaches 
maximum value at C1 = C/2 when C1 ∈ [0, C 2⁄ ]. 
 
(2) Consider g(C1) changes from less than zero to greater than zero when C1 ∈ [0, C 2⁄ ]. 
We have following three situations: (i) K ∈  �C + 1, (C + 1)C+1C � , ρ ∈  � lnK2 ln[(C/2 + 1) e] – lnK , lnK2ln(C + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − lnK�  or  K ∈  �(C + 1)C+1C , (C/2 + 1)e� , ρ ∈  � lnK2 ln[(C/2 + 1) e] – lnK , 1�. 
In above situation, the sign of f(C1) changes from positive to zero, changes from zero to 
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negative, and changes from negative to zero when C1 increases. Since q(C1) > 0, then the first 
derivative q(C1)f(C1) changes from positive to zero, changes from zero to negative, then 
changes from negative to zero. Then when C1 ∈ [0, C/2] , the objective function reaches 
maximum value at    
ρ = −(C − 2C1)(C − 2C1) − 2[(C − C1 + 1) ln(C − C1 + 1) − (C1 + 1) ln(C1 + 1)]lnK . (ii) K ∈  �C + 1, (C + 1)C+1C � , ρ = lnK2ln(C + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − lnK. 
In above situation, the sign of f(C1) changes from zero to negative, and then changes from 
negative to zero when C1 increases. Since q(C1) > 0, then the first derivative q(C1)f(C1) 
changes from zero to negative, then changes from negative to zero. Then the objective function 
reaches maximum value at C1 = 0 when C1 ∈ [0, C/2].  (iii) K ∈  �C + 1, (C + 1)C+1C � , ρ ∈ � lnK2ln(C + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − lnK , 1�. 
In above situation, the sign of f(C1) changes from negative to zero. Since q(C1) > 0 when C1 
increases, then the first derivative q(C1)f(C1) changes from negative to zero. Then the objective 
function reaches maximum value at C1 = 0 when C1 ∈ [0, C/2].  
 
(3) Consider g(C1) always greater than zero when C1 ∈ [0, C 2⁄ ] 
The following condition must be satisfied C ∈ (0, e2 − 1) , K ∈ �C + 1, e�(C + 1)� , ρ ∈  � lnKln(C + 1) + 2 − lnK , 1� 
In this case, the sign of f(C1) changes from negative to zero when C1  increases. Since q(C1) > 0 , then the first derivative q(C1)f(C1) changes from negative to zero. Then the 
objective function reaches maximum value at C1 = 0 when C1 ∈ [0, C/2].  
 
We show that the third result (3) is included in the second result (2)-(ii) as follows For the condition (2) −  (ii)  
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C1 ∈ �0, C2� , K ∈  �C + 1, (C + 1)C+1C � , ρ ∈ � lnK2ln(C + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − lnK , 1�, 
We have (C + 1)C+1C  will increase when C increase;  lnK2ln(C + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − lnK  will decrease when C increases. At C = e2 − 1, we have  (C + 1)C+1C = (e2) e2e2−1 lnK2ln(C + 1)(C+1)C − lnK = lnK2ln(e2) e2e2−1 − lnK −−− (𝐴) 
For the condition of the third result in Lemma 4 C ∈ (0, e2 − 1) , K ∈ �C + 1, e�(C + 1)� , ρ ∈  � lnKln(C + 1) + 2 − lnK , 1� 
We have e�(C + 1) will increase when C increase;  lnKln(C + 1) + 2 − lnK  will decrease when C increases. At C = e2 − 1, we have  e�(C + 1) = e2, lnKln(C + 1) + 2 − lnK = lnKlne2 + 2 − lnK −−− (B) 
Compare (A) and (B), we get  When C ∈ (0, e2 − 1) , �C + 1, e�(C + 1)� ∈  �C + 1, (C + 1)C+1C � ; 
�
lnKln(C + 1) + 2 − lnK , 1� ∈ � lnK2ln(C + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − lnK , 1�. 
Thus the third result (3) is included in the second result (2)-(ii), we can ignore the result (3). 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Theorem 3 Checking optimal allocation of expenditure in Example 1 in asymmetric 
information transmission with different levels of the channel’s persuasive function 
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𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶1(1 + 𝜌) � 𝛼𝐶1(𝐶1 + 𝐾) + (𝐶 − 𝐶1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)� − 2𝜌𝛼 𝐶1(𝐶1 + 𝐾) (𝐶 − 𝐶1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾), 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶], 𝜌 ∈  [0,1],𝛼 ∈ (0,1),𝐾 > 0. 
First order condition with respect to 𝐶1 (1 + 𝜌) � 𝛼𝐾(𝐶1 + 𝐾)2  − 𝐾(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2�
− 2𝜌𝛼 � 𝐾(𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 (𝐶 − 𝐶1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾) − 𝐶1(𝐶1 + 𝐾) 𝐾(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2� = 0. (1 + 𝜌)[𝛼(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 − (𝐶1 + 𝐾)2]  − 2𝜌𝛼(𝐶 − 2𝐶1)(𝐶 + 𝐾)(𝐶1 + 𝐾)2(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 = 0. 
We have 
𝜌 = 𝛼(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 − (𝐶1 + 𝐾)22𝛼(𝐶 − 2𝐶1)(𝐶 + 𝐾) − 𝛼(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 + (𝐶1 + 𝐾)2= 𝛼(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 − (𝐶1 + 𝐾)2
𝛼𝐶(𝐶 − 2𝐶1) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐶1 + 𝐾)2. 
Second derivative with respect to 𝐶1 (1 + ρ) � −2αK(C1 + K)3 + −2K(C − C1 + K)3�
− 2ρα � −2K(C1 + K)3 (C − C1)(C − C1 + K) − 2 K(C1 + K)2  K(C − C1 + K)2+ C1(C1 + K) −2K(C − C1 + K)3� = −2K(C1 + K)3(C − C1 + K)3 {(1 + ρ)[(C1 + K)3 + α(C − C1 + K)3]
− 2ρα[(C − C1)(C − C1 + K)2 + K(C1 + K)(C − C1 + K) + C1(C1 + K)2]} < 0. 
The second derivative of the objective function is less than zero, so a critical value of C1 is a 
global maximum value. 
Solve first order condition at 𝜌 = 0,𝐶1 = 0, we obtain a critical value of 𝛼, 
𝛼(𝐶 − 0 + 𝐾)2 − (0 + 𝐾)2 = 0 
𝛼 = 𝐾2(𝐶 + 𝐾)2. 
(1) When α ∈  (0, K2 (C + K)2⁄ ], the objective function reaches maximum value point when C1 = 0. It’s a corner solution. Thus the sender should invest all expenditure to the channel 2. 
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(2) When α ∈  (K2/(C + K)2, 1), there exits an internal solution. The optimal of expenditure for 
the sender should satisfy the following condition 
ρ = α(C − C1 + K)2 − (C1 + K)2
αC(C − 2C1) + (1 − α)(C1 + K)2. 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Corollary 3 Checking decision rules about optimal allocation of expenditure in 
Example 1 in asymmetric information transmission with different levels of the channel’s 
persuasive function 
𝜌 = 𝛼(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 − (𝐶1 + 𝐾)22𝛼(𝐶 − 2𝐶1)(𝐶 + 𝐾) − 𝛼(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 + (𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 
By the implicit function theorem 
𝑓(𝛼,𝐶1) = 𝜌[2𝛼(𝐶 − 2𝐶1)(𝐶 + 𝐾) − 𝛼(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 + (𝐶1 + 𝐾)2]
− [𝛼(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 − (𝐶1 + 𝐾)2] = 0 
𝜕𝑓(𝛼,𝐶1)
𝜕𝛼
= 𝜌 �2(𝐶 − 2𝐶1)(𝐶 + 𝐾) − 2 ∗ 2𝛼(𝐶 + 𝐾)𝜕𝐶1𝜕𝛼 − (𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 + 2𝛼(𝐶 − 𝐶1+ 𝐾)𝜕𝐶1
𝜕𝛼
+ 2(𝐶1 + 𝐾)𝜕𝐶1𝜕𝛼 �
− �(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 − 2𝛼(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)𝜕𝐶1𝜕𝛼 − 2(𝐶1 + 𝐾)𝜕𝐶1𝜕𝛼 � = 0 
𝜕𝐶1
𝜕𝛼
= 2𝜌(𝐶 − 2𝐶1)(𝐶 + 𝐾) − (1 + 𝜌)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2{2𝜌 ∗ 2𝛼(𝐶 + 𝐾) − (1 + 𝜌)[2𝛼(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾) + 2(𝐶1 + 𝐾)]} > 0 
The sender should increase expenditure in channel 1 when α increases from (𝐾2/(𝐶 + 𝐾)2, 1). 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Theorem 4 Checking the sign of ∂U(C1)
∂C1
|C1=0 of Example 2 in asymmetric information 
transmission with different levels of the channel’s persuasive function 




|𝐶1=0 = 1𝑙𝑛𝐾 �(1 + 𝜌) �𝛼 − 1𝐶 + 1� − 2𝜌𝛼 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 �= 1
𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑙𝑛𝐾
��(1 + 𝜌)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌𝑙𝑛 (𝐶 + 1)�𝛼 − (1 + 𝜌)𝑙𝑛𝐾
𝐶 + 1 � (𝑖) Assume 
𝜕𝑈(𝐶1)
𝜕𝐶1
|𝐶1=0 = 1𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑙𝑛𝐾 ��(1 + 𝜌)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌𝑙𝑛 (𝐶 + 1)�𝛼 − (1 + 𝜌)𝑙𝑛𝐾𝐶 + 1 � < 0 
Then 
𝛼 < (1 + ρ)ln𝐾(𝐶 + 1)[(1 + ρ)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)] 1. 𝐼𝑓 (𝐶 + 1)[(1 + ρ) 𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)] > (1 + ρ)lnK,𝑤𝑒 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  (1) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)2(𝐶+1)𝐶 � ,𝜌 < 𝑙𝑛𝐾2𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − 𝑙𝑛𝐾, 
• 𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 � ,𝜌 ∈ �0, 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾� ; 
• 𝐾 ∈ �(𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 , (𝐶 + 1)2(𝐶+1)𝐶 � ,𝜌 < 1 < 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝜌. (2) 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐾 ∈ �(𝐶 + 1)2(𝐶+1)𝐶 , +∞� ,𝜌 > 0 > 𝑙𝑛𝐾2𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − 𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝜌. 2. 𝐼𝑓 (𝐶 + 1)[(1 + ρ) 𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)] < (1 + ρ)lnK, 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝛼,𝑤𝑒 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 (1) 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)2(𝐶+1)𝐶 � ,𝜌 > 𝑙𝑛𝐾2𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − 𝑙𝑛𝐾, 
• 𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 � ,𝜌 ∈ � 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 1�. 
• 𝐾 ∈ �(𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 , (𝐶 + 1)2(𝐶+1)𝐶 � ,𝜌 > 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾 > 1,𝑛𝑜 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. (2) 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐾 ∈ �(𝐶 + 1)2(𝐶+1)𝐶 , +∞� ,𝜌 < 𝑙𝑛𝐾2𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − 𝑙𝑛𝐾 < 0, 𝑛𝑜 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 
Results of (𝑖) situation as follows 1.  𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝛼 ∈ (0,1),𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 � ,𝜌 ∈ � 𝑙𝑛𝐾2𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − 𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 1�,  
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜕𝑈(𝐶1)
𝜕𝐶1
|𝐶1=0 < 0. 2.  𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝛼 ∈ �0, (1 + ρ)ln𝐾(𝐶 + 1)[(1 + ρ)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌ln(𝐶 + 1)]�, 
• K ∈ �C + 1, (C + 1)C+1C � , ρ ∈ �0, 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾� , 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 ∂U(C1)∂C1 |C1=0 < 0. 
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• K ∈ �(C + 1)C+1C , +∞� , 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 ∂U(C1)
∂C1




|𝐶1=0 = 1𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑙𝑛𝐾 ��(1 + 𝜌)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌𝑙𝑛 (𝐶 + 1)�𝛼 − (1 + 𝜌)𝑙𝑛𝐾𝐶 + 1 � > 0, 
Then 
𝛼 > (1 + ρ)ln𝐾(𝐶 + 1)[(1 + ρ)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)] 1. 𝐼𝑓 (𝐶 + 1)[(1 + ρ)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)] > (1 + ρ)ln𝐾, (1) 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)2(𝐶+1)𝐶 � ,𝜌 < 𝑙𝑛𝐾2𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − 𝑙𝑛𝐾, 
• 𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 � ,𝜌 ∈ �0, 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾�. 
• 𝐾 ∈ �(𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 , (𝐶 + 1)2(𝐶+1)𝐶 � ,𝜌 < 1 < 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝜌. (2) 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐾 ∈ �(𝐶 + 1)2(𝐶+1)𝐶 , +∞� ,𝜌 > 0 > 𝑙𝑛𝐾2𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − 𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝜌. 2.  If (𝐶 + 1)[(1 + ρ)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)] < (1 + ρ)ln𝐾, no solution. 
Result of (ii) situation as follows 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 α ∈ � (1 + ρ)ln𝐾(𝐶 + 1)[(1 + ρ)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)] , 1�, 
• K ∈ �C + 1, (C + 1)C+1C � , ρ ∈ �0, 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾� , 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 ∂U(C1)∂C1 |C1=0 > 0. 
• K ∈ �(C + 1)C+1C , +∞� , 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 ∂U(C1)
∂C1
|C1=0 > 0. 
 
Conclude above results (i) and (ii), we have  1.𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝛼 ∈ (0,1),𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 � ,𝜌 ∈ � 𝑙𝑛𝐾2𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ − 𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 1�,      𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜕𝑈(𝐶1)
𝜕𝐶1
|𝐶1=0 < 0,𝐶1 = 0 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡. 2.𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝛼 ∈ �0, (1 + ρ)ln𝐾(𝐶 + 1)[(1 + ρ)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)]�, 
  𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 � ,𝜌 ∈ �0, 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾�  𝑜𝑟 𝐾 ∈ �(𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 , +∞�, 
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  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜕𝑈(𝐶1)
𝜕𝐶1
|𝐶1=0 < 0, 𝐶1 = 0 is a local maximum point. 3.𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝛼 ∈ � (1 + ρ)ln𝐾(𝐶 + 1)[(1 + ρ)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 2𝜌 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 + 1)] , 1�, 
  𝐾 ∈ �𝐶 + 1, (𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 � ,𝜌 ∈ �0, 𝑙𝑛𝐾
2𝑙𝑛(𝐶+1)(𝐶+1) 𝐶⁄ −𝑙𝑛𝐾�  𝑜𝑟 𝐾 ∈ �(𝐶 + 1)𝐶+1𝐶 , +∞�, 
  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜕𝑈(𝐶1)
𝜕𝐶1
|𝐶1=0 > 0, 𝐶1 = 0 is a local minimum point. 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Lemma 7 The first order condition of Example 2 has no more than three solutions in 
asymmetric information transmission with different levels of the channel’s persuasive function. 
First derivative with respect to 𝐶1, we have 
𝜕𝑈(C1)
𝜕C1 = (1 + ρ) � α(C1 + 1)lnK  − 1(C − C1 + 1)lnK�
− 2ρα � 1(C1 + 1)lnK ln(C − C1 + 1)lnK − ln(C1 + 1)lnK 1(C − C1 + 1)lnK�. 
Simplifying first derivative, we have = 1(𝐶1 + 1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 �(1 + ρ)[α(C − C1 + 1) − (C1 + 1)]
−
2ραlnK [(C − C1 + 1) ln(C − C1 + 1) − (𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1)]�. 




[(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) − (𝐶1 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1)]. 
𝑔(𝐶1) = 𝜕𝑤(𝐶1)𝜕𝐶1 = −(1 + 𝜌)(𝛼 + 1) + 2𝜌𝛼𝑙𝑛𝐾 [𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1) + 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) + 2]= −(1 + 𝜌) − 𝛼 �(1 + 𝜌) − 2𝜌
𝑙𝑛𝐾
[ln [(𝐶1 + 1) (𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)] + 2]�. 
ℎ(𝐶1) = 𝜕𝑔(𝐶1)𝜕𝐶1 = 2𝛼𝜌𝑙𝑛𝐾 �−(𝐶1 + 1) + (𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)(𝐶1 + 1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1) � = 2𝛼𝜌(𝐶 − 2𝐶1)(𝐶1 + 1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾. 
Then we have 
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ℎ(𝐶1) ≥ 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐶1 ∈ �0,𝐶2� ;ℎ(𝐶1) ≤ 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐶1 ∈ �𝐶2 ,𝐶�. 
Thus the sign of 𝑔(𝐶1) changes no more than three times when 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶], and 𝑤(𝐶1)＝0 has 
no more than three solutions. Since we have 𝑣(𝐶1) > 0, the first order condition of example 2 
has no more than three solutions when 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶]. 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Theorem 5 Checking optimal allocation of expenditure in example 1 in asymmetric 
information transmission with different degrees of information transmission for the receivers 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶1(1 + 𝜌12) C1(C1 + 𝐾) + (1 + 𝜌21) (𝐶 − C1)(𝐶 − C1 + 𝐾) − (𝜌21 + 𝜌12) C1(C1 + 𝐾) (𝐶 − C1)(𝐶 − C1 + 𝐾) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶],𝜌12, 𝜌21 ∈  [0,1],𝜌12 ≠ 𝜌21,𝐾 > 0. 
First order condition with respect to 𝐶1 (1 + 𝜌12) 𝐾(C1 + 𝐾)2  − (1 + 𝜌21) 𝐾(𝐶 − C1 + 𝐾)2 − (𝜌21+ 𝜌12) � 𝐾(C1 + 𝐾)2 (𝐶 − C1)(𝐶 − C1 + 𝐾) − C1(C1 + 𝐾) 𝐾(𝐶 − C1 + 𝐾)2� = 0, 
𝐾
(1 + 𝜌12)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 − (1 + 𝜌21)(𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 − (𝜌21 + 𝜌12)(𝐶 − 2𝐶1)(𝐶 + 𝐾)(C1 + 𝐾)2(𝐶 − C1 + 𝐾)2 = 0. 
We have 
𝜌12 = 𝜌21[(𝐶 − 𝐶1)2 + 𝐶𝐾 + 𝐾2] + (𝐶 + 2𝐾)(2𝐶1 − 𝐶)
𝐶1
2 + 𝐾2 + 𝐶𝐾 . 
Second derivative with respect to 𝐶1 (1 + 𝜌12) −2𝐾(𝐶1 + 𝐾)3 + (1 + 𝜌21) −2𝐾(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)3 − (𝜌21+ 𝜌12) � −2𝐾(𝐶1 + 𝐾)3 (𝐶 − 𝐶1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾) − 2 𝐾(𝐶1 + 𝐾)2  𝐾(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2+ 𝐶1(𝐶1 + 𝐾) −2𝐾(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)3� 
−2𝐾(𝐶1 + 𝐾)3(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)3 {(1 + 𝜌12)(𝐶1 + 𝐾)3 + (1 + 𝜌21)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)3 − (𝜌21+ 𝜌12)[(𝐶 − 𝐶1)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾)2 + 𝐾(𝐶1 + 𝐾)(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 𝐾) + 𝐶1(𝐶1 + 𝐾)2]} < 0 
The second derivative of the objective function is less than zero, so a critical value of C1 is a 
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maximum value.  
     ⊡ 
 
Proof of Corollary 5 Checking decision rules about optimal allocation of expenditure in 
Example 1 in asymmetric information transmission with different degrees of information 
transmission for the receivers 
𝜌12 = 𝜌21[(𝐶 − 𝐶1)2 + 𝐶𝐾 + 𝐾2] + (𝐶 + 2𝐾)(2𝐶1 − 𝐶)
𝐶1
2 + 𝐾2 + 𝐶𝐾 . 
By the implicit function theorem 
1. 𝑓(𝜌12,𝐶1) = 𝜌12�𝐶12 + 𝐾2 + 𝐶𝐾� − 𝜌21[(𝐶 − 𝐶1)2 + 𝐶𝐾 + 𝐾2] − (𝐶 + 2𝐾)(2𝐶1 − 𝐶) = 0, 
𝜕𝑓(𝜌12,𝐶1)
𝜕𝜌12
= �𝐶12 + 𝐾2 + 𝐶𝐾� + 2𝜌12𝐶1 𝜕𝐶1𝜕𝜌12 + 2𝜌21(𝐶 − 𝐶1) 𝜕𝐶1𝜕𝜌12 − 2(𝐶 + 2𝐾) 𝜕𝐶1𝜕𝜌12 = 0, 
𝜕𝐶1
𝜕𝜌12
= −�𝐶12 + 𝐾2 + 𝐶𝐾�2𝜌12𝐶1 + 2𝜌21(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 2(𝐶 + 2𝐾) > 0. 
2. 𝑓(𝜌21,𝐶1) = 𝜌12�𝐶12 + 𝐾2 + 𝐶𝐾� − 𝜌21[(𝐶 − 𝐶1)2 + 𝐶𝐾 + 𝐾2] − (𝐶 + 2𝐾)(2𝐶1 − 𝐶) = 0, 
𝜕𝑓(𝜌12,𝐶1)
𝜕𝜌21
= 2𝜌12𝐶1 𝜕𝐶1𝜕𝜌21 − [(𝐶 − 𝐶1)2 + 𝐶𝐾 + 𝐾2] + 2𝜌21(𝐶 − 𝐶1) 𝜕𝐶1𝜕𝜌21 − 2(𝐶 + 2𝐾) 𝜕𝐶1𝜕𝜌21= 0, 
𝜕𝐶1
𝜕𝜌21
= (𝐶 − 𝐶1)2 + 𝐶𝐾 + 𝐾22𝜌12𝐶1 + 2𝜌21(𝐶 − 𝐶1) − 2(𝐶 + 2𝐾) < 0. 
The sender should increase expenditure in channel 1 when 𝜌12 increases or 𝜌21 decreases. 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Theorem 6 Checking optimal allocation of expenditure in example 2 in asymmetric 
information transmission with different degrees of information transmission for the receivers 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶1(1 + 𝜌12) 𝑙𝑛 (𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 + (1 + 𝜌21) ln(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − (𝜌21+ 𝜌12) 𝑙𝑛(𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝐶1 + 1)𝑙𝑛𝐾 , 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶1 ∈ [0,𝐶],𝜌12,𝜌21 ∈  [0,1],𝜌12 ≠ 𝜌21,𝐾 > 𝐶 + 1. 
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First order condition with respect to 𝐶1, (1 + ρ12)(C1 + 1)lnK − (1 + ρ21)(C − C1 + 1)lnK − (ρ21 + ρ12) � ln(C − C1 + 1)(C1 + 1)lnKlnK − ln(C1 + 1)lnK(C − C1 + 1)lnK�＝0. 1(C1 + 1)lnK(C − C1 + 1)lnK {(1 + ρ12)(C − C1 + 1)lnK − (1 + ρ21)(C1 + 1)lnK − (ρ21+ ρ12)[(C − C1 + 1) ln(C − C1 + 1) − (C1 + 1) ln(C1 + 1)]}＝0 (1 + ρ12)(C − C1 + 1)lnK − (1 + ρ21)(C1 + 1)lnK − (ρ21+ ρ12)[(C − C1 + 1) ln(C − C1 + 1) − (C1 + 1) ln(C1 + 1))] = 0 
We have 


















A formal analysis of scientists’ effort provision in 




This paper studies two scenarios in a formal analysis of scientists’ effort provision in 
research and dissemination. One is a simultaneous problem that the sender offers effort to send a 
signal to two types of audiences, such as experts and public; another is a sequential problem that 
the sender offers effort in academic research, and then sends signal to one type of audiences to 
representation with effort in science popularization. We investigate how the scientist should 
divide their time or energy between academic research and science popularization to obtain 
maximum utility. Consider the same probability and different probability functions at two 
dimensional for each scenario. We show the optimal allocation of effort depends on the weight of 
payoff from academic research and science popularization, and the difference in two probability 
functions between two signals, or between signal and representation. Specifically, in scenario 
one, if there exist polarization in academic research and science popularization, we could prevent 
polarization by increasing the ratio of the weights of payoff from dissemination and research 
using incentives to guarantee the scientist keep the allocation of effort as before. In scenario two, 
the result shows that we should put equal effort on research and dissemination for scientific 
achievements transformation no matter how difference in two probability functions between 
signal and representation. 




Besides academic research, science popularization is especially important in social progress. 
However, the public and society have recently been expressing dissatisfaction with the lack of 
effort from scientists in science popularization. Despite public interest in science, multiple nations 
report that their populations are lacking in basic factual knowledge about science, which is 
documented by National Science Board (2012). Some within academia even suggest that 
popularization should be a secondary activity. There will be questions about the academic’s 
reputation and motivations. Bentley and Kyvik (2011) also suggest that only a minority of 
academic staff undertakes popular science publishing by a survey of popular science publishing 
across 13 countries. The main reason is that scientists, especially young scientists, care more 
about academic research that is more important to the advancement of their career. Some 
scientists are ashamed of science popularization, and believe that if one is regarded as “science 
popularization personality”, her image will be harmed and her career advancement prospects will 
be diminished. Thus, scientists would like to communicate with experts and scholars in the arena 
of internal scientific communication, rather than the general public in the public arena. 
    While Jensen, Rouquier, Kreimer, and Croissant (2008) find that scientists’ dissemination 
activities have almost no impact on their careers, Weigold (2001) believes that scientists have a 
basic responsibility to interact with the public. Moreover Bentley and Kyvik (2011) show that the 
positive relationship between academic research and science popularization is consistent across all 
countries and academic fields. Their data suggests that scientist with popular publications in 
science popularization have higher levels of scientific publishing and academic rank. Thus, 
scientists have responsibility to become the backbone power in science communication and 
science popularization. 
    This paper focuses on a scientist’s tradeoff between academic research and science 
popularization. We believe that allocation of time conflict is inevitable. The purpose of this paper 
is to solve the problem that how to divide their time or energy between academic research and 
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science popularization for a scientist. 
We consider two types of audiences for scientists. For academic research, audience is 
mainly experts and scholars; also, audience of science popularization is general public. In 
addition, since audiences have different preference, we introduce preference bias measuring how 
nearly receivers’ interests coincide, which is similar to the bias in the model of Crawford and 
Sobel (1982). Goltsman and Pavlov (2011) show that the sender prefers communicating by 
private messages if the receivers’ average bias is high, and by public messages if the receivers’ 
average bias is low. 
This paper constructs two scenarios in a formal analysis of scientists’ effort provision in 
research and dissemination. One scenario is that the sender offers effort to send signal to two 
types of audiences simultaneously. This scenario is similar to horizontal communication in Hori 
(2006), who considers the state of nature is a linear function of the agents’ information: 
𝜃 = 𝛿𝐴𝛼 + 𝛿𝐵𝛽. Agents’ information transmissions are independent. Here is another similar 
model, Farrell and Gibbons (1989) develop the simplest possible model of cheap talk with two 
audiences, and show that cheap talk may influence bargaining with asymmetric information.  
Another scenario is that the sender offers effort in academic research, and then sends signal 
to one type of audiences to representation with effort in science popularization. Our model here 
is close to the model constructed in McGee and Yang (2013). They focus on two senders with 
complementary information, and show that the senders’ information transmissions exhibit 
strategic complementarity. The receiver’s ideal action is multiplicative in the realized 
states:𝑦∗(𝜃1,𝜃2) = 𝜃1𝜃2. While we introduce the probability of the signal and representation for 
the sequential effort from the sender in research and dissemination. 
We form the sender’s maximum problem and the receiver’s maximum payoff problem 
depends on Vroom's expectancy theory by giving the utility function of the sender and receivers, 
which is related with the model of strategic communication developed by Crawford and Sobel 
(1982). They show that the sender sends a possibly noisy signal to a receiver who takes an action 
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that determines the welfare of both. While in our model, communication is not a cheap talk, 
because the scientist offers time or effort in research and dissemination. We represent the 
probability of the signal and representation by effort.  
Some recent literatures deal with costly information transmission, including works by 
Degan and Li (2017), Li and Li (2013), Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014). Li and Li (2013) study 
two privately informed political candidates. They assume the information campaigns are costly, 
and a higher level of campaign, whether positive or negative, costs more than a lower level one. 
Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014) analyze Bayesian persuasion with costly signals. The cost of a 
signal is proportional to the expected reduction in uncertainty relative to the some fixed reference 
belief. Degan and Li (2017) study a sender’s optimal choice of precision. They assume the higher 
costs associated with higher precision.  
    Because the probability of the signal for different type of audiences is different, and the 
probability of the signal and representation is different in general, so we consider the same 
probability and different probability functions at two dimensional for each scenario. 
We investigate how the scientist should divide their time or energy between academic 
research and science popularization by the sender and receiver’s maximum problem. In scenario 
one, we show the optimal allocation of effort not only depends on the weights of payoff from 
two receivers in academic research and science popularization, but also depend on the difference 
in two probability functions between two signals. While, we show that the effort should be 
allocated equally in research and dissemination in scenario two. 
This paper explains the question that how to allocate the effort for the scientist when there 
exists polarization in two types of audiences in scenario one. In addition, we show that which is 
important in transforming scientific achievements to productive force in scenario two. 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up a model with simultaneous 
efforts offered by sender under the same and different probability of signals for two types of 
audiences. We deal with sender’s maximum problem and receiver’s maximum problem, and 
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obtain some results about time or effort allocation. Section 2.3 sets up a model with sequential 
efforts offered by sender under the same and different probability for signal and representation. 
Section 2.4 concludes.  
 
2.2 Scenario One: Simultaneous Efforts Offered by the Sender 
We set up a model with one informed sender and two uninformed receivers. It’s a simultaneous 
problem with additive method for the scientist to offer efforts simultaneously in academic 
research and science popularization. 
The sender faces two groups of audiences. One group consists of experts, and another group 
consists of public audiences. We assume that all experts are identical, and regard its group as the 
receiver 1; and assume all public audiences are identical, and regard its group as the receiver 2. 
The sender offers efforts of information provision to them separately, which is denoted by 
𝑒𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2, 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ≤ 1.  
The state of the world, 𝜃 ∈  {0,1}, is chosen by nature, which is observed by the sender but 
not the receiver. The probability of 𝜃 = 1 is defined by 𝑝 ∈  (0,1), then the probability of 
𝜃 = 0 is 1 − 𝑝. After observing the state of world, the sender sends signal to two receivers 
separately, which is denoted by 𝑠𝑖 ∈  {0,1}, 𝑖 = 1,2. After observing signal, the receiver 𝑖 make 
a decision 𝑦𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2, which can be observed by the sender. The receiver 𝑖 makes decision 
𝑦𝑖(0) if observing signal 0, and 𝑦𝑖(1) if observing signal 1. In addition, the receivers could be 
biased and unbiased, which is denoted by 𝛽𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2. The bias is common knowledge. 
    The utility function for the sender is 
𝑈(𝜃,𝑦1,𝑦2) = −[𝛼1(𝑦1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛼2(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2], 
where 𝛼𝑖 is the weight of payoff from receiver 𝑖. 
    The utility function for receiver 𝑖 is 
𝑉(𝜃,𝑦𝑖,𝛽𝑖) = −(𝑦𝑖 − 𝜃 − 𝛽𝑖)2, 𝑖 = 1, 2. 
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2.2.1 With the Same Probability Function of the Signals for Two Receivers  
For simplicity, we assume the probability function of the signal for two types of receivers is the 
same. Given the probability function of the signal 𝑓(𝑒𝑖): ℝ+ ∈ �12 , 1�, it is continuous, twice 
differentiable for 𝑒𝑖 > 0, strictly increasing, and strictly concave, and satisfices 𝑓(0) = 1/2.  
 
From Table 2.1, we have the conditional probability of the sender as follows 
𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 1|𝜃 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 0|𝜃 = 1) = 1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖), 
𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 1|𝜃 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 0|𝜃 = 0) = 𝑓(𝑒𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2. 
 
Using Bayes’ Rule, we have the conditional probability of the receiver as follows 
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃(𝜃 = 0, 𝑠𝑖 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0, 𝑠𝑖 = 1) + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1, 𝑠𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0)
𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 1|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) = (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖))(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)) + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖), 
 
𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃(𝜃 = 1, 𝑠𝑖 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0, 𝑠𝑖 = 1) + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1, 𝑠𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 1|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1)
𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 1|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) = 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖)(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)) + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖), 
 
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 0) = 𝑃(𝜃 = 0, 𝑠𝑖 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0, 𝑠𝑖 = 0) + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1, 𝑠𝑖 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 0|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0)
𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 0|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 0|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) = (1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒𝑖)(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒𝑖) + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)), 
 
𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0) = 𝑃(𝜃 = 1, 𝑠𝑖 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0, 𝑠𝑖 = 0) + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1, 𝑠𝑖 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 0|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1)
𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 0|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑠𝑖 = 0|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) = 𝑝�1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)�(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒𝑖) + 𝑝�1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)�,  𝑖 = 1,2. 
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Table 2.1 The Matrix with the Probability Function of the Signal 𝑠𝑖 
  Signal 𝑠𝑖 
  0 1 
State 
𝜃 
0 𝑓(𝑒𝑖) 1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖) 
1 1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖) 𝑓(𝑒𝑖) 
 
Lemma 1 Rule of the conditional probability of the receiver 𝑖 ∈  {1,2} as follows 
𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1) ≥ 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0),𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 1) ≤ 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 0). 
If p<1/2, we have 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 0) ≥ 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 1) ≥ 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1) ≥ 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0). 
 
Proof of lemma 1 is provided in Appendix. 
 
Receiver Problem 1 The maximization problem for the receiver with the same probability 
function of the signals for two receivers in scenario one can be written as 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑦𝑖
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖),𝛽𝑖) , 𝑖 = 1,2. 
 
For receiver 𝑖 ∈  {1,2}, we have 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑦𝑖
 𝐸𝑉(𝜃, 𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖),𝛽𝑖) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 
𝑦𝑖
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖)[−(𝑦𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖)2] + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖)[−(𝑦𝑖 − 1 − 𝛽𝑖)2] 
 
Proposition 1 The receiver 𝑖 obtains the maximum expectation utility with the same probability 
function of the signals for two receivers in scenario one when  
𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖 = 1) = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1) = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖)(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)) + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖) 
Or 
𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖 = 0) = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0) = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖))(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒𝑖) + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)) , 𝑖 = 1,2. 




𝐸𝑉(𝜃, 𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖 = 1),𝛽𝑖) = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 1), 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑦𝑖
𝐸𝑉(𝜃, 𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖 = 0),𝛽𝑖) =  −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 0). 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix. Note that the best respond decision of the 
receiver is related with the corresponding probability of the signal when the state of the world is 
one and own bias. For two signals 0 and 1, the best respond decision of the receiver for two 
signals are complemented with each other regardless the receiver’s own bias. The maximum 
expectation utility of the receiver is the negative product of two corresponding probability of the 
state of the world given a signal. 
 
Sender Problem 1 The maximization problem for the sender with the same probability function 
of the signals for two receivers in scenario one can be written as 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 𝐸𝑈(𝜃, 𝑦1,𝑦2) = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼1(𝑦1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛼2(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2], 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ≤ 1. 
 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼1(𝑦1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛼2(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − {𝛼1[𝑃(𝑠1 = 0|𝜃 = 0)(𝑦1(0) − 0)2 + 𝑃(𝑠1 = 1|𝜃 = 0)(𝑦1(1) − 0)2]+ 𝛼2[𝑃(𝑠2 = 0|𝜃 = 0)(𝑦2(0) − 0)2 + 𝑃(𝑠2 = 1|𝜃 = 0)(𝑦2(1) − 0)2]}𝑃(𝜃 = 0)
− {𝛼1[𝑃(𝑠1 = 0|𝜃 = 1)(𝑦1(0) − 1)2 + 𝑃(𝑠1 = 1|𝜃 = 1)(𝑦1(1) − 1)2]+ 𝛼2[𝑃(𝑠2 = 0|𝜃 = 1)(𝑦2(0) − 1)2 + 𝑃(𝑠2 = 1|𝜃 = 1)(𝑦2(1) − 1)2]}𝑃(𝜃 = 1) 
 
Lemma 2 The expectation utility of the sender will increase when the sender increases effort in 
either receiver with the same probability function of the signals for two receivers in scenario one. 




𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 𝐸𝑈(𝜃,𝑦1,𝑦2) 
= −𝛼1 �𝛽12 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒1)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)�[𝑓(𝑒1) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒1) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1)]�
− 𝛼2 �𝛽2
2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒2)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒2)�[𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2)]� = −𝛼1 �𝛽12 + �𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0)� 
−𝛼2 �𝛽2
2 + �𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 0)�. 
 
The Proof of lemma 2 is provided in Appendix. Note that the sender could obtain more expectation utility by increasing effort in either receiver. So the sender should use up all effort supply in order to obtain a maximum expectation utility. The maximum expectation utility of the sender is the weighted sum of both receivers’ square root of all conditional 
probability with bias square. 
 
Proposition 2 Given a certain amount of the sender’s total effort t, t is less and equal to one, the 
optimal allocation of efforts in the receiver one and two for the sender to obtain a maximum 
expectation utility with the same probability function of the signals for two receivers in scenario 
one satisfies the following equation,  [1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1)]𝑓′(𝑒1)[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒2)]𝑓′(𝑒2) {[𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2)]}2{[𝑓(𝑒1) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒1) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1)]}2 = 𝛼2𝛼1, 
𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 1. 
Then 
𝑓′(𝑒1)[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1)][𝑝(1 − 𝑝) + (1 − 2𝑝)2𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1)(1 − 𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1))]2
𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1)[1 − 2𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1)][𝑝(1 − 𝑝) + (1 − 2𝑝)2𝑓(𝑒1)(1 − 𝑓(𝑒1))]2 = 𝛼2𝛼1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 is provided in Appendix. The result shows that how to offer effort into 
academic research and science popularization for the sender to obtain the maximum expectation 
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utility depend on the weight of payoff from two receivers and the probability of the state of the 
world.    
 
Corollary 1 Given a certain amount of the sender’s total effort t, t is less and equal to one, if we 
increase the ratio of the weight of payoff between the receivers 𝛼2 𝛼1⁄ , the sender would like to 
decrease effort on the receiver one to obtain maximum expectation utility with the same 
probability function of the signals for two receivers in scenario one. Specifically, 
(1) If 𝛼2 𝛼1⁄ = 1, 0 < 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 1, we have 0 < 𝑒1 = 𝑒2 ≤ 𝑡/2,  
(2) If 𝛼2 𝛼1⁄ > 1, 0 < 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 1, we have 0 < 𝑒1 < 𝑡/2 < 𝑒2 ≤ 𝑡,  
(3) If 𝛼2 𝛼1⁄ < 1, 0 < 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 1, we have 0 < 𝑒2 < 𝑡/2 < 𝑒1 ≤ 𝑡. 
 
Proof of Corollary 1 is provided in Appendix. Note that if the ratio of the weight of payoff from 
general public and the weight of payoff from the experts increase, the scientist would incline to 
spend more effort in science popularization in order to obtain the maximum expectation utility. 
    If the weight of payoff from general public in the public arena were equal to that from the 
experts in the arena of internal scientific communication, the scientist would like to offer the 
same effort on and science popularization. If the weight of payoff from general public were more 
than that from experts, the scientist would like to offer more effort on science popularization. If 
the weight of payoff from general public were less than that from experts, the scientist would like 
to offer more effort on academic research.  
    For the whole society, some local places are weak in academic research; some local places 
are weak in science popularization. We could adjust the weights of payoff from general public 
and the experts by incentives to change the proportion of effort offered by the scientist in 
academic research and science popularization when the behavior of the scientist is inconsistent 
with the goal of the society. 
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2.2.2 With the Different Probability Function of the Signals for Two Receivers  
In general, the probability function of the signal for different type of the receivers is different. 
We assume the probability function of the signal for the receiver 1 is 𝑓1(𝑒1): ℝ+ ∈ �12 , 1�, and 




, 1� , 𝜆 ∈  [0, 1]. Here 𝑓𝑖(𝑒) is continuous, twice differentiable for 𝑒 > 0, strictly increasing, 
and strictly concave, and satisfices 𝑓𝑖(0) = 12. 
 
From Table 2.2 and 2.3, we have the conditional probability of the sender as follows 
𝑃(𝑠1 = 1|𝜃 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑠1 = 0|𝜃 = 1) = 1 − 𝑓1(𝑒1), 
𝑃(𝑠1 = 1|𝜃 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑠1 = 0|𝜃 = 0) = 𝑓1(𝑒1), 
𝑃(𝑠2 = 0|𝜃 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑠2 = 1|𝜃 = 1) = 12 + 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�, 
𝑃(𝑠2 = 0|𝜃 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑠2 = 1|𝜃 = 0) = 12 − 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�. 
 
Using Bayes’ Rule, we have the conditional probability of the receiver as follows 
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑠1 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝑠1 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑠1 = 1|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) = (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑓1(𝑒1))(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑓1(𝑒1)) + 𝑝𝑓1(𝑒1), 
 
𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑠1 = 1|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝑠1 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑠1 = 1|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) = 𝑝𝑓1(𝑒1)(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑓1(𝑒1)) + 𝑝𝑓1(𝑒1), 
 
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑠1 = 0|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝑠1 = 0|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑠1 = 0|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) = (1 − 𝑝)𝑓1(𝑒1)(1 − 𝑝)𝑓1(𝑒1) + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓1(𝑒1)), 
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Table 2.2 The Matrix with the Probability of the Signal 𝑠1 
  Signal 𝑠1 
  0 1 
State 
𝜃 
0 𝑓1(𝑒1) 1 − 𝑓1(𝑒1) 
1 1 − 𝑓1(𝑒1) 𝑓1(𝑒1) 
 
Table 2.3 The Matrix with the Probability of the Signal 𝑠2 
  Signal 𝑠2 
  0 1 
State 
𝜃 
0 12 + 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 12 − 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 
1 12 − 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 12 + 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 
 
𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑠1 = 0|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝑠1 = 0|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑠1 = 0|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) = 𝑝(1 − 𝑓1(𝑒1))(1 − 𝑝)𝑓1(𝑒1) + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓1(𝑒1)), 
 
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑠2 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝑠2 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑠2 = 1|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) = (1 − 𝑝) �12 − 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12��(1 − 𝑝) �12 − 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�� + 𝑝 �12 + 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�� = (1 − 𝑝) �
12 − 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12��12 − 𝜆(1 − 2𝑝) �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� , 
 
𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑠2 = 1|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝑠2 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑠2 = 1|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) 
= 𝑝 �12 + 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12��(1 − 𝑝) �12 − 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�� + 𝑝 �12 + 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�� = 𝑝 �
12 + 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12��12 − 𝜆(1 − 2𝑝) �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�, 
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𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑠2 = 0|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝑠2 = 0|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑠2 = 0|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) = (1 − 𝑝) �12 + 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12��(1 − 𝑝) �12 + 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�� + 𝑝 �12 − 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�� = (1 − 𝑝) �
12 + 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12��12 + 𝜆(1 − 2𝑝) �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� , 
 
𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑠2 = 0|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝑠2 = 0|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑠2 = 0|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) = 𝑝 �12 − 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12��(1 − 𝑝) �12 + 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�� + 𝑝 �12 − 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�� = 𝑝 �
12 − 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12��12 + 𝜆(1 − 2𝑝) �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�. 
 
Receiver Problem 2 The maximization problem for the receiver with the different probability 
function of the signals for two receivers in scenario one can be written as  max
𝑦𝑖
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖),𝛽𝑖) , 𝑖 = 1,2. 
 
Proposition 3  
(1) The receiver 1 obtains the maximum expectation utility with the different probability function 
of the signals for two receivers in scenario one when  
𝑦1(𝑠1 = 1) = 𝛽1 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1) = 𝛽1 + 𝑝𝑓1(𝑒1)(1 − 𝑝)�1 − 𝑓1(𝑒1)� + 𝑝𝑓1(𝑒1) 
Or 
𝑦1(𝑠1 = 0) = 𝛽1 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0) = 𝛽1 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓(𝑒1))(1 − 𝑝)𝑓1(𝑒1) + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓1(𝑒1)). 
The maximum expectation utility of the receiver 1 is  max
𝑦1
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦1(𝑠1 = 1),𝛽1) = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 1), max
𝑦1
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦1(𝑠1 = 0),𝛽1) = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 0). 
(2) The receiver 2 obtains the maximum expectation utility with the different probability function 
of the signals for two receivers in scenario one when 
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𝑦2(𝑠2 = 1) = 𝛽2 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1) = 𝛽2 + 𝑝 �12 + 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12��12 − 𝜆(1 − 2𝑝) �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 
Or 
𝑦2(𝑠2 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑝 �12 − 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12��12 + 𝜆(1 − 2𝑝) �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�. 
The maximum expectation utility of the receiver 2 is  max
𝑦2
𝐸𝑉(𝜃, 𝑦2(𝑠2 = 1),𝛽2) = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 1), max
𝑦2
𝐸𝑉(𝜃, 𝑦2(𝑠2 = 0),𝛽2) = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 0). 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 is provided in Appendix.  
 
Sender Problem 2 The maximization problem for the sender with the different probability 
function of the signals for two receivers in scenario one can be written as 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 𝐸𝑈(𝜃, 𝑦1,𝑦2) = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼1(𝑦1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛼2(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2], 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ≤ 1. 
 
Lemma 3 The expectation utility of the sender will increase when the sender increases the effort 
in either receiver with the different probability function of the signals for two receivers in 
scenario one. And the maximum expectation utility of the sender increases with the increase of 𝜆. 
The maximum expectation utility of the sender as follows: 











= −𝛼1�𝛽12 + �𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0)�        
−𝛼2 �𝛽2
2 + �𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 0)�. 
 
The Proof of Lemma 3 is provided in Appendix. The result shows that the expectation utility of 
the sender will increase when the sender increases the effort on academic research or science 
popularization. The sender would obtain more expectation utility when the probability functions 
of the signal for different type of the receivers are closer. 
 
Proposition 4 Given a certain amount of the sender’s total effort t, t is less and equal to one, the 
optimal allocation of effort in receiver one and two for the sender to obtain a maximum 
expectation utility with the different probability function of the signals for two receivers in 
scenario one satisfies the following equation, 
𝑓1′(𝑒1)[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] �14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2�2
𝜆2𝑓1′(𝑒2)[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒2)] �14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2 �𝑓1(𝑒1) − 12�2�2 =
𝛼2
𝛼1
, 𝑖𝑓 0 <  𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 1. 
Then 
𝑓1′(𝑒1)[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] �14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑡 − 𝑒1) − 12�2�2





The proof of Proposition 4 is provided in Appendix. The result shows that how to offer effort into 
academic research and science popularization to obtain the maximum expectation utility, which 
is not only depend on the weights of payoff from two receivers in academic research and science 
popularization and the probability of the state of the world, but depend on the difference between 
the probability function of the signals for two types of audiences.  
 
 68 
Corollary 2 Given a certain amount of the sender’s total effort t, t is less and equal to one, if we 
increase the ratio of the weight of payoff between receivers 𝛼2 𝛼1⁄ , the sender would like to 
decrease effort in the receiver one to obtain maximum expectation utility; or if we decrease the 
difference between the probability function of the signals for two receivers, the sender would like 
to decrease effort in receiver one to obtain maximum expectation utility with the different 
probability function of the signals for two receivers in scenario one. Specifically, 
(1) 𝛼2 𝛼1⁄ = 1 if and only if [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑡 − 𝑒1)]⁄ = 𝜆, 
(2) 𝛼2 𝛼1⁄ > 1 if and only if [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑡 − 𝑒1)]⁄ > 𝜆, 
(3) 𝛼2 𝛼1⁄ < 1 if and only if [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑡 − 𝑒1)]⁄ < 𝜆,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜆 ∈ (0,1). 
 
Proof of Corollary 2 is provided in Appendix. Note that if the ratio of the weight of payoff from 
the public and the weight of payoff from the experts increase or the difference between the 
probability function of the signals for two receivers is smaller than before, the scientist would 
like to put more effort on science popularization. Moreover if there were a big difference 
between the probability functions of the signals for two types of audience, which means 𝜆 is 
very small, the scientist would like to increase effort in academic research to obtain the 
maximum expectation utility, or we could increase the ratio of the weight of payoff from two 
receivers. 
   
Corollary 3 Given a certain amount of the sender’s total effort t, t is less and equal to one, if the 
difference between the probability functions of the signals for two receivers is smaller than 
before, we could increase the ratio of the weight of payoff between two receivers 𝛼2 𝛼1⁄  to make 
the sender to obtain maximum expectation utility as before with the different probability function 
of the signals for two receivers in scenario one.  
 
Note that if there exists a big difference between the probability functions of the signals for two 
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receivers unusually, i.e. there exists polarization, we could make the sender to keep the allocation 
of effort as before by increasing the ratio of the weights of payoff from dissemination and 
research, such as using incentives. 
 
2.3 Scenario Two: Sequential Efforts offered by the Sender 
We set up a model with one informed sender and one uninformed receiver. It is a sequential 
problem with multiplicative method for the scientist to offered efforts sequentially in academic 
research and science popularization.  
    The sender faces a group of public audiences. We assume all public audiences are identical, 
and regard its group as one receiver. The sender firstly offers effort of information provision to 
academic research, which is denoted by 𝑒1; then offers effort of information provision to science 
popularization, which is denoted by 𝑒2; 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ≤ 1.  
The state of world 𝜃 ∈  {0,1}, is chosen by nature, which is observed by the sender but not 
the receiver. The probability of 𝜃 = 1 is defined by 𝑝 ∈  (0,1), then the probability of 𝜃 = 0 
is 1 − 𝑝. After observing the state of world 𝜃, the sender sends signal to the receiver, where 
signal 𝑠 ∈  {0,1} with effort 𝑒1 offered in academic research. After observing signal s, the 
receiver gives a representation 𝑟, where representation 𝑟 ∈  {0,1} with the sender’s effort 𝑒2 
offered in science popularization. At the same time, the receiver makes a decision 𝑦2 which can 
be observed by the sender. The receiver makes a decision 𝑦2(0) if representing 0, and 𝑦2(1) if 
representing 1. The receiver’s bias is denoted by 𝛽2. The bias is common knowledge. 
    The utility function for the sender is 
𝑈(𝜃,𝑦2) = −𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2, 
Where 𝛼 is the weight of payoff from the receiver 
    The utility function for the receiver 
𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2,𝛽2) = −(𝑦2 − 𝜃 − 𝛽2)2. 
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2.3.1 With the Same Probability Function of the Signal and Representation  
For simplicity, we assume the probability function of the signal and representation is the same. 
Given the probability function of the signal and representation 𝑓(𝑒𝑖): ℝ+ ∈ �12 , 1� , 𝑖 = 1,2, it is 
continuous, twice differentiable for 𝑒𝑖 > 0 , strictly increasing, and strictly concave, and 




From Table 2.4 and 2.5, we have the conditional probability of the sender as follows 
𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 0) = 𝑓(𝑒1)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒2)� + 𝑓(𝑒2)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)�= 𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2), 
𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 1) = 𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2) + �1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)��1 − 𝑓(𝑒2)�= 1 − 𝑓(𝑒1) − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2). 
 
Using Bayes’ Rule, we have the conditional probability of the receiver as follows 
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0)
𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) = (1 − 𝑝)�𝑓(𝑒1)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒2)� + 𝑓(𝑒2)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)��(1 − 𝑝)�𝑓(𝑒1)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒2)� + 𝑓(𝑒2)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)�� + 𝑝�𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2) + �1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)��1 − 𝑓(𝑒2)�� = (1 − 𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))
𝑝 + (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)), 
 
𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1)
𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) = 𝑝�𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2) + �1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)��1 − 𝑓(𝑒2)��(1 − 𝑝)�𝑓(𝑒1)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒2)� + 𝑓(𝑒2)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)�� + 𝑝�𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2) + �1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)��1 − 𝑓(𝑒2)�� = 𝑝(1 − 𝑓(𝑒1) − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))




Table 2.4 The Matrix with the Probability of the Signal for the Sender 
 
  Signal 𝑠 
  0 1 
State 
𝜃 
0 𝑓(𝑒1) 1 − 𝑓(𝑒1) 
1 1 − 𝑓(𝑒1) 𝑓(𝑒1) 
 
Table 2.5 The Matrix with the Probability of the Representation for the Receiver 
 
  Representation 𝑟 
  0 1 
Signal 
𝑠 
0 𝑓(𝑒2) 1 − 𝑓(𝑒2) 
1 1 − 𝑓(𝑒2) 𝑓(𝑒2) 
 
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0)
𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) = (1 − 𝑝)�𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2) + �1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)��1 − 𝑓(𝑒2)��(1 − 𝑝)�𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2) + �1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)��1 − 𝑓(𝑒2)�� + 𝑝�𝑓(𝑒1)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒2)� + 𝑓(𝑒2)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)�� = (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑓(𝑒1) − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))1 − 𝑝 − (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)), 
 
𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1)




Receiver Problem 3 The maximization problem for the receiver with the same probability 




Proposition 5 The receiver obtains the maximum expectation utility with the same probability 
function of the signal and representation in scenario two when 
𝑦2(𝑟 = 1) = 𝛽2 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1) = 𝛽2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓(𝑒1) − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))𝑝 + (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)) 
Or 
𝑦2(𝑟 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑝(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))1 − 𝑝 − (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)) 
The maximum expectation utility of the receiver is  max
𝑦2
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑟 = 1),𝛽2) = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1), max
𝑦2
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑟 = 0),𝛽2) = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0). 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 is provided in Appendix.  
 
Sender Problem 3 The maximization problem for the sender with the same probability function 
of the signal and representation in scenario two can be written as 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 𝐸𝑈(𝜃,𝑦2) = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2], 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ≤ 1. 
 
The maximum expectation utility of the sender  
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝛼{[𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 0)(𝑦2(0) − 0)2 + 𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 0)(𝑦2(1) − 0)2]𝑃(𝜃 = 0)+ [𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 1)(𝑦2(0) − 1)2 + 𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 1)(𝑦2(1) − 1)2]𝑃(𝜃 = 1)}. 
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Lemma 4 The expectation utility of the sender will increase when the sender increases the effort 
in research or dissemination with the same probability function of the signal and representation 
in scenario two. The maximum expectation utility of the sender as follows: 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 𝐸𝑈(𝜃,𝑦2) = −𝛼 �𝛽22
+ −𝑝(1 − 𝑝)�𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)��1 − 𝑓(𝑒1) − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)�
�𝑝 + (1 − 2𝑝)�𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)���1 − 𝑝 − (1 − 2𝑝)�𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)��� = −𝛼 �𝛽22 + �𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)�. 
 
The Proof of lemma 4 is provided in Appendix. Note that the sender could obtain more expectation utility by increasing effort in research or dissemination.  
 
Proposition 6 Given a certain amount of the sender’s total effort t, t is less and equal to one, the 
optimal allocation of effort in research or dissemination for the sender to obtain maximum 
expectation utility with the same probability function of the signal and representation in scenario 
two satisfies the following equation 
𝑓′(𝑒1)[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1)] = 𝑓′(𝑒2)[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒2)], 
𝑖. 𝑒. 𝑒1 = 𝑒2 = 𝑡/2 ≤ 1/2. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 is provided in Appendix. The result shows that effort in science 
popularization is just as important to scientist’s growth as academic research no matter what the 
receiver’s action is.  
 
2.3.2 With the Different Probability Function of the Signal and Representation  
In general, the probability function of the signal and representation is different. We assume the 
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probability function of the signal is 𝑓1(𝑒1): ℝ+ ∈ �12 , 1�, and the probability function of the 
representation is 𝑓2(𝑒2) = 1/2 + 𝛾[𝑓1(𝑒2) − 1/2]: ℝ+ ∈ �12 , 1� , 𝛾 ∈  [0, 1]. 𝑓𝑖(𝑒) is continuous, 
twice differentiable for 𝑒 > 0, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfices 𝑓𝑖(0) = 1/2. 
 
From Table 2.6 and 2.7, we have the conditional probability of the sender as follows 
𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 1) = 𝑓1(𝑒1) �12 − 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�� + �12 + 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�� �1 − 𝑓1(𝑒1)� = �12 + 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�� − 2𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 𝑓1(𝑒1) = 12 + 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)], 
 
𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 1) = 𝑓1(𝑒1) �12 + 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�� + �1 − 𝑓1(𝑒1)� �12 − 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�� = �12 − 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�� + 2𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 𝑓1(𝑒1) = 12 − 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)], 
 
Using Bayes’ Rule, we have the conditional probability of the receiver as follows 
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0)
𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) 
= (1 − 𝑝) �12 + 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�(1 − 𝑝) �12 + 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]� + 𝑝 �12 − 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]� 





Table 2.6 The Matrix with the Probability of the Signal for the Sender 
  Signal 𝑠 
  0 1 
State 
𝜃 
0 𝑓1(𝑒1) 1 − 𝑓1(𝑒1) 
1 1 − 𝑓1(𝑒1) 𝑓1(𝑒1) 
 
Table 2.7 The Matrix with the Probability of the Representation for the Receiver 
  Signal 𝑠2 
  0 1 
State 
𝜃 
0 12 + 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 12 − 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 
1 12 − 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 12 + 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 
 
𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1)
𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) 
= 𝑝 �12 − 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�(1 − 𝑝) �12 + 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]� + 𝑝 �12 − 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]� 
= 𝑝 �12 − 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�12 + (1 − 2𝑝)𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)], 
 
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0)
𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) 
= (1 − 𝑝) �12 − 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�(1 − 𝑝) �12 − 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]� + 𝑝 �12 + 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]� 
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= (1 − 𝑝) �12 − 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�12 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]  
 
𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1)
𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1) 
= 𝑝 �12 + 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�(1 − 𝑝) �12 − 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]� + 𝑝 �12 + 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]� 
= 𝑝 �12 + 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�12 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]. 
 
Receiver Problem 4 The maximization problem for the receiver with the different probability 




Proposition 7 The receiver obtains the maximum expectation utility with the different probability 
function of the signal and representation in scenario two when 
𝑦2(𝑟 = 1) = 𝛽2 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1) = 𝛽2 + 𝑝 �12 − 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�12 + (1 − 2𝑝)𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] 
Or 
𝑦2(𝑟 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑝 �12 + 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�12 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]. 




𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑟 = 1),𝛽2) = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1), max
𝑦2
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑟 = 0),𝛽2) = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0). 
 
Proof of Proposition 7 is provided in Appendix.  
 
Sender Problem 4 The maximization problem for the sender with the different probability 
function of the signal and representation can be written as 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 𝐸𝑈(𝜃,𝑦2) = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2], 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ≤ 1. 
 
Lemma 5 The expectation utility of the sender will increase when the sender increases effort in 
research or dissemination with the different probability function of the signal and representation 
in scenario two. And the maximum expectation utility of the sender increases with the increase of 
𝛾. The maximum expectation utility of the sender as follows: 








2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑝) �14 − �𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�
2




= −𝛼 �𝛽22 + �𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)�. 
 
The Proof of Lemma 5 is provided in Appendix. The result shows that the expectation utility of 
the sender will increase when the sender increases the effort on academic research or science 
popularization. The sender would obtain more expectation utility when the probability functions 
of the signal and representation are closer. 
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Proposition 8 Given a certain amount of the sender’s total effort t, t is less and equal to one, the 
optimal allocation of effort in research or dissemination for the sender to obtain maximum 
expectation utility with the different probability function of the signal and representation in 
scenario two: 
𝑓1′(𝑒1)[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] = 𝑓1′(𝑒2)[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒2)], 
𝑖. 𝑒. 𝑒1 = 𝑒2 = 𝑡/2 ≤ 1/2. 
 
Proof of Proposition 8 is provided in Appendix. The result shows that effort offered by the sender 
in science popularization is just as important to scientist’s growth as academic research no matter 
what the receiver’s action is.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This paper studies a formal analysis of scientists’ effort provision in research and dissemination. 
We consider two scenarios. One scenario is a simultaneous problem with additive method. The 
sender sends signal to two types of audiences simultaneously. We investigate how the scientists 
should divide their time or energy between academic research and science popularization to 
obtain maximum utility. In general, the probability of the signal for different type of audiences is 
different, so we consider two situations. One situation is under the same probability function of 
the signals for two types of audiences for a special case, while another situation is under the 
different probability function of the signals for two types of audiences.  
Under the same probability function situation, the results shows that if the ratio between the 
weight payoff from the public and the weight payoff from experts were increasing, scientist 
would like to decease effort in academic research to obtain the maximum expectation utility. In 
addition, if the behavior of the scientist is inconsistent with the goal of the society, we could 
adjust the weights of payoff from general public and the experts by incentives to change the 
proportion of effort offered by the scientist in academic research and science popularization. 
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Under the different probability function situation, if there exists a big difference between 
the probability functions of the signals for two types of audience, the scientist would like to 
increase effort in academic research to obtain the maximum expectation utility. In fact, we could 
make the sender to keep the allocation of effort as before by increasing the ratio of the weights of 
payoff from dissemination and research. In other words, if there exists polarization in academic 
research and science popularization, we could prevent polarization by increasing the ratio of the 
weights of payoff from dissemination and research using incentives. 
Another scenario is a sequential problem with multiplicative method. The sender offers 
effort in academic research, and then sends signal to one type of audiences to representation with 
effort in science popularization. In general, the probability of the signal and representation is 
different, so we consider two situations. One situation is under the same probability of the signal 
and representation for a special case, while another situation is under the different probability of 
the signal and representation.  
No matter the same probability function situation or the different probability function 
situation, the result shows that the effort in science popularization is always just as important to 
scientist’s growth as academic research no matter what the receiver’s action is. Take scientific 
achievements transformation as an example; we should put equal effort on research and 
dissemination. 
    In general, the best respond decision of the receiver is related with the corresponding 
probability of the signal and own bias no matter which situation. For two signals, 0 and 1, the 
best respond decisions of the receiver for two signals are complemented with each other 
regardless the receiver’s own bias. The maximum expectation utility of the receiver is the 
negative product of two corresponding probability of the signal. For the sender, he could obtain more expectation utility by increasing effort no matter which situation. Thus the sender should use up all effort to obtain a maximum expectation utility. And the maximum expectation utility of the sender is the negative weighted sum of receivers’ square root of all 
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conditional probability with their bias square. 
 
2.6 Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
(1) Consider 𝑠𝑖 = 1,  max
𝑦𝑖
𝐸𝑉(𝜃, 𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖 = 1),𝛽𝑖)= max 
𝑦𝑖




= −2𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 1)(𝑦𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖) − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)(𝑦𝑖 − 1 − 𝛽𝑖)= −2{[𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 1) + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)](𝑦𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖) − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)}= −2[𝑦𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)]. 
We obtain a critical value  
𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖 = 1) = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1) = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖)(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)) + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖). 
Second derivative 
𝑑2𝐸𝑉(𝜃, 𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖 = 1),𝛽𝑖)
𝑑2𝑦𝑖
= −2 < 0. 
Thus  
𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖 = 1) = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖)(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)) + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖) 
is a maximum point value point. 
 max
𝑦𝑖
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖 = 1),𝛽𝑖) = max 
𝑦𝑖
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 1)[−(𝑦𝑖 − 0 − 𝛽𝑖)2] + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)[−(𝑦𝑖 − 1 − 𝛽𝑖)2] = 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 1)[−(𝛽𝑖 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1) − 0 − 𝛽𝑖)2]+ 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)[−(𝛽𝑖 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1) − 1 − 𝛽𝑖)2] 
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= 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 1)[−𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)2] + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)[−(𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1) − 1)2] = −{𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)2+ 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)[𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)2 − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1) + 1]} = −{[𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 1) + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)]𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)2 − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)2+ 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)} =  𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)2 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1) = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)[1 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)] =  −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 1). 
 
(2) Consider 𝑠𝑖 = 0,  max
𝑦𝑖
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖 = 0),𝛽𝑖) = max 
𝑦𝑖




= −2𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 0)(𝑦𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖) − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0)(𝑦𝑖 − 1 − 𝛽𝑖)= −2{[𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 0) + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0)](𝑦𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖) − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0)}= −2[𝑦𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0)]. 
We obtain a critical value  
𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖 = 0) = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0) = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖))(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒𝑖) + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)). 
Second derivative 
𝑑2𝐸𝑉(𝜃, 𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖 = 0),𝛽𝑖)
𝑑2𝑦𝑖
= −2 < 0, 
Thus  
𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖 = 0) = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖))(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒𝑖) + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)) 





𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖 = 0),𝛽𝑖) = max 
𝑦𝑖
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 0)[−(𝑦𝑖 − 0 − 𝛽𝑖)2] + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0)[−(𝑦𝑖 − 1 − 𝛽𝑖)2] = 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 0)[−(𝛽𝑖 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0) − 0 − 𝛽𝑖)2]+ 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0)[−(𝛽𝑖 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0) − 1 − 𝛽𝑖)2] =  −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 0) 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
1. 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1) − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0) 
= 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖)(1 − 𝑝)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)� + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖) − 𝑝�1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)�(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒𝑖) + 𝑝�1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)� 
= −𝑝(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 2𝑓(𝑒𝑖))
�(1 − 𝑝)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)� + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖)�(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒𝑖) + 𝑝�1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)� ≥ 0. 
2. 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 1) − 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 0) = (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖))(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)) + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖) − (1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒𝑖)(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒𝑖) + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)) = 𝑝(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 2𝑓(𝑒𝑖))
�(1 − 𝑝)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)� + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖)��(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒𝑖) + 𝑝�1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)�� ≤ 0. 
3. 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0) − 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 0) 
= 𝑝�1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)�(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒𝑖) + 𝑝�1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)� − (1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒𝑖)(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒𝑖) + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)) 
= 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒𝑖) + 𝑝�1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)� 
𝐼𝑓 𝑝 < 12 ,𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 0) − 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 0) ≤ 0. 
4. 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 1) − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1) 
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= (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖))(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)) + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖) − 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖)(1 − 𝑝)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)� + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖) 
= 1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)
�(1 − 𝑝)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒𝑖)� + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒𝑖)� 
𝐼𝑓 𝑝 < 12 ,𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠𝑖 = 1) − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1) ≥ 0. 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼1(𝑦1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛼2(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − {𝛼1[𝑃(𝑠1 = 0|𝜃 = 0)(𝑦1(0) − 0)2 + 𝑃(𝑠1 = 1|𝜃 = 0)(𝑦1(1) − 0)2]+ 𝛼2[𝑃(𝑠2 = 0|𝜃 = 0)(𝑦2(0) − 0)2 + 𝑃(𝑠2 = 1|𝜃 = 0)(𝑦2(1) − 0)2]}𝑃(𝜃 = 0)
− {𝛼1[𝑃(𝑠1 = 0|𝜃 = 1)(𝑦1(0) − 1)2 + 𝑃(𝑠1 = 1|𝜃 = 1)(𝑦1(1) − 1)2]+ 𝛼2[𝑃(𝑠2 = 0|𝜃 = 1)(𝑦2(0) − 1)2 + 𝑃(𝑠2 = 1|𝜃 = 1)(𝑦2(1) − 1)2]}𝑃(𝜃 = 1) = −𝛼1{𝛽12 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒1)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)�[𝑓(𝑒1) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒1) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1)]}
− 𝛼2 �𝛽2
2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒2)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒2)�[𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2)]� = −𝛼1 �𝛽12 + �𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0)� 
−𝛼2 �𝛽2
2 + �𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 0)� 
First derivative with respect to 𝑒1  
𝜕 − 𝐸[𝛼1(𝑦1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛼2(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2]
𝜕𝑒1
= −𝛼1𝑝(1 − 𝑝)[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1)]𝑓′(𝑒1) 
�
[𝑓(𝑒1) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒1) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1)] − 𝑓(𝑒1)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)�(1 − 2𝑝)2{[𝑓(𝑒1) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒1) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1)]}2 � = −𝛼1[𝑝(1 − 𝑝)]2[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1)]𝑓′(𝑒1){[𝑓(𝑒1) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒1) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1)]}2 ≥ 0 
First derivative with respect to 𝑒2 
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𝜕 − 𝐸[𝛼1(𝑦1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛼2(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2]
𝜕𝑒2
 = −𝛼2[𝑝(1 − 𝑝)]2[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒2)]𝑓′(𝑒2){[𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2)]}2 ≥ 0 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼1(𝑦1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛼2(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2], 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ≤ 1. 
The Lagrangian can be written 
𝐿(𝑒1, 𝑒2; 𝛿) = −𝛼1 �𝛽12 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒1)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)�[𝑓(𝑒1) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒1) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1)]� 
−𝛼2 �𝛽2
2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒2)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒2)�[𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2)]� + 𝛿(1 − 𝑒1 − 𝑒2) 
Kuhn-Trucker conditions are 
𝛿 ≥ 0,1 − 𝑒1 − 𝑒2 ≥ 0 with CS 
𝜕𝐿(𝑒1, 𝑒2; 𝛿)
𝜕𝑒1
= −𝛼1[𝑝(1 − 𝑝)]2[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1)]𝑓′(𝑒1){[𝑓(𝑒1) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒1) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1)]}2 − 𝛿 = 0 
𝜕𝐿(𝑒1, 𝑒2; 𝛿)
𝜕𝑒2
= −𝛼2[𝑝(1 − 𝑝)]2[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒2)]𝑓′(𝑒2){[𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2)]}2 − 𝛿 = 0 
Combining above two equations, we have  
−𝛼1[𝑝(1 − 𝑝)]2[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1)]𝑓′(𝑒1){[𝑓(𝑒1) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒1) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1)]}2= −𝛼2[𝑝(1 − 𝑝)]2[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒2)]𝑓′(𝑒2){[𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2)]}2 [1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1)]𝑓′(𝑒1)[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒2)]𝑓′(𝑒2) {[𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒2)]}2{[𝑓(𝑒1) − 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑝][1 − 𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑒1) + 2𝑝𝑓(𝑒1)]}2 = 𝛼2𝛼1 
If 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 = 𝑡 ≤ 1, 𝑒2 = 𝑡 − 𝑒1 
𝑓′(𝑒1)[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1)][𝑝(1 − 𝑝) + (1 − 2𝑝)2𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1)(1 − 𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1))]2




Proof of Corollary 1 
𝑓′(𝑒1)
𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1) [1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1)][𝑝(1 − 𝑝) + (1 − 2𝑝)2𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1)(1 − 𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1))]2[1 − 2𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1)][𝑝(1 − 𝑝) + (1 − 2𝑝)2𝑓(𝑒1)(1 − 𝑓(𝑒1))]2 = 𝛼2𝛼1 
 
Let A=[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1)]�𝑝(1 − 𝑝) + (1 − 2𝑝)2𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1)�1 − 𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1)��2, we have  
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑒1
= −2𝑓′(𝑒1)�𝑝(1 − 𝑝) + (1 − 2𝑝)2𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1)�1 − 𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1)��2+ 2[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1)]�𝑝(1 − 𝑝) + (1 − 2𝑝)2𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1)�1 − 𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1)��(1 − 2𝑝)2�−1+ 2𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1)�𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1) < 0, 
𝜕𝑓′(𝑒1)𝐴
𝜕𝑒1
= 𝑓′′(𝑒1)𝐴 + 𝑓′(𝑒1) 𝜕𝐴𝜕𝑒1 < 0. 
Let B=[1 − 2𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1)]�𝑝(1 − 𝑝) + (1 − 2𝑝)2𝑓(𝑒1)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)��2 
𝜕𝐵
𝜕𝑒1
= 2𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1)�𝑝(1 − 𝑝) + (1 − 2𝑝)2𝑓(𝑒1)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)��2+ 2[1 − 2𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑒1)]�𝑝(1 − 𝑝) + (1 − 2𝑝)2𝑓(𝑒1)�1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)��(1 − 2𝑝)2�1
− 2𝑓(𝑒1)�𝑓′(𝑒1) > 0, 
𝜕𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1)𝐵
𝜕𝑒1






= 𝜕𝑓′(𝑒1)𝐴𝜕𝑒1 𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1)𝐵 − 𝑓′(𝑒1)𝐴𝜕𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1)𝐵𝜕𝑒1[𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1)𝐵]2 < 0. 
Thus 𝑒1 should be decreased for the sender to obtain the maximum expectation utility as 𝛼2 𝛼1⁄  
increases. We have 
(1) If α2 α1⁄ = 1,  0 < e1 + e2 ≤ t ≤ 1 , we have 0 < e1 = e2 ≤ t/2 . Specifically, when e1 + e2 = 1, we have e1 = e2 = 1/2. 
(2) If α2 α1⁄ > 1, 0 < e1 + e2 ≤ t ≤ 1, we have 0 < e1 < 𝑡/2 < e2 ≤ t.  




Proof of Proposition 3 
(1) Consider 𝑠1 = 1,  max
𝑦1
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦1(𝑠1 = 1),𝛽1) = max 
𝑦1
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 1)[−(𝑦1 − 0 − 𝛽1)2] + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)[−(𝑦1 − 1 − 𝛽1)2]. 
First derivative 
𝑑𝐸𝑉(𝜃, 𝑦1(𝑠1 = 1),𝛽1)
𝑑𝑦1
= −2𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 1)(𝑦1 − 𝛽1) − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)(𝑦1 − 1 − 𝛽1)= −2{[𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 1) + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)](𝑦1 − 𝛽1) − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)}= −2[𝑦1 − 𝛽1 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)]. 
We obtain a critical value  




= −2 < 0. 
Thus 
𝑦1(𝑠1 = 1) = 𝛽1 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1) = 𝛽1 + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒1)(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)) + 𝑝𝑓(𝑒1) 
is a maximum point value point. 
 max
𝑦1
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦1(𝑠1 = 1),𝛽1) = max 
𝑦1
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 1)[−(𝑦1 − 𝛽1)2] + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)[−(𝑦1 − 1 − 𝛽1)2] = 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 1)[−𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)2] + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)[−[𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1) − 1]2] = −{𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)2+ 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)[𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)2 − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1) + 1]} = −{𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)2 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)[1 − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)]} = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)[1 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)] = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 1) 
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(2) Consider 𝑠1 = 0,  max
𝑦1
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦1(𝑠1 = 0),𝛽1) = max 
𝑦1
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 0)[−(𝑦1 − 0 − 𝛽1)2] + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0)[−(𝑦1 − 1 − 𝛽1)2]. 
First derivative 
𝑑𝐸𝑉(𝜃, 𝑦1(𝑠1 = 0),𝛽1)
𝑑𝑦1
= −2𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 0)(𝑦1 − 𝛽1) − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0)(𝑦1 − 1 − 𝛽1)= −2{[𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 0) + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0)](𝑦1 − 𝛽1) − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0)}= −2[𝑦1 − 𝛽1 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0)]. 
We obtain a critical value  




= −2 < 0, 
Thus 
𝑦1(𝑠1 = 0) = 𝛽1 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0) = 𝛽1 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓(𝑒1))(1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓(𝑒1)). 
is a maximum point value point. 
 max
𝑦1
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦1(𝑠1 = 0),𝛽1) = max 
𝑦1
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 0)[−(𝑦1 − 0 − 𝛽1)2] + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0)[−(𝑦1 − 1 − 𝛽1)2] = 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 0)[−(𝛽1 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0) − 0 − 𝛽1)2]+ 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0)[−(𝛽1 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0) − 1 − 𝛽1)2] = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 0) 
 




𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑠2 = 1),𝛽2) = max 
𝑦1




= −2𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 1)(𝑦2 − 𝛽2) − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)(𝑦2 − 1 − 𝛽2)= −2{[𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 1) + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)](𝑦2 − 𝛽2) − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)}= −2[𝑦2 − 𝛽2 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)]. 
We obtain a critical value  




= −2 < 0 
Thus 
𝑦2(𝑠2 = 1) = 𝛽2 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1) = 𝛽2 + 𝑝 �12 + 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12��12 − 𝜆(1 − 2𝑝) �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 
is a maximum point value point. 
 max
𝑦2
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑠2 = 1),𝛽2) = max 
𝑦2
𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 1)[−(𝑦2 − 𝛽2)2] + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)[−(𝑦2 − 1 − 𝛽2)2] = 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 1)[−𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)2] + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)[−[𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1) − 1]2] = −{𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)2+ 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)[𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)2 − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1) + 1]} = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 1) 
 




𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑠2 = 0),𝛽2) = max 
𝑦2




= −2𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 0)(𝑦2 − 𝛽2) − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 0)(𝑦2 − 1 − 𝛽2)= −2{[𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 0) + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 0)](𝑦2 − 𝛽2) − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 0)}= −2[𝑦2 − 𝛽2 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 0)]. 
We obtain a critical value  




= −2 < 0, 
Thus 
𝑦2(𝑠2 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑝 �12 − 𝜆 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12��12 + 𝜆(1 − 2𝑝) �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 
is a maximum point value point. 
 max
𝑦2
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑠2 = 0),𝛽2) = max 
𝑦2





Lemma 3  
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼1(𝑦1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛼2(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝛼1{[𝑃(𝑠1 = 0|𝜃 = 0)𝑦1(0)2 + 𝑃(𝑠1 = 1|𝜃 = 0)𝑦1(1)2]𝑃(𝜃 = 0)+ [𝑃(𝑠1 = 0|𝜃 = 1)(𝑦1(0) − 1)2 + 𝑃(𝑠1 = 1|𝜃 = 1)(𝑦1(1) − 1)2]𝑃(𝜃 = 1)}







2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑝) �14 − 𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2�14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2 ⎦⎥⎥
⎤
 
= −𝛼1�𝛽12 + �𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠1 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠1 = 0)�        
−𝛼2 �𝛽2
2 + �𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑠2 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑠2 = 0)�. 
First derivative with respect to 𝑒1 
𝜕 − 𝐸[𝛼1(𝑦1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛼2(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2]
𝜕𝑒1
= −𝛼1 −𝑝2(1 − 𝑝)2[2𝑓1(𝑒1) − 1]𝑓1′(𝑒1)[𝑝(𝑝 − 1) + (1 − 2𝑝)2𝑓1(𝑒1)(𝑓1(𝑒1) − 1)]2 > 0 
First derivative with respect to 𝑒2 
𝜕 − 𝐸[𝛼1(𝑦1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛼2(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2]
𝜕𝑒2
= −𝛼2 −𝑝2(1 − 𝑝)2𝜆2[2𝑓1(𝑒2) − 1]𝑓1′(𝑒2)
�
14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2�2 > 0 
First derivative with respect to 𝜆 
𝜕𝑝(1 − 𝑝) �14 − 𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2�
𝜕𝜆
= −2𝑝(1 − 𝑝) �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2 𝜆 < 0 
𝜕 �
14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2�
𝜕𝜆
= −2(1 − 2𝑝)2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2 𝜆 < 0 
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⎧−2𝑝(1 − 𝑝) �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2 𝜆 �14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2�
�−2(1 − 2𝑝)2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2 𝜆�2
+ 2(1 − 2𝑝)2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2 𝜆𝑝(1 − 𝑝) �14 − 𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2�
�−2(1 − 2𝑝)2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2 𝜆�2 ⎭⎬
⎫
= −𝛼2 −2[𝑝(1 − 𝑝)]2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2 𝜆
�−2(1 − 2𝑝)2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2 𝜆�2 > 0 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 𝐸𝑈(𝜃, 𝑦1,𝑦2) = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼1(𝑦1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛼2(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2],𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ≤ 1. 
The Lagrangian can be written 
𝐿(𝑒1, 𝑒2; 𝛿) = −𝐸[𝛼1(𝑦1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛼2(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] + 𝛿(1 − 𝑒1 − 𝑒2) 
Kuhn-Trucker conditions are 
𝛿 ≥ 0,1 − 𝑒1 − 𝑒2 ≥ 0 with CS 
𝜕𝐿(𝑒1, 𝑒2;𝛿)
𝜕𝑒1
= 𝜕 − 𝐸[𝛼1(𝑦1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛼2(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] + 𝛿(1 − 𝑒1 − 𝑒2)
𝜕𝑒1
== −𝛼1 −𝑝2(1 − 𝑝)2[2𝑓1(𝑒1) − 1]𝑓1′(𝑒1)[𝑝(𝑝 − 1) + (1 − 2𝑝)2𝑓1(𝑒1)(𝑓1(𝑒1) − 1)]2 − 𝛿 = 0 
𝜕𝐿(𝑒1, 𝑒2; 𝛿)
𝜕𝑒2
= 𝜕 − 𝐸[𝛼1(𝑦1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛼2(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] + 𝛿(1 − 𝑒1 − 𝑒2)
𝜕𝑒2= −𝛼2 −𝑝2(1 − 𝑝)2𝜆2[2𝑓1(𝑒2) − 1]𝑓1′(𝑒2)
�
14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2�2 − 𝛿 = 0 
Combining above two equations, we have  
𝛼1[2𝑓1(𝑒1) − 1]𝑓1′(𝑒1)[𝑝(𝑝 − 1) + (1 − 2𝑝)2𝑓1(𝑒1)(𝑓1(𝑒1) − 1)]2 = 𝛼2𝜆2[2𝑓1(𝑒2) − 1]𝑓1′(𝑒2)
�








14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2�2 
𝑓1′(𝑒1)[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] �14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2�2




If 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 = 𝑡, 𝑒2 = 𝑡 − 𝑒1 
𝑓1′(𝑒1)[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] �14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑡 − 𝑒1) − 12�2�2






Proof of Corollary 2 
𝑓1′(𝑒1)[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] �14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑡 − 𝑒1) − 12�2�2




First order with respect to 𝑒1 
Let A=[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] �14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑡 − 𝑒1) − 12�2�2, we have  
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑒1
= −2𝑓1′(𝑒1) �14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑡 − 𝑒1) − 12�2�2
+ 4[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] �14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑡 − 𝑒1) − 12�2� (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑡 − 𝑒1)
−
12� 𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1) < 0, 
𝜕𝑓′(𝑒1)𝐴
𝜕𝑒1
= 𝑓′′(𝑒1)𝐴 + 𝑓′(𝑒1) 𝜕𝐴𝜕𝑒1 < 0. 




= 2𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1) �14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2 �𝑓1(𝑒1) − 12�2�2
− 4[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑡 − 𝑒1)] �14 + (1 − 2𝑝)2 �𝑓1(𝑒1) − 12�2� (1 − 2𝑝)2 �𝑓1(𝑒1)
−
12� 𝑓′(𝑒1) > 0, 
𝜕𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1)𝐵
𝜕𝑒1






= 𝜕𝑓′(𝑒1)𝐴𝜕𝑒1 𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1)𝐵 − 𝑓′(𝑒1)𝐴𝜕𝜆2𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1)𝐵𝜕𝑒1[𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1)𝐵]2 < 0. 
 
First order with respect to 𝜆, we have 
𝜕𝑓′(𝑒1)𝐴
𝜕𝜆
= −4 �14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(1 − 𝑒1) − 12�2� (1 − 2𝑝)2 �𝑓1(1 − 𝑒1) − 12�2 𝜆 < 0. 
𝜕𝜆2𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1)𝐵
𝜕𝜆






= 𝜕𝑓′(𝑒1)𝐴𝜕𝜆 𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1)𝐵 − 𝑓′(𝑒1)𝐴𝜕𝜆2𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1)𝐵𝜕𝜆[𝜆2𝑓′(𝑡 − 𝑒1)𝐵]2 < 0. 
 
Thus 𝑒1 should be decreased by the sender to obtain maximum expectation utility as 𝛼2 𝛼1⁄  
increases or 𝜆 increases.  
Specially, 
𝑓1′(𝑒1)[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] �14 − (1 − 2𝑝)2𝜆2 �𝑓1(𝑡 − 𝑒1) − 12�2�2





(1) α2 α1⁄ = 1 if and only if [1 − 2f1(e1)] [1 − 2f1(t − e1)]⁄ = λ. 
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(2) α2 α1⁄ > 1 if and only if [1 − 2f1(e1)] [1 − 2f1(t − e1)]⁄ > 𝜆. 
(3) α2 α1⁄ < 1 if and only if [1 − 2f1(e1)] [1 − 2f1(t − e1)]⁄ < 𝜆. 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
(1) Consider 𝑟 = 1  max
𝑦2
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑟 = 1),𝛽2) = max
𝑦2




= −2𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1)(𝑦2 − 0 − 𝛽2) − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)(𝑦2 − 1 − 𝛽2)= −2[𝑦2 − 𝛽2 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)]. 
We obtain a critical value  




= −2 < 0 
Thus  
𝑦2(𝑟 = 1) = 𝛽2 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1) = 𝛽2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑓(𝑒1) − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))𝑝 + (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)) 
is a maximum point value point. 
 max
𝑦2
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑟 = 1),𝛽2) = max
𝑦2
 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1)[−(𝑦2 − 0 − 𝛽2)2] + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)[−(𝑦2 − 1 − 𝛽2)2] = −𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)2 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)(𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1) − 1)2 = −𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)2
− 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)([𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)]2 − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1) + 1) 
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= −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)�1 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)� = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1) 
 
(2) Consider 𝑟 = 0  max
𝑦2
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑟 = 0),𝛽2) = max
𝑦2




= −2𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0)(𝑦2 − 0 − 𝛽2) − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)(𝑦2 − 1 − 𝛽2)= −2[𝑦2 − 𝛽2 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)]. 
We obtain a critical value  
𝑦2(𝑟 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑝(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))1 − 𝑝 − (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)). 
Second derivative 
𝑑2𝐸𝑉(𝜃, 𝑦2(𝑟 = 0),𝛽2)
𝑑2𝑦2
= −2 < 0. 
Thus  
𝑦2(𝑟 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑝(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))1 − 𝑝 − (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)) 
is a maximum point value point. 
 max
𝑦2
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑟 = 0),𝛽2) = max
𝑦2
 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0)[−(𝑦2 − 0 − 𝛽2)2] + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)[−(𝑦2 − 1 − 𝛽2)2] = −𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)2 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)(𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0) − 1)2 = −𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)2




Proof of Lemma 4 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝛼{[𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 0)(𝑦2(0) − 0)2 + 𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 0)(𝑦2(1) − 0)2]𝑃(𝜃 = 0)+ [𝑃(𝑟 = 0|𝜃 = 1)(𝑦2(0) − 1)2 + 𝑃(𝑟 = 1|𝜃 = 1)(𝑦2(1) − 1)2]𝑃(𝜃 = 1)} = −𝛼 �𝛽22
+ −𝑝(1 − 𝑝)�𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)��1 − 𝑓(𝑒1) − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)�
�𝑝 + (1 − 2𝑝)�𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)���1 − 𝑝 − (1 − 2𝑝)�𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)��� = −𝛼 �𝛽22 + �𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)� 
First derivative with respect to 𝑒1, we have 
𝜕𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2]
𝜕𝑒1
= 𝜕 − 𝛼 −𝑝(1 − 𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))(1 − 𝑓(𝑒1) − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))[𝑝 + (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))][1 − 𝑝 − (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))]
𝜕𝑒1
 
= 𝛼𝑝(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 2𝑝)2�1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1) − 2𝑓(𝑒2) + 4𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)�[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒2)]𝑓′(𝑒1)[𝑝 + (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))]2[1 − 𝑝 − (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))]2> 0. 
First derivative with respect to 𝑒2, we have  
𝜕𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2]
𝜕𝑒1
= 𝜕 − 𝛼 −𝑝(1 − 𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))(1 − 𝑓(𝑒1) − 𝑓(𝑒2) + 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))[𝑝 + (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))][1 − 𝑝 − (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))]
𝜕𝑒1
 




Proof of Proposition 6 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ≤ 1. 
The Lagrangian can be written 
𝐿(𝑒1, 𝑒2;𝛿) = −𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] + 𝛿(1 − 𝑒1 − 𝑒2). 
Kuhn-Trucker conditions are 
𝛿 ≥ 0,1 − 𝑒1 − 𝑒2 ≥ 0 with CS 
𝜕𝐿(𝑒1, 𝑒2; 𝛿)
𝜕𝑒1
= 𝜕 − 𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] + 𝛿(1 − 𝑒1 − 𝑒2)
𝜕𝑒1= 𝛼𝑝(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 2𝑝)2�1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1) − 2𝑓(𝑒2) + 4𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)�[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒2)]𝑓′(𝑒1)[𝑝 + (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))]2[1 − 𝑝 − (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))]2
− 𝛿 = 0 
𝜕𝐿(𝑒1, 𝑒2; 𝛿)
𝜕𝑒2
= 𝜕 − 𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] + 𝛿(1 − 𝑒1 − 𝑒2)
𝜕𝑒2= 𝛼𝑝(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 2𝑝)2�1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1) − 2𝑓(𝑒2) + 4𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2)�[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1)]𝑓′(𝑒2)[𝑝 + (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))]2[1 − 𝑝 − (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑓(𝑒1) + 𝑓(𝑒2) − 2𝑓(𝑒1)𝑓(𝑒2))]2
− 𝛿 = 0 
Combining above two equations, we have [1 − 2𝑓(𝑒2)]𝑓′(𝑒1) = [1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1)]𝑓′(𝑒2) 
𝑓′(𝑒1)[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒1)] = 𝑓′(𝑒2)[1 − 2𝑓(𝑒2)] 
Since 𝑓′(∙)/[1 − 2𝑓(∙)] is an increasing function. 
Thus we have  
𝑒1 = 𝑒2 ≤ 𝑡/2 ≤ 1/2 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Proposition 7 




𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑟 = 1),𝛽2)= max
𝑦2




= −2𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1)(𝑦2 − 𝛽2) − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)(𝑦2 − 1 − 𝛽2)= −2[𝑦2 − 𝛽2 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)]. 
We obtain a critical value  




= −2 < 0 
Thus  
𝑦2(𝑟 = 1) = 𝛽2 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1) = 𝛽2 + 𝑝 �12 − 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�12 + (1 − 2𝑝)𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] 
is a maximum point value point. 
 max
𝑦2
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑟 = 1),𝛽2) = max
𝑦2
 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1)[−(𝑦2 − 0 − 𝛽2)2] + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)[−(𝑦2 − 1 − 𝛽2)2] = −𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)2 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)(𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1) − 1)2 = −𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)2
− 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)([𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)]2 − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1) + 1) = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)�1 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)� = −𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1) 
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 (2) Consider 𝑟 = 0,  max
𝑦2
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑟 = 0),𝛽2) = max
𝑦2




= −2𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0)(𝑦2 − 0 − 𝛽2) − 2𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)(𝑦2 − 1 − 𝛽2)= −2[𝑦2 − 𝛽2 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)]. 
We obtain a critical value  
𝑦2(𝑟 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑝 �12 + 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�12 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]. 
Second derivative 
𝑑2𝐸𝑉(𝜃, 𝑦2(𝑟 = 0),𝛽2)
𝑑2𝑦2
= −2 < 0. 
Thus  
𝑦2(𝑟 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0) = 𝛽2 + 𝑝 �12 + 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�12 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] 
is a maximum point value point. 
 max
𝑦2
𝐸𝑉(𝜃,𝑦2(𝑟 = 0),𝛽2) = max
𝑦2
 𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0)[−(𝑦2 − 0 − 𝛽2)2] + 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)[−(𝑦2 − 1 − 𝛽2)2] = −𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)2 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)(𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0) − 1)2 = −𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)2




Proof of Lemma 5 








+ 𝑝(1 − 𝑝) �12 + 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]� �12 − 𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�
�










𝛽2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑝) �14 − �𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�
2




= −𝛼 �𝛽22 + �𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 1)𝑃(𝜃 = 0|𝑟 = 0)𝑃(𝜃 = 1|𝑟 = 0)�. 
 
First derivative with respect to 𝑒1, we have 
𝜕𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2]
𝜕𝑒1
= −4𝛼[𝑝(1 − 𝑝)]2𝛾2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2 [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]𝑓1′(𝑒1)
�
14 − �(1 − 2𝑝)𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�2�2 > 0. 
First derivative with respect to 𝑒2 
𝜕𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2]
𝜕𝑒2
= 2𝛼[𝑝(1 − 𝑝)]2𝛾2[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 𝑓1′(𝑒2)
�
14 − �(1 − 2𝑝)𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�2�2 > 0. 
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First derivative with respect to 𝜆 
Let 𝑀 = �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] 
𝜕𝑝(1 − 𝑝) �14 − �𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�2�
𝜕𝜆
= 𝜕𝑝(1 − 𝑝) �14 − [𝛾𝑀]2�
𝜕𝜆
= −2𝑝(1 − 𝑝)𝑀2𝛾, 
𝜕
14 − �(1 − 2𝑝)𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�2
𝜕𝜆
= 𝜕 �14 − [(1 − 2𝑝)𝛾𝑀]2�
𝜕𝜆
= −2(1 − 2𝑝)2𝑀2𝛾 
𝜕𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2]
𝜕𝜆
= −𝛼 𝜕𝑝(1 − 𝑝) �14 − [𝛾𝑀]2�𝜕𝜆 �14 − [(1 − 2𝑝)𝛾𝑀]2� − 𝜕 �14 − [(1 − 2𝑝)𝛾𝑀]2�𝜕𝜆 𝑝(1 − 𝑝) �14 − [𝛾𝑀]2�
�
14 − [(1 − 2𝑝)𝛾𝑀]2�2  
= −𝛼−2𝑝(1 − 𝑝)𝑀2𝛾 �14 − [(1 − 2𝑝)𝛾𝑀]2� + 2(1 − 2𝑝)2𝑀2𝛾𝑝(1 − 𝑝) �14 − [𝛾𝑀]2�
�
14 − [(1 − 2𝑝)𝛾𝑀]2�2  
= −𝛼 𝑝(1 − 𝑝)𝑀2𝛾{−2 �14 − [(1 − 2𝑝)𝛾𝑀]2� + 2(1 − 2𝑝)2 �14 − [𝛾𝑀]2�}
�
14 − [(1 − 2𝑝)𝛾𝑀]2�2  = −𝛼 −2[𝑝(1 − 𝑝)]2𝑀2𝛾
�
14 − [(1 − 2𝑝)𝛾𝑀]2�2 > 0 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Proposition 8 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑒1, 𝑒2 − 𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ≤ 1. 
The Lagrangian can be written 
𝐿(𝑒1, 𝑒2;𝛿) = −𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] + 𝛿(1 − 𝑒1 − 𝑒2). 
Kuhn-Trucker conditions are 
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𝛿 ≥ 0,1 − 𝑒1 − 𝑒2 ≥ 0 with CS 
𝜕𝐿(𝑒1, 𝑒2; 𝛿)
𝜕𝑒1
= 𝜕 − 𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] + 𝛿(1 − 𝑒1 − 𝑒2)
𝜕𝑒1
= −4𝛼[𝑝(1 − 𝑝)]2𝛾2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2 [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]𝑓1′(𝑒1)
�
14 − �(1 − 2𝑝)𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�2�2 − 𝛿 = 0 
𝜕𝐿(𝑒1, 𝑒2; 𝛿)
𝜕𝑒2
= 𝜕 − 𝐸[𝛼(𝑦2 − 𝜃)2] + 𝛿(1 − 𝑒1 − 𝑒2)
𝜕𝑒2
= 2𝛼[𝑝(1 − 𝑝)]2𝛾2[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 𝑓1′(𝑒2)
�
14 − �(1 − 2𝑝)𝛾 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]�2�2 − 𝛿 = 0 
Combining above two equations, we have 
−4 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12�2 [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]𝑓1′(𝑒1) = 2[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]2 �𝑓1(𝑒2) − 12� 𝑓1′(𝑒2) 
−[2𝑓1(𝑒2) − 1]𝑓1′(𝑒1) = [1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)]𝑓1′(𝑒2) 
𝑓1′(𝑒1)[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒1)] = 𝑓1′(𝑒2)[1 − 2𝑓1(𝑒2)] 
Since 𝑓′(∙)/[1 − 2𝑓(∙)] are increasing function. 
Thus we have  















We construct a simple model of direct democracy with supermajority rule and different 
preference intensities for two sides of a referendum: reform versus status quo. Two parties spend 
money and effort to mobilize their voters. We characterize the set of pure strategy Nash 
equilibria. We investigate the optimal majority rule that maximizes voters’ welfare. Using an 
example, we show that if the preference intensity of the status quo side is relatively high, the 
higher preference intensity of the status quo side, the higher the optimal majority rule. While, if 
the preference intensity of status quo side is relatively low, the optimal majority rule decreases if 
the preference intensity of the status quo side increases. We also show that when the preference 
intensity of the status quo side is higher, or the easiness to mobilize voters on the status quo side 
is lower, the optimal majority rule is more likely to be supermajority.    
 









A referendum is a mechanism through which all citizens collectively make a decision on major 
issues. Recent examples include the British vote on EU membership in 2016 (commonly known 
as “Brexit”) and the Scottish vote on UK membership in 2014. Since the Second World War, 
most of the world's countries are moving towards a greater use of referenda, and paying more 
attention to designs and implementation of referenda. Referenda have become an established 
mechanism for decision-making in democratic systems.  
Despite its wide use, the adoption of referenda as a decision mechanism is often 
controversial. Outcomes of referenda are sometimes far from voters’ expectations. Two recent 
instances are the shock Brexit vote and the failure of the Italian constitutional reforms. If not 
properly designed and managed, referenda have the potential of causing division and instability 
in society. 
    Take the Brexit referendum as an example. In 2016, the United Kingdom held a referendum 
on June 23 to decide whether the UK should leave or remain in the European Union. The 
outcome was that 17.4 million people, or 51.9 per cent of the participants, voted to leave the EU 
while 48.1 per cent, or 16.1 million people, voted to stay. Leave won by 51.9% to 48.1%. The 
referendum turnout was 72.21%, with more than 30 million people voting. Leave scored a 
narrow victory over Remain. On the day after the referendum, Prime Minister Cameron 
announced his resignation. More than 4 million people signed a petition calling for a second EU 
referendum to be held. The petition reads: “we the undersigned call upon HM Government to 
implement a rule that if the remain or leave vote is less than 60% based a turnout less than 75% 
there should be another referendum.” However, the British government formally rejected the 
petition on July 9, 2016. The Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff considered the Brexit vote as a 
democratic failure: “The real lunacy of the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union 
was not that British leaders dared to ask their populace to weigh the benefits of membership 
against the immigration pressures it presents. Rather, it was the absurdly low bar for exit, 
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TABLE 3.1 Majority Provisions on Referenda in Established Western Democracies* 
Australia Geographical requirement: majority of votes and majority of states 
Austria Simple majority 
Belgium No provisions for referendums 
Canada Under debate 
Denmark Registered voter requirement: 30% of voters, 40% of voters on constitutional changes 
France Simple majority 
Finland Simple majority 
Germany No provisions for referendums 
Iceland Simple majority 
Ireland  Simple majority 
Italy Turnout requirement: 50% of the registered voters 
Luxembourg Simple majority 
Malta Simple majority 
Netherlands Simple majority 
Switzerland Geographical requirement: simple majority and majority of cantons 
United Kingdom Simple majority (40% of registered voters in 1979) 
USA No provisions for nationwide referendums 
*A Comparative Study of Referendums Qvortrup 2005 P.171 
 
requiring only a simple majority. Given voter turnout of 70%, this meant that the leave campaign 
won with only 36% of eligible voters backing it.” 
Referenda are often criticized for two reasons. The first reason is that many countries adopt 
the simple majority rule. Qvortrup (2005, p171) provides a list of majority provisions in 
established Western Democracies. See TABLE 3.1 for a list of the threshold requirements for 
referenda held in established Western democracies. 
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TABLE 3.2 Referenda with Close Results 
Year Referendum Outcome 
1992 The Danish Maastricht referendum 49.3-50.7 per cent 
1992 The French Maastricht Treaty referendum 51-49 per cent 
1995 The Quebec Secession referendum 49.4-50.6 per cent 
1995 The Irish Divorce referendum 50.3-49.7 per cent 
2014 Scottish independence referendum 44.7-55.3 per cent 
2016 The Brexit referendum 51.9-48.1 per cent 
 
The second reason is that referenda often produce close outcomes. “A close result threatens 
the legitimacy of the outcome” (Qvortrup 2005, 174). Former Canadian Prime Minister Jean 
Chretien once said that 50 percent plus one vote could split a country. There are a handful of 
examples of referendums showed on TABLE 3.2 that were decided by a whisker.  
The above two problems make it worthwhile to investigate the determining factors of the 
outcome of referenda and consider how referenda should be optimally designed. As is well 
known, some restrictions are relatively uncontroversial in a democratic system, such as the 
encouragement of voting, the location of the polling station, and the size of the ballots. However, 
there are some controversial restrictions imposed in the referendum process in order to ensure a 
fair outcome, such as limits on campaign expenditures, disclosure laws, super-majority 
requirements, and higher signature requirements. Take for example super-majority provisions, 
known from the UK and Italy, which led to the defeat of several laws in Italy and to the defeat of 
the devolution proposal for Scotland in the UK.  
    Another important factor to consider is the true meaning of democracy. The famous 
commentator on American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, talked a great deal in his book 
Democracy in America about the tyranny of the majority. This is when majority rule - the basis 
of democracy - ends up perverting democracy by forcing injustice on the minority. For example, 
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Proposition 8, a California ballot proposition was passed in 2008 to amend the California 
constitution and ban gay marriages, which was later ruled unconstitutional by the Federal courts, 
because it was viewed to purported to re-remove rights from a disfavored class only, with 
no rational basis. 
    Joseph Stiglitz mentioned, “On both sides of the Channel, politics should be directed at 
understanding the underlying sources of anger. Also how, in a democracy, the political 
establishment could have done so little to address the concerns of so many citizens, and figuring 
out how to do that now: to create within each country, and through cross-border arrangements, a 
new, more democratic Europe, which sees its goal as improving the wellbeing of ordinary 
citizens.” 
    This paper mainly focuses the following question: How to obtain the optimal majority rule 
that maximizes voters’ welfare, in order to reflect the superiority of the referendum and make the 
results of the referendum convincing? We show that it is necessary to strengthen research on the 
supermajority requirement of referendum and the optimization expectation payoff of all voters. 
In addition, the outcome of the referendum must be a clear expression of a will by a clear 
majority of participants. The Government should stipulate a specific percentage below which the 
result of a referendum becomes legally void. 
    This paper mainly analyzes the effect of the optimal majority rule in referenda. Our model 
is similar with a group turnout model developed by Herrera and Mattozzi (2010) based on 
Snyder (1989) and Shachar and Nalebuff (1999), where two opposed parties spend effort to 
mobilize their supporters to the polls, while facing aggregate uncertainty on the voters’ 
preferences. Herrera and Mattozzi (2010) mainly analyze how a participation requirement affects 
the distribution of voting outcomes. We updated their model by introducing new factors, such as 
supermajority rule and different intensities preference of two sides in referenda: reform versus 
status quo, and ignoring participation requirement.  
    The main results of this paper are as following. First, we introduce a majority rule which 
 108 
affect the probability that alternative reform is selected, and different intensities of preference of 
two sides of a referendum: reform versus status quo. By characterizing the set of pure strategy 
Nash equilibriums, we show that the parties could stipulate upper bound of campaign funds to 
spend, which depend on the payoff of parties receive if their preferred alternative is chosen. The 
higher the payoffs of parties receive, the higher upper bound of campaign fund to spend is 
stipulated.  
Second, we maximize the welfare of all voters to obtain the threshold value of the 
proportion of voters support policy reform, and get a general formula of the optimal majority rule 
in referenda.  
Third, using an example, we obtain the special optimal majority rule. With the method of 
comparative analysis, we find there is a critical value of the preference intensity of the status quo 
side. The optimal majority rule is inversely proportional to the preference intensity of the status 
quo side as the preference intensity of the status quo low enough, while the optimal majority rule 
is proportional to the preference intensity of the status quo as the preference intensity of the 
status quo side high enough.  
Also, there exists a critical value of the ratio of the easiness to mobilize of reform to status 
quo. The optimal majority rule is proportional to payoff of reform party receives as the ratio of 
the easiness to mobilize of reform to status quo low enough, while the optimal majority rule is 
inversely proportional to as payoff of reform party receives as the ratio of the easiness to 
mobilize of reform to status quo high enough. 
Under the analysis of supermajority requirement, we obtain one necessary and sufficient 
condition and some judgement rules. For example, we show that when it is easier for the reform 
side to mobilize, then the optimal majority rule is more likely to be supermajority.    
In our paper, the intuition “High turnout is a result of increased effort that parties exert” is 
supported by the empirical work of Gerald H. Kramer (1971) and Peter W. Wielhouwer and Brad 
Lockerbie (1994), who show that respondents who were contacted by the parties are more likely 
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to participate. Thus efforts must be made to ensure that the electorate is as wide and as inclusive 
as possible. Above intuition also is supported by the theoretical work by Shachar and Nalebuff 
(1999) show that participation rate and political parties’ efforts are a positive function of 
predicted closeness and a negative function of the voting population size. 
Our maximization problem is similar to welfare analysis from Osborne and Turner (2010), 
who analyze welfare of all agents. In their paper they study how a referendum or a cost benefit 
analysis leads to higher welfare, and show that the outcome of a cost benefit analysis is superior 
when individuals have diverse preferences but similar information, whereas the outcome of a 
referendum is superior when individuals have similar preferences but different degrees of 
uncertainty. While we investigate the optimal majority rule that maximizes voters’ welfare. We 
show that if the intensity preference of the status quo side becomes higher, the optimal majority 
rule should not always be stipulate higher by government. 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is model. We focus on pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium, optimal analysis of party campaign funding allocation problem, and the voters’ 
expectation optimization problem. We also analyze the specific optimal majority rule M and 
supermajority requirement through an example. Section 3 is conclusion. We summarize results of 




3.2.1 Model Setup    
Consider a direct democracy model, the individuals legally eligible to vote in a society. Each 
individual can only choose between two alternatives: r (reform) and s (status quo). Government 
selects a majority rule M ∈  (0,1], defining the fraction of voters that must approve a policy 
proposed to replace the status quo. The unanimity rule, for example, is defined by M = 1, while 
M = 1/2 is the simple majority rule.  
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    There are two exogenously given parties supporting policies r and s, and a continuum of 
voters of measure 1, of which a proportion ?̃? ∈  [0,1] supports policy r, and the remaining 
supports policy s. Here ?̃? is a random variable with uniform distribution. Each voter has a 
personal cost of voting 𝑐 ∈ [0,1] that is also drawn from a uniform distribution. 
Parties decide simultaneously the amount of campaign funds to spend (equivalently, the 
amount of effort to exert) to mobilize voters in order to win the referendum. The parties’ 
objective functions are  
 
𝜋𝑅(𝑥𝑟 , 𝑥𝑠) = 𝐵𝑃 − 𝑥𝑟 
𝜋𝑠(𝑥𝑟 , 𝑥𝑠) = 𝛽𝐵(1 − 𝑃) − 𝑥𝑠 
 
Where P is the (endogenous) probability that alternative r is selected. 𝑥𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥𝑠 are spending of 
parties r and s, respectively. Consider different payoffs that parties receive, B>0 is the payoff of 
reform party receives, and 𝛽𝐵 > 0 is the payoff of status quo party receives where 𝛽 is the 
preference intensity of party and voters in favor of status quo. 
Voters decide whether to vote in referendum or not depending a benefit from the party and 
cost of voting. We assume that voters receive a benefit from voting their preferred policy that is 
strictly concave in parties’ mobilization efforts. In particular, if a party spends x, the benefit to a 
voter who supports that party’s policy is 𝜌𝑖  (𝑥):ℝ+ →  [0,1], 𝑖 = 1, 2 is continuous, twice 




′ (𝑥) = 0, lim
𝑥→0
𝑥𝜌𝑖
′′ (𝑥) = 0, lim
𝑥→∞
𝜌𝑖
′ (𝑥) = 0, lim
𝑥→∞
𝜌𝑖(𝑥) = 1 
 
This specification is equivalent to having parties’ expenditures affect individual cost of voting. 
For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that 𝜌𝑖  (0) = 0.  
    Let us denote 𝜌1(𝑥) is the benefit to a voter who supports policy r, and 𝜌2(𝑥) is the 
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benefit to a voter who supports policy s. For a given level of spending 𝑥𝑟, a voter who support 
policy r and has a voting cost equal to c votes for alternative r if and only if 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) ≥ 𝑐. 
Because this holds for fraction 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) of the voters supporting policy r, the vote share for that 
policy (as a fraction of the total population) is 𝑣𝑅 = ?̃?𝜌1(𝑥𝑟). Likewise, the vote share for policy 
s is 𝑣𝑆 = (1 − ?̃?)𝜌2(𝑥𝑠). 
The probability that alternative r is selected is: 
 
𝑃 = Pr � 𝑣𝑅
𝑣𝑅 + 𝑣𝑆 ≥ 𝑀� = Pr� ?̃?𝜌1(𝑥𝑟)?̃?𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + (1 − ?̃?)𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) ≥ 𝑀 �= Pr�?̃? ≥  𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)
�
1
𝑀− 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)�＝1－ 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)�1𝑀 − 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) 
 
Note that P is represented as a function of 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) and 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) for any given M, and is 
continuous in its arguments on the whole space �𝜌1(𝑥𝑟),𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)� ∈ [0,1]2.  
 
Characteristics of P (M): The probability 𝑃(𝑀)  is decreasing in M; the value of P is 
determined as follows. 
 
𝑃(𝑀) = 1－ 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)
�
1









⎧= 0                                                   𝑀＝1< 12             𝜌1(𝑥𝑟)𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) < 𝑀 < 1= 12                    𝑀 =  𝜌1(𝑥𝑟)𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)> 12            0 < 𝑀 <  𝜌1(𝑥𝑟)𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)
→ 1                                                𝑀 → 0
  
 




                      𝜌1(𝑥𝑟)               
                                               𝑀 =  𝜌1(𝑥𝑟)
𝜌1(𝑥𝑟)+𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)   
                     1                         𝑃(𝑀) = 1/2 
                         𝑃(𝑀) > 1/2            
 
                                 𝑃(𝑀) < 1/2   
(0,0)                 1      𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)  
FIGURE 3.1 Probability of approval 
 
Note that P is continuous in its arguments on the whole space �𝜌1(𝑥𝑟),𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)� ∈ [0,1]2. If M=1, 
that is, there is a unanimity rule, the probability of the reform policy is selected is zero. If 
𝑀 → 0, that is, there is no majority rule, the probability of the reform policy is selected close to 
1. As M increases, the line rotates around the origin counter clockwise, and on the line the 
probability that the reform policy is selected is equal to 1/2, and below the line the probability 
that the reform policy is selected is below 1/2, and above the line the probability that the reform 
policy is selected is above 1/2.  
 
3.2.2 Equilibrium Characterization 
Considering Parties Behavior, we start by focusing on pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 1 (Nash Equilibrium) A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of parties is the positive 
spending profile 𝐶 ≡ (𝑥𝑟�, 𝑥𝑠� ), which satisfies the following two equations 




− 1� 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)𝜌1′(𝑥𝑟) = [�1𝑀 − 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)]2 
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The proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix. 
 
Corollary 1 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑀 → 1 𝑜𝑟 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑥𝑠(𝑀),𝑥𝑟(𝑀))  →  (0, 0) 
 
The proof of Corollary 1 is provided in Appendix. Corollary 1 means if the majority rule close to 
one or zero, the best respond of the reform party and status quo party have corner solution (0,0). 
 
Corollary 2 There exists a majority rule M to obtain maximum value of spending profile 𝐶 ≡(𝑥𝑟∗, 𝑥𝑠∗) in the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where  
𝜌1
′ (𝑥𝑟∗)
𝜌1(𝑥𝑟∗) = 𝛽𝜌2′ (𝑥𝑠∗)𝜌2(𝑥𝑠∗) = 4𝐵 
 
The proof of Corollary 2 is provided in Appendix. Corollary 2 represents that the party sides 
have a unique best respond spending profile with each other for any M from zero to one. Among 
those unique profiles, we have a maximum value of spending profile given a specific value M. 
 
Corollary 3 ℎ𝑖(𝑥) = 𝜌𝑖′(𝑥) 𝜌𝑖(𝑥)⁄  is a decreasing function in x. 
 
The proof of Corollary 3 is provided in Appendix. The parties could stipulate upper bound of 
campaign funds to spend depend on the payoff of parties receive if their preferred alternative is 
chosen. The higher payoff of reform party receive, the high upper bound of campaign funds to 
spend is stipulated. 
 
3.2.3 Welfare Maximization  




Problem. The maximization problem for the expectation payoff of all voters  
𝑈(𝑀) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑀




𝑀 − 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) 
 
Note that 𝐸?̃?≥𝐾[?̃?] represents the expectation payoff of voters in favor of policy r when policy r 
is chosen, and 𝛽𝐸?̃?≤𝐾[1 − ?̃?] represents the expectation payoff of voters in favor of policy s 
when policy s is chosen. Here K is a threshold point of the proportion of voters support policy r; 
parameter 𝛽 is the preference intensity of the voters in favor of status quo. Clearly, it shows that 
the higher 𝛽, the higher expectation payoff of voters in favor of status quo, and the higher 
expectation payoff of all voters. Moreover, if 0 < 𝛽 < 1, i.e. the preference intensity of the 
voters in favor of status quo is lower than the voters in favor of reform, then the expectation 
payoff of voters in favor of reform is higher than the voters in favor of status quo; if 𝛽 > 1, then 
expectation payoff of voters in favor of reform is lower than the voters in favor of status quo. 
 
Proposition 2 (Social Welfare) The expectation payoff of all voters’ reaches the maximum value 
if and only if the threshold value 𝐾 = 𝛽 (𝛽 + 1)⁄ , i.e. the optimal majority rule satisfies the 
following equation 
𝑀 = 𝛽1 + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) 





𝐸?̃?≥𝐾[?̃?] + 𝛽𝐸?̃?≤𝐾[1 − ?̃?]＝� 𝑟1
𝐾
𝑑𝑟 + � 𝛽(1 − 𝑟)𝐾
0
𝑑𝑟 = 𝑟22 �1𝐾  + 𝛽 �𝑟 − 𝑟22 � �𝐾0  = 12 − 𝐾22 + 𝛽 �𝐾 − 𝐾22 � = 12 + 𝛽𝐾 − (𝛽 + 1)2 𝐾2
= − (𝛽 + 1)2 �𝐾 − 𝛽𝛽 + 1�2 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽 + 12(𝛽 + 1)  





𝑀 − 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) = 𝛽𝛽 + 1 
Then 
𝑀 = 𝛽𝜌1(𝑥𝑟)
𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) = 𝛽1 + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) 
⊡ 
 
Note that if the preference intensity of the status quo side 𝛽 becomes higher, we need the higher 
threshold value K, and gain the higher value of the expectation payoff of all voters 𝑈(𝑀). 
Specifically, if the preference intensity of the status quo side 𝛽 = 0, it means there is no benefit 
to voters in favor of status quo, so the threshold value K=0 and a majority rule M=0 which 
means the party in favor of status quo will not spend campaign funds to mobilize voter. Depend 
on the Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, the best respond of party reform to party status quo is to 
also not spend campaign funds to mobilize voter. Thus the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of 
parties is the positive spending profile 𝐶 = (0,0) as 𝛽 = 0 while the expectation payoff of all 
voters 𝑈(𝑀) = 1/2. Please recall corollary 1. 
 
2.4. An Example 
Consider the case in which 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) = 1 − 𝑒−𝛼1𝑥𝑟  and 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) = 1 − 𝑒−𝛼2𝑥𝑠 ,  where 𝛼1,𝛼2 
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represents the easiness to mobilize, i.e. the larger 𝛼, the easier to mobilize. As we have proved in 
the model, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of parties is the positive spending profile 𝐶 ≡(𝑥𝑟�, 𝑥𝑠� ), which satisfies the following two equations 
 




− 1� (1 − 𝑒−𝛼2𝑥𝑠)𝛼1𝑒−𝛼1𝑥𝑟 = ��1𝑀− 1� (1 − 𝑒−𝛼1𝑥𝑟) + (1 − 𝑒−𝛼2𝑥𝑠)�2 
 
Here we introduce parameter 𝛼 to represent benefit to voter. For example, we assume most 
young people more prefer reform, while most old people more prefer status quo. Because most 
of young people living in city have job and have to work, so they have not much time left in the 
voting queue. It seems that it is difficulty to mobilize young people than old people. Thus base 
the same effort of party, the mobilize level 𝛼 is different between status quo and reform. It is 
suitable for us to introduce 𝛼 here. 
 
Proposition 3 (Optimal Majority Rule) The expectation payoff of all voters reaches the 
maximum value if and only if the optimal majority rule  
 
𝑀∗ = 𝐵𝛽2𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1
𝐵𝛽 (𝛽 + 1)𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1 + (𝛽 + 1)2 𝛼2 
 
And the positive spending profile of parties 𝐶 ≡ (𝑥𝑟∗, 𝑥𝑠∗), where  
𝑒−𝛼1𝑥𝑟
∗ = (𝛽 + 1)2
𝛽𝐵𝛼1 + (𝛽 + 1)2 , 𝑒−𝛼2𝑥𝑠∗ = (𝛽 + 1)2𝐵𝛽2𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2 , 𝑥𝑟∗ > 0, 𝑥𝑠∗ > 0  𝑖. 𝑒. 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) = 𝛽𝐵𝛼1𝛽𝐵𝛼1 + (𝛽 + 1)2 ,𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) = 𝐵𝛽2𝛼2𝐵𝛽2𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2 
 
The proof of Proposition 3 is provided in Appendix. 
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Comparative analysis for the optimal majority rule M 
𝑀 = 𝐵𝛽2𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1
𝐵𝛽(𝛽 + 1)𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1 + (𝛽 + 1)2 𝛼2 
 
 
Corollary 4 The optimal majority rule 
𝑀 = 𝐵𝛽2𝛽𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛽
𝐵𝛽(𝛽 + 1)𝛽𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)3 = 𝛽𝛽 + 1 
as 𝛼1 = 𝛽𝛼2，which has no relation to parameter B, and equal to threshold value K.  
 
Note that the optimal majority rule M increases when the preference intensity of the status quo 
side increases if the ratio of easiness to mobilize of two sides equal to 𝛽. 
 
Corollary 5 There exists one critical value of 𝛽, when  
𝛽 ∈  [
−𝛼2 + �𝐵𝛼12𝛼2 + 2𝛼1𝛼2 + 𝛼12 + 𝛼22(𝐵𝛼1𝛼2 + 𝛼1 + 2𝛼2) , +∞] 
The optimal majority rule M increases as 𝛽 increases; when  
𝛽 ∈  [0,
−𝛼2 + �𝐵𝛼12𝛼2 + 2𝛼1𝛼2 + 𝛼12 + 𝛼22
𝐵𝛼1𝛼2 + 𝛼1 + 2𝛼2 ] 
The optimal majority rule M decreases as 𝛽 increases. 
 
The proof of Corollary 4 is provided in Appendix. Note that if the intensity preference of status 
quo 𝛽 is close to zero, the optimal majority rule M decreases if 𝛽 increases a little. Also if the 
preference intensity of the status quo side 𝛽 is high enough, the optimal majority rule M would 






FIGURE 3.2 A Numerical Example 1 
 
                      
 
 
Numerical Example 1 Given 𝛼1 = 1,𝛼2 = 2,𝐵 = 10, then  
𝑀 = 20𝛽2 + (𝛽 + 1)220𝛽(𝛽 + 1) + 3(𝛽 + 1)2 
 
Please see FIGURE 2. Note that the change of the majority rule M as 𝛽 increases from zero to 
infinity. It shows that the optimal majority rule decreases firstly, then increases as 𝛽 increases. 
 
Corollary 6 There exists one critical value of 𝛼1 𝛼2⁄ , the optimal majority rule M increases as B 
increases when 𝛼1 𝛼2⁄ < 𝛽; the optimal majority rule M decreases as B increases when 
𝛼1 𝛼2⁄ > 𝛽.  
 
The proof of Corollary 6 is provided in Appendix. Not saying that higher payoff of the party 
reform received, the lower optimal majority rule M should be stipulated. If the ratio of easiness 
to mobilize of two sides greater than 𝛽, the higher optimal majority rule M should be stipulated 






Proposition 4 (Supermajority Requirement) Referendum must satisfy supermajority 





< 𝐵𝛽 ((1/𝑠 − 1) 𝛽 − 1)(𝛽 + 1)2  
Where s is a supermajority rule with s > 1/2, 𝛼1 is the easiness to mobilize of reform, and 𝛼2 
is the easiness to mobilize of status quo party. 
 
The proof of Proposition 4 is provided in Appendix. 
 
Corollary 7 (Judgment rule for supermajority requirement) Referendum must satisfy 
supermajority requirement if any of the following conditions is standing. 
(1) 𝛼1
𝛼2














= 𝑡 ∈ �− 𝐵𝑠
4
, 0� ,𝛽 ∈  (0, −√𝐵𝑠√𝐵𝑠+4𝑡−𝐵𝑠−2𝑠𝑡






= 𝑡 ∈ (0, +∞),𝛽 ∈  [√𝐵𝑠√𝐵𝑠+4𝑡−𝐵𝑠−2𝑠𝑡
2(𝐵𝑠−𝐵+𝑠𝑡) , +∞] 
 
The proof of Corollary 7 is provided in Appendix. Note that if the easiness to mobilize of status 
quo α2 is low enough, the optimal majority rule is more likely to be supermajority. If the intensity 
preference of the status quo side 𝛽 is high enough, the optimal majority rule is more likely to be 
supermajority. 
 
Numerical Example 2 (Simple majority requirement) Referendum must have simple majority 





< Bβ (β − 1)(β + 1)2  
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The proof of Numerical Example 2 is provided in Appendix. 
 
Judgment rule for simple majority requirement of numerical example 2 Referendum must 
satisfy simple majority requirement if any of the following conditions is standing. 
(1) 𝛼1
𝛼2














= 𝑡 ∈ �− 𝐵
8
, 0� ,𝛽 ∈   (0, √𝐵−√𝐵+8𝑡
3√𝐵+√𝐵+8𝑡













This paper constructed a simple direct democracy model with majority rule and preference 
intensity of the status quo side. Focus on pure strategy Nash equilibrium theory, we show that the 
parties could stipulate upper bound of campaign fund to spend depend on the payoff of parties 
receive if their preferred alternative is chosen. Also if the majority rule close to zero or one, then 
the spending profile of two parties have corner solution, which is close to (0,0). 
    We construct a maximization problem about voter’s expectation payoff, and investigate the 
optimal majority rule. Using an example, we show the specific optimal majority rule and the 
specific spending profile of parties. 
    From the optimal majority rule, we show that if the preference intensity of the status quo 
side 𝛽 is high enough, the optimal majority rule M would higher as the preference intensity of 
the status quo side 𝛽 become higher. While if the preference intensity of the status quo side 𝛽 
is low enough, then the optimal majority rule M decreases if 𝛽 increases. In addition, the 
optimal majority rule M increases when the preference intensity of the status quo side 𝛽 
increases if the ratio of easiness to mobilize of two sides equal to 𝛽. For payoff of the party 
reform received B, not saying that higher payoff of the party reform received, the lower optimal 
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majority rule M should be stipulated, because the ratio of easiness to mobilize of two sides 
greater than 𝛽, the higher optimal majority rule M should be stipulated as B becomes higher. 
    From the supermajority requirement, we find that when the preference intensity of status 
quo side β is high enough, or the easiness to mobilize of status quo α2 is low enough, the optimal 
majority rule M is more likely to be supermajority. 
    It is conducive to the parties to rationally use of the referendum funds to gain maximum 
benefit. It is conducive to the voters to achieve the optimal expectation. It is conducive to 
government to stipulate a specific percentage (optimal majority rule), which if the result of a 
referendum below, then the result of a referendum becomes legally void. It is conducive to make 
the outcome of the referendum to better reflect the expression of public opinion. 
    In this study, the participation quorum requirement is not considered. If participation rate is 
less than a certain threshold, it may distort the public opinion from the outcome of the 
referendum. So in the future study, we could combine quorum requirement and majority rule 
together into the model, to do further analysis, make the outcome of referendum to better reflect 
voters’ optimal expectation. 
  
3.4 Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The parties’ objective functions are  
�
𝜋𝑟(𝑥𝑟 , 𝑥𝑠) = 𝐵𝑃 − 𝑥𝑟






⎧𝜋𝑟(𝑥𝑟 , 𝑥𝑠) = 𝐵(1－ 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)
�
1
𝑀 − 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)) − 𝑥𝑟
𝜋𝑠(𝑥𝑟 ,𝑥𝑠) = 𝛽𝐵 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)
�
1




𝑥𝑟� = 𝑎𝑟𝑔max (𝐵(1－ 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠� )
�
1
𝑀 − 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟�) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠� )) − 𝑥𝑟�) 
𝑥𝑠� = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝛽𝐵 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠� )
�
1
𝑀 − 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟�) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠� ) − 𝑥𝑠� ) 













𝑀 − 1� 𝜌2′ (𝑥𝑠)𝜌1(𝑥𝑟)[�1𝑀 − 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)]2 − 1 = 0
  
Then  𝐵 �1
𝑀




− 1� 𝜌2′(𝑥𝑠)𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) = [�1𝑀 − 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)]2 
Thus 
𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)𝜌1′ (𝑥𝑟) = 𝛽𝜌2′ (𝑥𝑠)𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Corollary 1 




− 1� 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)𝜌1′ (𝑥𝑟) = ��1𝑀 − 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)�2 
𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) → 0 
Put into the following equation 
𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)𝜌1′ (𝑥𝑟) = 𝛽𝜌2′ (𝑥𝑠)𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) 0 ← 𝛽𝜌2′ (𝑥𝑠)𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) 
𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) → 0 
Then 
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(𝑥𝑠(𝑀),𝑥𝑟(𝑀)) → (0, 0) 
When 𝑀 → 0, we have lim
𝑀→0










𝜋𝑠(𝑥𝑟 , 𝑥𝑠) = 0,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥𝑠(𝑀) = 0 
lim
𝑀→0









𝜋𝑟(𝑥𝑟 , 𝑥𝑠) = 𝐵,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥𝑟(𝑀) = 0  
⊡ 
Proof of Corollary 2 
By the Implicit Function Theorem 
𝑓(𝑥𝑠, 𝑥𝑟 ,𝑀) = 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)𝜌1′ (𝑥𝑟) − 𝛽𝜌2′ (𝑥𝑠)𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) = 0 






















































































































































































































= 𝜌2′ (𝑥𝑠)𝜌1′ (𝑥𝑟) − 𝛽𝜌2′′(𝑥𝑠)𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) > 0 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑥𝑟
= 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)𝜌1′′(𝑥𝑟) − 𝛽𝜌2′ (𝑥𝑠)𝜌1′ (𝑥𝑟) < 0 
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑀
= −𝐵𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)𝜌1′ (𝑥𝑟) 1𝑀2 + 2 ��1𝑀 − 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) 1𝑀2 
There exists an extreme value of spending profile 𝐶 ≡ (𝑥𝑟∗, 𝑥𝑠∗) when 𝜕𝑔𝜕𝑀 = 0, thus  
𝐵𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)𝜌1′ (𝑥𝑟) = 2 ��1𝑀 − 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) 




− 1� 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)𝜌1′(𝑥𝑟) = [�1𝑀 − 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)]2 
𝐵𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)𝜌1′ (𝑥𝑟) = 2 ��1𝑀 − 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) 
We have [�1
𝑀




− 1� 𝜌1(𝑥�) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) = 2 �1𝑀− 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) 
𝜌1(𝑥𝑟)
𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) = 𝑀1 −𝑀 








− 1� 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)𝜌1′ (𝑥𝑟) = ��1𝑀 − 1� 𝑀1 −𝑀𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) + 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)�2 
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𝜌1
′ (𝑥𝑟) = 4𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)
𝐵 �
1
𝑀 − 1� 
Put above equation into the following equation 




𝑀 − 1� = 𝛽𝜌2′ (𝑥𝑠)𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) 
𝜌2
′ (𝑥𝑠)
𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) = 4𝜌2(𝑥𝑠)𝛽𝐵 �1𝑀 − 1� 𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) = 4𝛽𝐵 �1𝑀− 1� 𝑀1 −𝑀 = 4𝛽𝐵 
𝜌1
′ (𝑥𝑟)
𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) = 𝛽𝜌2′ (𝑥𝑠)𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) = 4𝐵 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Corollary 3  
ℎ𝑖
′(𝑥) = 𝜌𝑖′′(𝑥)𝜌𝑖(𝑥) − 𝜌𝑖′(𝑥)𝜌𝑖′(𝑥)[𝜌𝑖(𝑥)]2 < 0 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Put  
𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) = 1 − 𝑒−𝛼1𝑥𝑟 = 1 − 𝑃, 𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) = 1 − 𝑒−𝛼2𝑥𝑠 = 1 − 𝑄 
Into 
𝜌1(𝑥𝑟)
𝜌2(𝑥𝑠) = 𝑀𝛽 (1 −𝑀) 
Then 1 − 𝑃1 −𝑄 = 𝑀𝛽 (1 −𝑀) 
Combine the following equations 
 �(1 − 𝑄) 𝛼1𝑃 = 𝛽𝛼2𝑄(1 − 𝑃)1 − 𝑃1 − 𝑄 = 𝑀𝛽 (1 −𝑀)   
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𝑃 = 𝛼2[𝛽(1 −𝑀) −𝑀](𝛽𝛼2 − 𝛼1)(1 −𝑀)，𝑄 = 𝛼1[𝛽(1 −𝑀) −𝑀](𝛽𝛼2 − 𝛼1)𝑀  









− 1� �1 − 𝛼1[𝛽(1 −𝑀) −𝑀](𝛽𝛼2 − 𝛼1)𝑀 �𝛼1 𝛼2[𝛽(1 −𝑀) −𝑀](𝛽𝛼2 − 𝛼1)(1 −𝑀)= ��1
𝑀




𝛽�𝛼2𝑀 − 𝛼1(1 −𝑀)�(𝛽𝛼2 − 𝛼1)𝑀 𝛼1𝛼2[𝛽(1 −𝑀) −𝑀](𝛽𝛼2 − 𝛼1)(1 −𝑀)= �(1 −𝑀)
𝑀
�𝛼2𝑀 − 𝛼1(1 −𝑀)�(𝛽𝛼2 − 𝛼1)(1 −𝑀) + 𝛽�𝛼2𝑀 − 𝛼1(1 −𝑀)�(𝛽𝛼2 − 𝛼1)𝑀 �2 
𝐵
𝛽(𝛼2𝑀 − 𝛼1(1 −𝑀))𝛼1𝛼2[𝛽(1 −𝑀) −𝑀]
𝑀(𝛽𝛼2 − 𝛼1)𝑀(𝛽𝛼2 − 𝛼1) = �(𝛼2𝑀 − 𝛼1(1 −𝑀))(1 + 𝛽)𝑀(𝛽𝛼2 − 𝛼1) �2 
𝐵𝛽𝛼1𝛼2[𝛽(1 −𝑀) −𝑀] = (𝛼2𝑀 − 𝛼1(1 −𝑀))(1 + 𝛽)2 
𝑀 = 𝐵𝛽2𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1
𝐵𝛽(𝛽 + 1)𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1 + (𝛽 + 1)2 𝛼2 
Put  
𝑀 = 𝐵𝛽2𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1
𝐵𝛽 (𝛽 + 1)𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1 + (𝛽 + 1)2 𝛼2 
Into the result  
𝑃 = 𝛼2[𝛽(1 −𝑀) −𝑀](𝛽𝛼2 − 𝛼1)(1 −𝑀) ,𝑄 = 𝛼1[𝛽(1 −𝑀) −𝑀](𝛽𝛼2 − 𝛼1)𝑀  
Then 
𝑒−𝛼1𝑥𝑟 = 𝑃 = (𝛽 + 1)2
𝐵𝛽𝛼1 + (𝛽 + 1)2，𝑒−𝛼2𝑥𝑠 = 𝑄 = (𝛽 + 1)2𝐵𝛽2𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2 
𝜌1(𝑥𝑟) = 1 − 𝑒−𝛼1𝑥𝑟 = 1 − (𝛽 + 1)2𝛽𝐵𝛼1 + (𝛽 + 1)2 = 𝐵𝛽𝛼1𝐵𝛽𝛼1 + (𝛽 + 1)2 




Proof of Corollary 5 
First derivate for 𝛽 
𝜕𝑀
𝜕𝛽
= 𝐵𝛼1𝛼2(𝐵𝛽2𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽2 − 1)𝛼1 + 2𝛽 (𝛽 + 1)𝛼2)(𝐵𝛽(𝛽 + 1)𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1 + (𝛽 + 1)2 𝛼2)2 = 0 
Since 𝐵𝛽2𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽2 − 1)𝛼1 + 2𝛽 (𝛽 + 1)𝛼2 = (𝐵𝛼1𝛼2 + 𝛼1 + 2𝛼2)𝛽2 + 2𝛼2𝛽 − 𝛼1, then 
𝛽 = −𝛼2 ± �𝐵𝛼12𝛼2 + 2𝛼1𝛼2 + 𝛼12 + 𝛼22
𝐵𝛼1𝛼2 + 𝛼1 + 2𝛼2  
When 𝛽∈ [ (−𝛼2 + �𝐵𝛼12𝛼2 + 2𝛼1𝛼2 + 𝛼12 + 𝛼22) (𝐵𝛼1𝛼2 + 𝛼1 + 2𝛼2)� , +∞], the optimal 
majority rule M increases as 𝛽 increases;  
When 𝛽 ∈  [0, (−𝛼2 + �𝐵𝛼12𝛼2 + 2𝛼1𝛼2 + 𝛼12 + 𝛼22) (𝐵𝛼1𝛼2 + 𝛼1 + 2𝛼2)� ] , the optimal 
majority rule M decreases as 𝛽 increases. 
⊡ 
 
Proof of Corollary 6 
First derivate for 𝐵 
𝜕𝑀
𝜕𝐵
= 𝛽𝛼1𝛼2(𝛽𝛼2 − 𝛼1)(𝐵𝛽𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)(𝛼1 + 𝛼2))2 = 0 
Thus the optimal majority rule M increases as B increases when 𝛼1 𝛼2⁄ < 𝛽; the optimal 
majority rule M decreases as B increases when 𝛼1 𝛼2⁄ > 𝛽.  
⊡ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
𝑀 = 𝐵𝛽2𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1
𝐵𝛽(𝛽 + 1)𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1 + (𝛽 + 1)2 𝛼2 > 𝑠 
𝐵𝛽2𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1
𝑠
> 𝐵𝛽(𝛽 + 1)𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1 + (𝛽 + 1)2 𝛼2 
𝐵𝛽((1/𝑠 − 1)𝛽 − 1)𝛼1𝛼2 > (𝛽 + 1)2 𝛼2 − (1/𝑠 − 1)(𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1 
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𝐵𝛽�(1/𝑠 − 1)𝛽 − 1�𝛼1𝛼2 > (𝛽 + 1)2(𝛼2 − (1/𝑠 − 1)𝛼1) 





< 𝐵𝛽((1/𝑠 − 1)𝛽 − 1)(𝛽 + 1)2  
⊡ 
 
Proof of Corollary 7 
First order condition 
𝜕
𝐵𝛽((1/𝑠 − 1)𝛽 − 1)(𝛽 + 1)2
𝜕𝛽
= 𝐵 �2(1𝑠 − 1)𝛽 − 1� (𝛽 + 1) − 2𝛽((1𝑠 − 1)𝛽 − 1)(𝛽 + 1)3 = 𝐵((2𝑠 − 1)𝛽 − 1)(𝛽 + 1)3  
Critical value of 𝛽 
𝛽 = 1(1/𝑠 − 1) 
Second order condition 
𝜕2
𝐵𝛽 ((1/𝑠 − 1) 𝛽 − 1)(𝛽 + 1)2
𝜕𝛽𝜕𝛽
= 𝐵 (2𝑠 − 2 2𝑠 𝛽 + 2𝛽 + 2)(𝛽 + 1)4 > 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑠 > 1/2 
Thus the shape of 𝐵𝛽 ((1/𝑠−1) 𝛽−1)(𝛽+1)2  is convex. 
𝑚𝑖𝑛








𝐵𝛽 ((1/𝑠 − 1) 𝛽 − 1)(𝛽 + 1)2 = 𝑡 
Then  
𝛽1 = √𝐵𝑠√𝐵𝑠 + 4𝑡 − 𝐵𝑠 − 2𝑠𝑡2(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵 + 𝑠𝑡) ,𝛽2 = −√𝐵𝑠√𝐵𝑠 + 4𝑡 − 𝐵𝑠 − 2𝑠𝑡2(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵 + 𝑠𝑡)  
The graph of inequality is showed on FIGURE 3. 
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Figure 3.3 Sufficient and necessary condition of Corollary 7 
 





= 𝑡 = 0 
Above the blue line  
𝛽 > 11/𝑠 − 1 
We have necessary and sufficient condition is established, thus referendum must satisfy 
supermajority requirement. 





= 𝑡 < −𝐵𝑠4  
Regardless of 𝛽, we have necessary and sufficient condition is established, thus referendum 






= 𝑡 ∈ �−𝐵𝑠4 , 0� 
Above green line 
𝛽 ∈  �0,−√𝐵𝑠√𝐵𝑠 + 4𝑡 − 𝐵𝑠 − 2𝑠𝑡2(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵 + 𝑠𝑡) � ∪  �√𝐵𝑠√𝐵𝑠 + 4𝑡 − 𝐵𝑠 − 2𝑠𝑡2(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵 + 𝑠𝑡) , +∞� 








= 𝑡 ∈ (0, +∞) 
Above red line  
𝛽 ∈  [√𝐵𝑠√𝐵𝑠 + 4𝑡 − 𝐵𝑠 − 2𝑠𝑡2(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵 + 𝑠𝑡) , +∞] 




Proof of Numerical example 2 
Proof 
𝑀 = 𝐵𝛽2𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1
𝐵𝛽(𝛽 + 1)𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1 + (𝛽 + 1)2 𝛼2 > 12 2𝐵𝛽2𝛼1𝛼2 + 2(𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1 > 𝐵𝛽(𝛽 + 1)𝛼1𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1 + (𝛽 + 1)2 𝛼2 
𝐵𝛽(𝛽 − 1)𝛼1𝛼2 > (𝛽 + 1)2 𝛼2 − (𝛽 + 1)2𝛼1 
𝐵𝛽(𝛽 − 1)𝛼1𝛼2 > (𝛽 + 1)2(𝛼2 − 𝛼1) 
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